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Abstract of Thesis 
This thesis examines some of the implications for social policy of an 
account of human nature frequently associated with liberal political 
theory. Taking as its starting point the claim that the objectives of 
social policy are contested, it seeks to develop an account of autonomy 
that will serve as a neutral 'organizational principle' around which to 
construct social policy. A particular version of personal autonomy is 
developed and defended against both abstract Kantian moral autonomy, and 
the individualism often associated with liberal theories. This project 
is pursued first through a discussion of the relationship of autonomous 
persons to 'social forms', and then through a critique of libertarian 
and 'intellectualist' accounts of autonomy. It is argued that, since 
autonomy is not only employed in the making of choices, but also in the 
implementing of those choices, it follows that the autonomous person 
must, of necessity, be viewed 'holistically' for the body is the primary 
means of implementing the choices autonomous persons make. The health of 
the body, as well as that of the mind, therefore assumes importance for 
any social policy that takes autonomy to be a fundamental objective. The 
implications for such an account of social policy are then explored in 
two ways. First, through a discussion of the phenomenon of 'medical-
ization'. Second, through a discussion of the Prevention and Health 
campaign. In the first instance, it is argued that the assumption that 
medicalization systematically undermines autonomy is ill-founded because 
theories of medicalization misunderstand what it is to be autonomous. In 
the second instance, the discussion of preventive health-care policy 
serves to illustrate the fundamentally erroneous assumptions of 
individually-focussed health-care programmes. In conclusion, it is 
argued that a unified account of autonomous persons must inevitably lead 
to a more integrated social policy. 
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Our central concern in the work that follows can be simply stated: it is 
to examine a particular account of what it is to be a human being, and 
to draw out some of the implications for social policy of that account. 
In other words, we shall be examining the practical implications of a 
theoretical construct. But although simply stated, such a task is 
fraught with difficulties. In section i of this introduction we shall 
concern ourselves with setting out some of these difficulties in order 
to make explicit at least some of the limitations of the task we shall 
be undertaking. We begin with some brief comments on what we take, at 
least within the terms of this thesis, to be the purposes that theories 
in general may be said to serve, and how they relate us to the world in 
which we live. We shall then conment briefly on our interest in the 
concept of autonomy, locating it in relation to an important dichotomy 
wi thin political theory. We next turn to a brief discussion concerning 
the reflexive mode of argument employed by a mnnber of political and 
social theorists to defend autonomy-based accounts of social policy. 
Having established (in section i) the parameters of the theSis, we turn, 
in section ii, to the thesis itself, giving a brief chapter-by-chapter 
outline of the overall argument. 
* * * * * 
i: 1be Importance of Theory 
Broad! y speaking, theories are said to serve two main purposes. They 
ei ther serve to explain reality - explain, that is, why things are as 
they are and not otherwise - or they serve to guide action. The usual 
way to state this dichotomy is to say that theories may be either 
explanatory, or they may be normative; they may be descriptive, or they 
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may be prescriptive. It is often thought good practice to keep these 
dichotomous functions apart; to conflate the two is to commit What G.E. 
Moore called (in his Principia Ethica) the 'naturalistic fallacy'. The 
error is said to consist in deriving ethical conclusions (statements 
about what one ought to do) from factual premises (statements about What 
is the case)1. A crude example will illustrate the point. Jeremy 
Bentham's 'principle of utility' (that all human beings are placed under 
the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure) purports to 
be a descriptive account of human psychology. But it does not obviously 
entail the prescriptive greatest happiness principle (act so as to 
maximise the greatest happiness of the greatest number) since it is 
possible that, in maximising the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number, one's own happiness may have to be sacrificed. It becomes clear 
then that individuals are being exhorted to act, at least on occasion, 
against their own interests, and this they are held to be psycho-
logically incapable of doing2• In other words, the prescriptive part of 
Bentham's theory (the greatest happiness principle) does not seem to 
follow from the descriptive part (the principle of utility) and might in 
fact be in conflict with it. 
But it is not always easy to keep the two kinds of statement distinct, 
because the way one understands or describes the world may itself entail 
certain courses of action (where ' entail' is used in a weak sense to 
avoid the implication that one is compelled so to act), or it may at 
1. 
2. 
G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1903), pp.1D-21. An earlier version can be found in David 
Hume's A Treatise of Htmm Nature, Edited by A. Selby-Bigge, second 
edition revised by P .H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978), p.469 
This point is made by Jack Lively and John Rees (Eds.), Utilitarian 
Logic and Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp.4o-42 
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least render certain courses of action inadmissible. This realisation 
can be said to have informed the writings of both Kant and Hegel, and 
possibly even Marx3• In this thesis we take the view that theories, if 
they do not obviously imply normative conclusions (conclusions about how 
we oUght to act), at least delineate the area in which action may take 
place. This is intended to be a fairly weak account of the role of 
theory, because we wish to avoid the difficulties inherent in some 
strong accounts of the role of theory, especially those difficulties 
that might be said to derive from 'constructionist' schools of thought, 
where such things as 'facts' (and 'truths') have no reality outside of 
the particular theory in which they are embedded. We do, however, accept 
that theories playa role in organising facts. The example that Popper 
gives in his Conjectures and Refutations illustrates the point that 
without some structure knowledge would be irnpossible4, but the point is 
(and this is intended to count against the constructionists) that the 
world itself provides a structure. We may illustrate what we mean by 
this with reference to the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal 
world and the noumenal world. 
For Kant, the human mind can have access only to the world of phenomena, 
the world, that is, of appearances. The noumenal world (the world of the 
3. See, for example, Marx's letter to his father of 10th November, 
1837, in David McLellan (Ed.), Karl Marx Selected Writings, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 5-9, where Marx indicates that 
the opposition of 'is' and 'ought' - a 'hallmark of idealism' -
might be overcome by a materialist philosophy. 
4. In order to illustrate the absurdity of the belief that scientific 
investigation proceeds from observation to theory, Popper asked a 
group of students to whom he was lecturing to 'Take pencil and 
paper; carefully observe, and write down what you have observed'. 
Popper, of course, had not specified to his students what it was he 
wanted them to observe. Related by Popper in Conjectures and 
Refutations, Fourth edi tion, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1972), p.46 
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'thing-in-itself') is inaccessible to the human mind, although it can be 
inferred (by any rational mind) through our experience of the phenomenal 
world. In other words, we can only ever know the apPearance of an 
object, and never the object in itself. Although the noumenal world is 
sometimes taken to be the world of ideas it should not be confused with 
the Platonic realm of the forms, where an actual object - for example, a 
chair - approximates to an ideal 'chair'. The noumenal world for Kant is 
inaccesible to experience; it is unknowable since that Which is 
knowable, for Kant, must be phenomenal 5 • Now, admittedly this is a crude 
charicature of Kant's theory of knowledge, but it would require a 
separate work (and probably several of those) adequately to do it 
justice. However, the point we wish to make is essentially 
straightforward. The question arises for Kant as to the nature of the 
relationship that might exist between the two worlds. When Kant suggests 
that we can only know the appearance of an object, and never the object 
in itself, he seems to be suggesting that the categories we, as human 
beings, impose on the world enable us to make sense of what is 
essentially shapeless and formless (since the categories of dimension -
space, time, etc. - are applied to the phenomenal world by beings with 
our particular mental capacities). Quite how we are to understand the 
notion of something transcendental (the noumenal thing-in-i tself) 
inhering in phenomenal objects is unclear. But what seems to be certain 
is that if there is indeed a relationship between the two worlds (and it 
must be said that the very idea of 'relationship' would seem to belong 
to the phenomenal world, unless we wish to see Kant - as Marx saw him -
as a mere idealist) then the noumenal world itself must be ordered in 
5. One may reasonably make the objection that, since Kant claims to 
know about the existence of the noumenal world, it too has entered 
his experience and has become phenomenal. 
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some correspondence with the phenomenal world. If this were not so, 
there would be no relationship between the two worlds. The noumenal 
world, in its shapelesseness and formlessness, would be arbitrary so 
that there would be no things-in-themselves (because the notion of 
6 
'things' and 'selves' would be meaningless). If this were the case, then 
the 'appearances' we experience in the phenomenal world would have to 
originate with us, and if there were no correspondence between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal worlds we ought to be able to construct 
whatever phenomenon we wish to 'see'. This is as a short route to the 
most radical kind of idealism - solipsism - and if it is to be avoided, 
then Kant himself must accept that the noumenal world constrains, in 
some sense, what may exist in the phenomenal world6• 
The point of this discussion is to suggest that, although we may require 
theories in order to understand the world, we must take it that the 
world is 'given'. David Hume's notion of causality also bears this out 
(and Kant, of course, saw his own theory of knowledge as in part an 
attempt to answer problems raised by Hume), for although BUrne also 
believed that human beings impose relational concepts upon the world, he 
nevertheless believed that those events to which concepts were applied 
had independent existence. Relationships of causality were a human 
imposition on objects that were nevertheless constantly conjoined. 
Theories, we may say, enable us to organise empirical data, but there 
must be empirical data for theories to work on, and the way the world is 
will constrain the theories that we have about it. This does not mean 
6. This seems to be Roger Scruton's understanding of Kant's account of 
the relationship between the two worlds. Scruton, Kant, (Oxford: 
Oxford university Press, 1982), p.45, where he suggests that the 
concept of the noumenon marks out the limits of experience. 
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that there cmmot be a variety of ways of organising empirical data, but 
it does mean that the theories do not and cannot create that empirical 
data. This would be to put the cart before the horse. Popper could 
suggest to his students that they observe, say, light-fittings, but he 
could not, by suggesting this, make them 'see' light-fittings that did 
not exist7 • 
In terms of political theory, one aspect of the world assumes some 
importance, at least within the terms of this thesis. This is the social 
context within which individuals may be said to operate, or, more 
precisely, the 'social forms' (as Raz calls them) or 'fonns of life' (as 
Wittgenstein calls them) that individuals engage with. If we are to 
begin to understand the individual in relation to his or her social 
milieu, then, as Wittgenstein suggests, we must take 'forms of life' as 
givenB. This might be thought to align us with certain 'conmtmitarian' 
thinkers (Charles Taylor, for example, or Michael Walzer, or possibly 
even Alasdair MacIntyre), and it is true that our understanding of 
'personhood' is mediated, if not through some notion of 'conmtmity' then 
at least through the notion of 'social forms' (or 'forms of life'). We 
do not, however, take the communitarian notion of 'conmtmity' to be 
equivalent to the notion of a 'social form' discussed in this work. One 
important reason for this is that we do not attribute to the notion of a 
'social form', as we understand it, the normative content that 
communitarians appear often to attribute to the notion of 'community'. 
7. We recognise that,· under certain circumstances, individuals can be 
made to 'see' things that are not there - for example, under the 
influence of hallucinatory drugs. We also recognise that one's 
expectations may lead one to interpret data in a particular, but 
erroneous, way. 
B. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953), para.217 
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Our concern, as we shall specify shortly, is with a particular aspect of 
liberal political theory. Our account of 'social forms' is derived from 
Raz, and serves essentially the same purpose here as it does for this 
thinker - it overcomes the individualistic, atomistic tendencies to 
which liberal theory is often said to fall prey. 
Communitarian theories have developed, in part at least, as a response 
to what is undoubtedly a central difficulty of liberal political theory. 
This difficulty consists in attempting to find a foundation upon which 
to construct political and social institutions (and, since this is our 
concern, social policy) given the characteristically liberal view that 
individuals are best placed to decide for themselves what is the good 
for them. The communitarian response represents an attempt to come to 
terms with the apparently foundationless impasse that liberal theory has 
led to. However, whilst acknowledging the seriousness of this debate, it 
must be said that our concern in this thesis is not with the question of 
how well-founded political theories may (or may not) be. Our concern, as 
we have already suggested, is with the implications of a particular 
theory concerning what it is to be a person. Our concern, we may say, is 
with a particular theory of human nature. There are, of course, many 
accounts of human nature available to political and social theorists9• 
The point of developing such accounts is classically thought to be 
twofold: first, to delineate what is to be counted as the good life for 
human beings; and second, having established what this is, to 
9. Two models - 'plastic' and 'autonomous' - are discussed by Martin 
Hollis in his MOdels of Man, (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
1977), pp.1-21. See also Christopher Berry, Htwnan Nature, (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), passim; and Leslie Stevenson, Seven 'lheories of 
Human Nature, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), passim. 
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decide what form of society will best attain itlO • In this thesis we 
shall concentrate on one particular account of what it is to be a human 
being. We shall refer to this as a 'liberal' account, although we shall 
not be citing a thinker, or set of thinkers, as the 'authentic voice' of 
liberal theory (one reason for this is that liberal theory has many 
'authentic voices'). Our use of the term 'liberal' is left intentionally 
vague at this point, and the reason for this is that our interest lies 
essentially with but one aspect of some liberal accounts of human nature 
- autonomy. This vagueness, however, begs the question as to why we wish 
to retain the term 'liberal' at all. One reason for this is to signal 
that we wish to demarcate our discussion in the text from other issues 
and theories that might be thought to impinge upon our concerns. We have 
already suggested that one area of possible concern - that identified by 
the cammunitarians - is held to be outside the scope of this thesis. But 
our concern with autonomy (rather than the classic liberal concern with 
liberty) might be said to bring other theories within our scope. For 
example, Marx may be said to have had an account of autonomy at the 
heart of his political theory - at least in his earlier writings11 . 
However, for Marx autonomy (or self-determination) appears to be a 
future state, while 'liberal' accounts generally hold that individuals 
are autonomous (or at least are capable of autonomy) here and now. 
Another set of theories that fall outside the scope of this thesis are 
those broadly described as 'consequentialist'. It is often claimed in 
the field of moral philosophy that deontological theories are 
10. This is clearly expressed in the opening paragraph of Aristotle's 
Politics, Translated and Introduced by Ernest Barker, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1946), p.l 
11. See Chapter Three, section i(b) , for a discussion of an account of 
autonomy derived from Marx. 
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incompatible with consequentialist theories. This is because the former 
prioritise the rights that individuals are thought to have, while the 
latter emphasise the importance of impartially maximising the amount of 
good (however 'good' is to be defined) in the world, a position which 
(as was the case with Bentham discussed above) might on occasion 
necessitate over-riding individual rights in the name of some greater 
good. Deontological (or agent-relative) theories generally hold that 
individuals are best placed to judge what is the good for them, with the 
implication that there may be as many accOtmts of the good as there are 
individuals. Consequentialist theories, on the other hand, seek an 
impersonal accotmt of the good, thus raising the possibility that any 
individual might not agree with this accotmt12 • A criticism frequently 
made of consequentialist theories is that, in pursuing this impersonal 
accotmt of the good against individual accotmts, they belie an 
authoritarianism that deontological theories avoid (although not all 
deontological theories avoid this criticism. Even Kant's ethical theory 
can be said to place us tmder the strict authority of universal rational 
principles) . 
The connection between deontological theories and moral autonomy is 
sometimes made through Kant, though this time through his moral theory 
as set out in his Grouralwrk of the MetaphysiCS of ~ which is often 
taken to be a paradigmatic statement of the deontological position13• 
12. 
13. 
For a discussion of this debate, see the introductory essay by 
Samuel Scheffler in Scheffler (Ed.), ~~Jal j SID and Its 
Critics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9 • See also the 
deba te between J. J • C. Smart and B. Williams, published as 
Utilitarianism: For and Against, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973) 
Kant's Groundwork ••• is translated and analysed by H.J. Paton in 1he 
~ra1 Law, (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1941) 
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For Kant, to be autonomous is to be rational and therefore moral. For 
Kant, the motive of the moral agent is of parammmt importance. The 
significance of a moral act is to be weighed against the motive of the 
person performing it, regardless of consequences. For the 
consequentialist, on the other hand, the moral significance of an act is 
determined by its consequences regardless of the motive of the agent. 
However, our interest in this thesis is not with the relatively 
restricted notion of moral autonomy, but instead with the broader notion 
of personal autonomy. The reasons for focussing on personal rather than 
moral autonomy will be made clear in Chapter Two, but to anticipate the 
argument, we may state here that personal autonomy seems to us to be a 
much more fundamental concept than moral autonomy. The latter concept is 
usually a component part of a moral system (Kant's, for example), but of 
course moral systems may themselves be autonomously chosen, or rejected. 
We do not therefore accept the Kantian conflation of autonomy with 
acting morally (as opposed to immorally), since autonomous persons might 
well choose to act immorally. That moral systems may be autonomously 
chosen suggests that the choice of moral system is itself not a moral 
choice, so that personal autonomy may be said to be a prerequisite of 
morality, and if this is so it cannot itself be a moral concept. 
Our task in this thesis is not merely to explore the relationship 
between moral autonomy and personal autonomy. We are also interested in 
exploring the practical implications of the account of personal autonomy 
we seek to develop. We have already noticed (above) that the 'classic' 
account of the purpose of political and social theory is twofold -
initially to develop a theory of the good (or the good life), and then 
to describe how best to attain this good. But if the task of practical 
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politics is to secure the good life for all, and each autonomous 
individual chooses and is responsible for developing his or her own 
version of the good life, then some means of matching political 
ob jecti ves to individual ob jecti ves is required, if the authoritarianism 
entailed by consequentialist solutions to this problem is to be avoided. 
One theoretical solution to this problem utilises a reflexive mode of 
argument, modelled on that employed in H.L.A. Hart's influential essay 
"Are There Any Natural Rights? ,,14 • Hart argues that if there are any 
moral rights at all, then there must be a natural right to freedom, for 
to assert that there exists an obligation presupposes that those obliged 
must also possess that right. This form of argument has been used by 
several writers in the context of political and moral theory, in an 
attempt to establish the primacy of autonomy over other potentially 
foundational principles (such as utilitarianism). One such author states 
the argument in the following terms: 
Autonomous persons are capable of plarming and deliberation 
concerning their actions and projects. Uhless political 
theory assumed that persons were autonomous in this sense, 
there would be1go point in taking the trouble to construct such a theory. 
This type of argument is not without its difficulties. In Hart's case, a 
straightforward criticism could focus on the conditional nature of the 
argument, for one may deny that there are such things as moral rights in 
the first place16• Similarly, it is possible to deny that persons are 
14. 
15. 
16. 
H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?", in Anthony Quinton 
(Ed.), Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1967), pp.S3-66 
Albert Weale, Political 1beory and Social Policy, (London: 
Macmillan, 1983), p.45. See also Alan Gewirth, Reason and ~ty, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); and Raymond Plant, 
Harry Lesser, Peter Taylor-Gooby, Political Philo~ and Social 
ielfare, (London: Routledge and Kegan P8UI, 1980)~ latter is 
discussed at some length below, in Chapter One, sections iv(b) ami 
v, and Chapter Two, section li. 
This possibility is recognised by Hart, ibid., p. 54 
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'capable of plarming and deliberation concerning their actions', since 
this view rests on the implicit assumption that the central 
characteristics of human nature comprise of 'purposive action, self-
control and self-development' 17. An alternative account of human nature 
will then conceivably undermine the reflexive argument in favour of 
autonomy. For example, in a mechanistic universe where there is little 
or no room for free will, one would expect there to be little or no room 
for self-control. However, it is not our task here to enter into the 
complex and unresolved philosophical debate surrounding the notions of 
determinism and free-wi1118• Another potential difficulty for autonomy-
based theories is presented by the marxist notion of 'false 
consciousness', where even if one believes oneself to be in control of 
one's life, one might nevertheless be radically mistaken, one's 
understanding of oneself being a product of the prevailing ideology19. 
The 'false consciousness' thesis, with its implicit assumption that 
there is a 'real' consciousness, raises important issues concerning the 
nature and construction of reality. Such concerns, however, are well 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
17. Michael Freeden, Rights, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 
1991), p.45 
18. But see Weale's brief discussion of Hobbes with regard to this 
point, ope cit., pp.46-47. Weale suggests that Hobbes, as 
thoroughgoing a determinist as one could find, must have assumed 
some level of autonomy amongst his prospective readership, since in 
publishing his works he hoped to influence the debates with which he 
'chose' to engage. 
19. AI though this is a marxist position, it is of course disputed as to 
whether or not Marx himself endorsed it. The term' false 
consciousness' is attributed, not to Marx, but to Engels in a letter 
written to Franz Mehring on 14th July, 1893. For an accomt of some 
of the difficulties surrounding the concept, see Ted Benton, 
"Realism, Power and Objective Interests" in Keith Graham (Ed.), 
Cant Political Philo : Radical Stldies, (Cambridge: 
Cambri ge University Press, 1982 , pp. -33 
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ti. The Thesis Stated 
In Chapter One, section i we examine some of the accOlmts that are given 
by political and social theorists of society, and of the kinds of 
individuals that make up society. Such accounts will, it is argued, 
influence the way in which both political theory and social policy are 
constructed. In section ii we examine the notion of social policy, 
Characterising it by focussing on the objectives at which social policy 
is said to aim. Since there are many such objectives and they are not 
always compatible, one task of the political or social theorist is to 
find some means of arbitrating amongst them. One way in which this might 
be done would be to find a single, foundational 'organising principle' 
or objective that would perform this function. In section iii we examine 
the adequacy for this task of two of the more important objectives at 
which social policy is said to aim - the alleviation of need, and the 
securing of liberty. Neither convincingly withstands scrutiny as an 
organising principle because each requires a separate and additional 
theory in order to establish a priority of certain needs and liberties 
over others. In section iv we consider two theories of this type -
Rawls' neo-Kantian argument, set out in his A '1beory of Justice, and 
that offered by Raymond Plant, Harry Lesser and Peter Taylor-Gooby in 
their joint work Political Philosophy and Social Welfare. Although both 
theories have an account of autonomy at their centre, the Kantian 
formality of Rawls is shown to be too abstract to provide a substantive 
foundation upon which to construct social policy. Plant et al' s theory 
is also shown to be inadequate, but encounters fewer difficulties than 
Rawls'. In section v we consider some problems with the concept of moral 
autonomy employed in both of these works. It is argued that, at least 
for the purposes of deriving substantive policy proposals, the concept 
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of moral autonomy oUght to be replaced by the more pranising concept of 
personal autonomy. In section vi, the final part of this chapter, the 
substantive nature of personal autonomy is indicated through its 
relationship to the notion of a plan of life. 
Chapter Two explores in greater detail some of the issues raised in the 
previous Chapter. The first section of this chapter considers the 
'neutrality' of autonomy. Taking personal, rather than moral, autonomy 
as the focal point, the discussion in section i considers the problem of 
neutrality in respect to two important recent political theories - that 
of Jom Rawls, aspects of whose A l1!eory of Justice we will have already 
discussed (albeit in a different context and for different reasons) in 
Chapter One, and Robert Nozick' s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. In section 
ii we identify an important ambiguity in Plant et aI's account of 
autonomy, and its relationship to morality. The importance of this 
ambiguity rests on the moralistic account of autonomy given by the 
authors. In section iii the relationship between personal and moral 
autonomy is examined in some detail, through a discussion of Joseph 
Raz's 'Dle Morality of Freedan. The point of this is to establish the 
priori ty of personal autonomy over moral autonomy. But if personal 
autonomy is to be an 'organising principle' for social policy, then we 
must be in a position to substantiate the concept if we are to avoid the 
problems of conceptual formality that adhere to the Kantian notion of 
moral autonomy. For this reason, and in the final two sections of this 
chapter, we make some attempt to contextualise our account of personal 
autonomy. Section iv examines Raz' s notion of a 'social fonn', and how 
this is to be related to his account of personal autonomy. But Raz' s 
account of personal autonomy is itself confused, and his account of what 
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a t social form t consists of is shown to be vague. Section v offers some 
tentative clarification of the latter concept, and of its relation to 
the former. 
In relating our account of personal autonomy to social fonns, we seek to 
overcome the individualist tendencies of IIRlch liberal theory. 'This has 
practical import if we seek to make practical use of our account of 
personal autonomy in the fonna tion of social policy. In Chapter 'lbree 
therefore, we continue the task of contextualising personal autonomy. In 
the section i of this chapter, this project is pursued through an 
attempt to situate the concept of autonomy in relation to a tradition of 
political thought and practice - liberal democracy. This is intended to 
show that adoption of autonomy as a focal point for social policy would 
not be a revolutionary project. In order to demonstrate this, we 
distinguish our account of autonomy, centred as it is on a liberal 
tradition, from what might reasonably be said to be an account of 
autonomy with revolutionary implications. 'This is the marxist tradition. 
In section ii we examine the relationship between autonomy and liberty. 
Classically, of course, a concern with liberty is taken to be a central 
characteristic of liberal theory. However, our account of the liberal 
tradition prioritises autonomy. In section ii of this chapter, 
therefore, we attempt to clarify the relationship between liberty and 
autonomy in the context of a discussion of Berlin t s account of positive 
liberty. In section iii we examine the notion of independence in 
relation to our account of personal autonomy, and in section iv we 
examine the relationship between autonomy and rationality. The problem 
that we identify in relation to both independence and rationality is the 
tendency, inherent in liberal theory, to view individuals as atomised, 
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self-contained units. Against this we contend that the very idea of 
'personhood' must, if it is to be intelligible, make reference to a 
context, or Situation, beyond 'ruggedly' independent or rational beings. 
In section v we argue, against I intellectualist I accounts of autonomy, 
that the autonomous person must be viewed as a totality, or, what 
amounts to the same thing, that autonomy must be seen as embodied in 
material persons. This materialist aCCO'lnlt of autonomy is intended to 
avoid the idealist associations that some post-Kantian accounts might 
entail. We argue that the body is the primary means of enacting one's 
autonomous decisions, so that the condition - or health - of the body 
assumes some importance, not only for those who are thought to be 
autonomous, but also for those who are charged with the task of 
formulating social policy. The final section of this chapter - section 
vi - considers some initial difficulties in relating the notion of 
heal th to social policy, through autonomy. 
Having established the importance of health to our account of autonomy, 
we then move on, in the final two chapters of the thesiS, to discuss 
some of the implications of our aCCO'lnlt. Chapter Four examines a set of 
sociological theories that pose a potential difficulty for aCCO'lnlts of 
autonomy that focus on health. These all turn on the phenomenon of 
medicalization which is taken to be a process whereby the power, 
influence, or authority (or all of these) of the medical profession 
expands at the cost of individual autonomy. Theories of medicalization 
may be grouped into three categories. The first of these suggest that 
the rationale underlying the expansion of medical influence in society 
is professional self-interest. This self-interest largely manifests 
itself in two ways. First, it takes the form of a defence, by the 
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profession, of its scientific status. This offers the profession a means 
by which it may secure funding for itself while simultaneously enabling 
it to exclude rival medical practices. The effects of this are seen to 
be ambiguous with regard to autonomy. There is, for example, no doubt 
that having adequate choices is an important component of autonomy, and 
choice of treatment (where, for example, 'alternative' medicines are 
included in the range of health care on offer) might therefore be 
thought important to autonomy. But the question arises as to where, and 
how, one is to draw the line between medicine and quackery. The second 
manifestation of self-interest turns on the use that the medical 
profession makes of teChnology. This too has its ambiguities, since the 
medicalization that occurs may be said to be a 'spin-off', an unintended 
consequence, of the imposition of technology the point of which, after 
all, is to secure a benefit to the patient. 
Section ii examines the second category of medicalization - where it is 
viewed as part of a wider social process - through a discussion of the 
theories of Ivan Illich and Vicente Navarro. Illich's account is 
seriously flawed, because his view of what it is to be autonomous is 
inadequate, bearing, as it does, the hallmarks of the individualist 
accounts rejected in Chapter Three. Navarro's account locates the source 
of medicalization in the capitalist structure of western industrial 
society. His is a self-consciously marxist account, where medicalization 
is a form of alienation, and as such its terms of reference, strictly 
speaking, fall outside the scope of this essay. All the same, some 
tentative criticisms are levelled at the theory. 
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In the final part of this chapter, section iii, we consider the argument 
that medicalization is a fom of social control. In particular, we focus 
on the work of Talcott Parsons, whose concept of deviancy derived from a 
Durkheimian theory of role-occupancy. Sickness, for Parsons, is 
potentially a fom of deviancy, since it could prevent individuals from 
filling the role (or roles) that the social structure has allocated to 
them. Social order is to be maintained, according to Parsons, by the 
siCk person correctly filling the 'sick role', allocated to him, or her, 
by the medical profession. It follows from this that, in a Parsonian 
world, the medical profession is an important agent of social control. 
There are serious difficulties with the Parsonian account of the social 
structure, and the most serious of these arises out of his account of 
role-governed behaviour. The Parsonian idea of 'role-occupancy', for 
example, bears no relation to the notion of 'social forms' developed in 
Chapter Two of this thesis, since it is, or appears to be, rigidly 
detenninistic, and in a detenninistic universe, there is no room for 
autonomy, personal or otherwise. 
We began, in Chapter One, by suggesting that a particular accOlmt of 
personal autonomy might provide an organizing principle around which 
social policy might be constructed. In Chapter Two, we explored this 
concept of autonomy, linking it to a social context through an account 
of social forms. In Chapter Three we placed our account of autonomy in 
an historical context, and then went on to argue that our account of 
autonomy required us to view individuals as whole persons. This in turn 
required us to acknowledge the importance of the body, and hence of 
heal th, to our account of autonomy, and so to social policy. In Chapter 
Four we examined the relevance to our argument of three accounts of 
Introduction Page No. 20 
medicalization. In our final chapter, Chapter Five, we consider the 
relevance to our acccn.mt of autonomy of an aspect of health policy that 
focusses on the responsibility of the individual - preventive health-
care. What is of primary interest in the ensuing discussion is what kind 
of individual it is that preventive health-care policy assunes. Health-
care policy is, of course, a vast and diffuse subject - this is one 
reason why we choose to consider but one aspect of it. But in order to 
fix our discussion still further we consider a particular approach to 
preventive health-care as it was set out in a series of documents 
published by the British government under the Prevention and Health 
rubric, between 1976 and 1981. 
Although this series of documents was published by the British 
government, the general approach to preventive health-care that they 
adopt was not itself unique to Great Britain20 • For this reason, of 
course, our comments, although focussed on a set of British 
publications, might be expected to have wider application than within 
these shores. However, this is not something we pursue in the text. We 
also do not pursue the reasons for the relatively sudden and widespread 
interest amongst nations in prevention although there were a number of 
these - rising medical costs and so rising public expenditure; the 
changing disease-profile of modern industrial society and the 
replacement of the traditionally endemic diseases with the so-called 
'diseases of affluence' (cancer; heart disease) for which there existed 
no effective cure and against which the medical profession was therefore 
20. The key document in the rise in interest concerning preventive 
medicine is Marc Lalonde, A New Perspective on the Health of 
~ans: A Working DocmJent, (Ottowa: Department of National 
HFth and Welfare, 1974). All the hallmarks of the British 
prevention campaign are to be found in this document. 
Introduction Page No. 21 
largely powerless; the realisation that medical intervention could 
itself damage patients. 
We begin in section i with a discussion of the very idea of prevention, 
where we seek to demonstrate some of the complexities of what initially 
appears to be a relatively straightforward concept. The central 
difficulty turns on the notion of a 'problem state' - that which is to 
be prevented - since there are both subjective and objective dimensions 
to be considered. The idea of a problem state itself makes reference to 
'norms' of various kinds - behavioural norms, health norms, and so on -
which also have subjective and objective aspects21 • Once a problem has 
been identified there may be a choice of preventive strategies available 
to those charged with solving it. In section ii, we discuss some of the 
difficulties that might hamper preventive strategies, especially the 
'dilemmas of tmcertainty' that might themselves prevent the 
implementation of preventive policies. In section iii we look in some 
detail at the concept of prevention employed in the Prevention and 
Health campaign, and consider some of the implications of adopting this 
particular account of prevention, rather than any other. A stated aim of 
the Prevention and Health campaign was to make clear to average non-
medically trained persons the responsibility that devolved to them for 
the state of their own health. It is suggested that utilising this 
particular account of prevention allocates responsibility for a variety 
of preventive functions in a way that implicitly supports this project. 
In section iv some of the implications of this account of responsibility 
are drawn out through a discussion of the model of disease-causality 
21. In making these problems explicit, of course, we do not solve them, 
but acknowledging that there are problems is a prerequisite of 
solving them. 
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that is said Characteristically to underpin individually-focussed 
preventive policies. Since the model of disease-causality employed 
appears to treat of individuals in the fashion said to be characteristic 
of liberal theory (i.e. atomised), it follows that this approach to 
preventive health-care would be incompatible with an attempt to utilise 
our 'holistic' account of personal autonomy as an organising principle, 
at least with regard to this aspect of health policy. 
Preventive health-care, of course, is but one aspect of a vast and 
complex health-care industry, and the Prevention and Health campaign 
represented only a relatively small (and short-lived) government-
sponsored exercise within that industry. It might be thought to follow 
from this that we may draw only modest conclusions from our examination 
of this campaign. But in the context of our general discussion of 
personal autonomy this need need not be the case. In our conclusion 
then, we seek to indicate that the consequences of taking our account of 
personal autonomy seriously as an organising principle for social policy 
might potentially have radical implications. 
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I.i: The Nature of Social Policy 
Social policies presuppose the existence of society. This, after all, is 
What makes them social policies. But the nature of society is in 
dispute, and if we are to understand What social policy is and Why 
social policies take the form (and have the content) that they do we 
must begin by addressing the disputes that hinge on our tmderstanding of 
the nature of society. This has practical as well as theoretical 
importance, for such disputes are not confined to the realms of 
academia, or even to the more restricted sphere of the social sciences. 
The claim that society is a 'fiction' may well be fotmd in the 
theoretical writings of the eighteenth-century legal theorist Jeremy 
Bentham1, but it is also a claim recently restated by the then leader of 
the British Conservative Party - Margaret Thatcher. If we are to 
understand social policy adequately, we must address at least some of 
the problems - theoretical and practical - that are associated with the 
the notion of society. We begin, therefore, with an account of some of 
the theoretical problems concerning the concept of society. 
(a) Individualist .AccOtmts of Society 
Accounts of SOCiety may be (and conventionally are) ranged along a 
continuum. Society may be defined at one end by reference to the 
individuals that comprise it, such that there are no statements about 
society that are not directly reducible to statements about the 
individual members that are thought to make up that society. This 
position is associated not only with Bentham, but also with Hobbes, 
1. Jeremy Bentham, "DIe Principles of "k>rals and Legislation, (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1988), Ch.I, para. IV, p.3 
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Montesquieu, J. S. Mill, and, more recently, with Friederich Hayek and 
Karl Popper2. From this initial premise, and the further assumption that 
individuals are the best judges of their own interests, it is sometimes 
deduced that state intervention in the activities of individuals ought 
to be kept to a minimum3• On these grounds it is concluded that the 
appropriate regulating principle governing the distribution of goods 
throughout society ought to be the market. '!his is thought to be 
preferable to state regulation because the market, and the benefits 
contingent upon the operation of that market, are taken to be the result 
of choices made freely and voluntarily by participants, in the absence 
of coercion. From this perspective, the role of social policy will be 
residual, clearing up those areas of concern with which market 
mechanisms cannot cope or are held to be inappropriate4 • On this view, 
the state (whatever is to be understood by this term) need not simply 
confine itself to the policing of the voluntary exchanges made in the 
market-place, or to the protection of property legitimately obtained 
there. For example, it would seem to be admissible wi thin the terms of 
this model for the state to adopt a progressive role in those areas 
where market mechanisms either could not cope, or would not be 
2. Steven Lukes, "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered" in Alan 
Ryan (Ed.), '.ftle Philosophy of Social Explanation, (Oxford: OUP, 
1973), pp.119-124 for an account of the methOdology associated with 
this position. For an account of the dangers said to be inherent in 
seeing society as something more than the smn of its parts, see F. A. 
Hayek, "What Is 'Social' - What Does It Mean?" in Albert Hunold 
(Ed.), Freedom and Serfdom, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1961), pp.107-118 
3. This is not universally concluded by methodological individualists, 
of course. Hobbes, for example, argued for substantial intervention 
by the state (or, more correctly, by the Sovereign) in the 
activities of i ts individual members. Bentham himself, in his 
posthumously published Constitutional Code, (1843), prescribed 
extensive governmental powers of intervention and regulation. See 
Bill Jordan, '.ftle State: Authority and Autonany, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985), p.64 
4. Richard Ti tmuss makes this point in Social Policy, (London: George 
Allen & unwin, 1974), pp.33-34 
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appropriate. So we find that in the heyday of laissez-faire capitalism, 
Edwin Chadwick (himself a Benthamite utilitarian) proposed and 
instigated a progranme of interventionist sanitary refonn which, had it 
been left to individual choice and action, would not have developed when 
it did, if at all. With the exception of only the most radical of 
libertarians, few would deny that the state had no role to play in the 
distribution of goods, espeCially collective goods where little or no 
incentive exists for individuals ~ individuals to act. Similar 
argtDllents may be made with regard to educationS and the defence of the 
country6. Aspects of health care may also require non-market solutions7• 
Markets, to use Halevy's terminology, exist to hannonize naturally the 
interests of the participants, but where markets are inappropriate or 
inefficient the state may provide an artificial means of hannonization. 
(b) Holistic Accounts of Society 
At the other end of the continuum there is the view that individuals 
cannot be understood without reference to SOCiety because SOCiety makes 
individuals what they are. This view is often attributed to G.W.F. 
Hegel, for whom it is said individuals are but contingent aspects of the 
Absolute, and for whom ' concrete' freedom consists in subordination to 
S. Bill Jordan, Rethiriking welfare, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 
p.39 
6. Market solutions may raise the problem of the free-rider. Some 
people may be willing to contribute to the defence of their country, 
while others may not. The latter will still benefit from civil 
defence while contributing nothing to its upkeep. Non-market 
solutions, in this case government supply of defence from taxation, 
ensure equity. 
7. Health insurance, for example, is notoriously difficult to obtain 
for those suffering from terminal illnesses. This is one argtDllent in 
favour of a national insurance scheme which is blind to the nature 
of a person's illness, or state of health. 
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the State8• It is also possible to attribute a similar position to Marx 
(whose intellectual debt to Hegel ought not to be underestimated). For 
Marx, the very notion of the 'individual' can be said to be but a 
function of historically specific social relations, characterised by 
class conflict9• In the context of social policy, the problem here is 
that if the notion of the individual is debased, then the notion of 
individual interests, deSires, needs and so on is also potentially 
called into question. If interests, desires, needs, and so on are 
generated by one's position either in the order of things (for Hegel) or 
in the class struggle (for Marx) then the speCial status accorded to 
these by the free-market model is diminished. Since interests, deSires, 
needs and so on are no longer things that originate in the subject, the 
subject might not necessarily be the best judge of what they are. It 
devolves then to philosophers, intellectuals, or politicians to discern 
what is in a person's interest. Social policy, on this reading, might 
become something that is imposed by an external source and possibly in 
direct contradiction to the subject's perception of his or her own 
interests10• 
8. 
9. 
10. 
G.W.F. Hegel, Phil052)hy of Rimt, Translated by T.M. Knox, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952 , paras.1 2-186 for example. 
At least this much may be inferred from the "Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts" of 1844, where Marx discusses the concept 
of 'species-being' and remarks that 'it is above all necessary to 
avoid restoring society as a fixed abstraction opposed to the 
individual. The individual is the social being", in D. McLellan 
(Ed.), Karl Marx Selected Writings, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), p.91. This point is echoed in the sixth of the "Theses 
on Feuerbach" (from whom Marx derived the concept of 'species-
being') where Marx describes the human essence as 'the ensemble of 
social relations', in McLellan, ope cit., p.157 
It must be said that adherents to the individualist account of 
society sometimes argue that individuals are not always best-placed 
to judge what is in their interest. Bentham's supporters, for 
example, distinguished between 'real' and 'apparent' interests in 
their defence, against Macaulay's attack, of James Mill's Essay on 
Governoent. See Lively; Rees (Eds.), Utilitarian Logic and Politics, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp.46-48 
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(c) Htmm Nature and Politica11heory 
A further theoretical difficulty, and one which closely parallels the 
difficu1 ties discussed with reference to society, concerns the nature of 
those individuals who comprise society. It has been suggested that 
prescriptive political theories rest on, often implicit, assumptions or 
theories about human nature11 • These theories may take a variety of 
forms and may have various implications for social policy. For Hobbes, 
it is the fear of death and the subsequent pursuit of instrumental power 
in order to avoid this calamity that is characteristic of all human 
beings, a 'general inclination of all mankind' as he puts it12• The 
social policies (if they may be described as such) that Hobbes claims to 
deduce from this account of human nature include measures that would not 
be out of place in a modern welfare state13, but also include measures 
(such as the all-powerful Sovereign) which would generally be held to be 
unacceptable. Alternatively, Marx's account of human nature, as it is 
set out in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 generates a 
quite different attitude to welfarist policies. Given the relationship 
that is there said to exist between the worker, the object of 
production, and the capitalist, it is unlikely that a programme of 
pragmatic social reform will do very much to overcome the alienation 
experienced in work which is both repetitive and mundane. Different 
accounts of htnnan nature will lead to differing views as to the kinds of 
social policy that will be appropriate in any given context. But the 
account of htnnan nature one gives may serve another objective with 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Christopher Berry, HtJOJaD Nature, (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp .1-28 ; 
Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1967), p.268 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edited by c. B. MacPherson, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1981), p.161 
Hobbes, ope cit., p.387 
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regard to social policy. For accounts of human nature are not only 
employed in the construction of social policies; they might also be used 
to criticise existing social policies. This is certainly true of those 
'New Right' theorists who argue that socialism, or at least those 
policies pursued by the British Labour Party since 1945, has repressed 
or distorted the development of human potentiality through the creation 
of a 'cu1 ture of dependence'. The 'enterprise cuI ture' is intended not 
only to raise living standards throughout society by regenerating the 
economy and so on, but also to re-mora1ize the population through the 
creation of self-reliant, responsible and altruistic citizens. Where it 
is sometimes held to be a strength of conservative thinking that it has 
no dogmatically-held view of human nature, and thus that it avoids the 
totalitarian implications of 'utopian' or 'end-state' theories, this 
betrays an account of human nature which is both substantive and 
te1eo10gical14 • 
We have so far attempted to establish two things: first, that there is a 
variety of ways in which society, and those individuals of whom it is 
composed, may be understood; and second, that the account one holds of 
these two entities and of the relationship between them will have some 
bearing on the kinds of social policies proposed. In the next section we 
examine the idea of social policy, before, in the final three sections 
of this chapter, examining the connection between social policy and 
personal autonomy. 
14. Ian Carter, "Human Nature and the Utopianism of the New Right" in 
Politics, (1989), Vol.9(2), p.S 
Chapter I: Social Policy and Autonany Page No. 30 
I.li: Social Policy and Value 
The term 'social policy', as T.H. Marshall has pointed out, eludes 
precise definition15 • One way in which a definition might be arrived at 
would be to see What kinds of things are generally taken to be social 
policies, as distinct from, for example, economic policies. Marshall 
suggests that, conventionally at least, social policy concerns itself 
with those things related to the maintenance of social security -
maintaining, that is, a standard of living during periods of sickness, 
tmemployment, and old age. Social policies could then be said to provide 
a system of benefits and services geared to the maintenance of a 
standard of living, or of a particular level of welfare16 • But the 
implementation and administration of social policy costs money. It might 
therefore, and with some justification, be argued that economic policy 
is itself a form of social policy, albeit an indirect one17 • But it 
might equally be argued that economic policy is a constraint on social 
policy. The Thatcher-led Conservative govermnent, for example, can be 
said to have utilised 'monetarist' economic policies during the 1980s to 
rein in What they took to be an over-extension of govermnental ability 
to finance social policy to the detriment of the COtmtry's economic, 
15. T.R. Marshall, Social Policy, 5th Edition, Revised and Edited by 
A.M. Rees, (London: Hutchinson, 1985), p.l1 
16. As Richard Titmuss has pointed out, there are numerous examples of 
social policy Which do not seem beneficient or welfare-oriented. 
Hitler's social policies concerning Jews, Homosexuals, and the 
mentally ill and retarded, for example, prompt one to ask 'Whose 
welfare?' or 'whose benefit?' does social policy serve? 'What is 
welfare for some', says Titmuss, 'may be "illfare" for others'. 
Titmuss, ope cit., pp.26-27 
17. Marshall suggests that social policy is distinct from economic 
policy in that the former is concerned with individuals in an 
inmediate sense, whereas the latter is concerned with the welfare of 
society as a whole. The suggestion, presumably, is that the latter, 
in raising the level of welfare of society, may do so at the cost of 
some individuals or groups. Marshall, ope cit., p.15 
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entrepreneurial health18• A positivistic definition of social policy 
indicates an international (but not universal) acceptance that the state 
has some responsibility for at least the social security of its 
citizens19• But positivist accounts of social policy do not indicate 
why, at other than a superficial level, social policy differs from 
country to country and, within a given country, from time to time. An 
alternative way to state this problem is to ask how social values change 
over time, and how they come to differ from COtmtry to country. This 
question might be answered by adopting an historical perspective. This 
would involve specifying the particular traditions of thought that are 
Characteristic of a particular society (leaving aside the problem of 
what constitutes a 'tradition'). For if theories of human nature and of 
the nature of society underpin social policy, then we would expect to be 
able to locate social policies in traditions of thought20 , or we should 
at least to be able to say something of the relationship between these 
traditions and social policy. This in turn requires us to say something 
about the way in which value gets built into social policy, for if it is 
the case that political theory aims at specifying the Good for human 
beings then we might expect social policies to embody the the values 
deriving from this specification. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Ian Gough, "ThatCherism and the Welfare State" in Stuart Hall; 
Martin Jacques (Eds.), The Politics of Thatcherism, (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), pp.151-153 
Marshall, ope cit., p.l1 
This point, with regard to autonomy, will be returned to in Chapter 
Three, section i, below pp.l06-1l4. 
Chapter I: Social Policy and Autonomy Page No. 32 
An obvious and salient criticism of this project would be to accuse us 
of overstating the importance of political theory to the essentially 
pragmatic task of formulating and implementing social policy. 
Totalitarian societies apart, social policies are never solely the work 
of one person, or party. On the contrary, they usually represent the 
result of complex negotiations between Ministers, junior ministers, 
civil servants, select Committees, lobby groups, pressure groups, other 
government departments, and sometimes the mass media21 • The resulting 
social policy might then represent some concensus or compromise as to 
Which objectives are to be pursued by Which means. Even within political 
parties, where political theory might be thought to be of singular 
importance, it is not always clear Which political theory best 
characterises a party - for example, both high tories and low tories 
will be fotmd inside the Conservative Party. But although this criticism 
is both salient and important, it need not concern us here. Our project 
here requires us only to take seriously the claim that our own SOCiety 
(since this is the focus of the analysis) may be described as a 'liberal 
democracy'. This term can be left tmexamined for the present (though we 
shall return to it in Chapter Three, section i below). 
If the positivist attempt to define social policy is mlSatisfactory, 
what alternatives have we? One possibility is to define social policy, 
not by its content, but instead by its objectives, by the ends at which 
21. The complexity of policy-making in the field of health policy is 
indicated by the fact that over 1,200 organisations gave evidence to 
the 1976-79 Royal Commission on the National Health Service. G. 
Jordan and J. Richardson, "The British Policy Style or the Logic of 
Negotiation" in J. Richardson (Ed.), Policy Styles in Western 
~, (London: Allen & unwin, 1981), p.90. On the influence of the 
~in policy-making, see Christopher Ham, fr1th Polis: in 
Britain, 2nd Edition, (London: Macmillan, 198 ,pp.24-2. 
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it aims, rather than the means - economic or otherwise - used to attain 
those ends. This is not easy to do because there is dispute as to what 
these objectives are, or should be. Liberty (or alternatively freedom of 
choice), equality (or the redistribution of resources), the alleviation 
of need, dimensions of welfare ( individual or social), have all been 
proposed by commentators on social policy22. The objectives towards 
Which social policies are directed may themselves be a constraint on the 
kinds of policies adopted. It is sometimes thought to be the case, for 
example, that equality can be promoted only at the expense of liberty, 
and that policies designed to distribute resources to promote equality 
will inevitably be coercive23• But there is no reason to conclude that 
social policy should have only one objective, or that a variety of 
objectives need necessarily be incompatible. For example, enhanced 
liberty may be thought to be an important component of welfare. 
Defining social policy in this way forces us to confront the existence, 
at the heart of social policy, of value. The problem is that this 
suggests that debate about social policy must necessarily be 
inconclusive and there are, it has been suggested, two broad reasons why 
this should be so. The first is that people can disagree as to Which 
features of a social situation are important as objects of social 
policy24. There appears to be no self-evident logical reason, for 
example, why society should choose to alleviate hunger rather than allow 
the hungry to die. There might, of course, be moral reasons as to why 
22. 
23. 
24. 
Nicholas Deakin, 'Dle Politics of Welfare, (London: Methuen, 1987), 
pp.15-25; Albert Weale, Political Theory and Social Policy, (London: 
Macmillan, 1983), pp.4-5; Titmuss, ope cit., p.Z9 
Deakin, ope cit., p.19 
Raymond Plant; Harry Lesser; Peter Taylor-Gooby, Political 
Philosophy and Social Welfare, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1980):p.i22 
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one option is preferable to the other, but the status of the moral 
system one adopts might itself lack a rational or logical fmmdation25. 
The second reason why it is said that social policy debate must be 
inconclusive concerns the status of the principle or theory used to 
organise the facts or data employed there. If our account of social 
policy is not to become circular or regressive, we must, it is claimed, 
have a starting point, a principle of organization. This starting point 
must be theoretical (since it is the basis upon which empirical data are 
to be organised) and basic (that is, there must be no further appeal to 
premises in support of the organizing principle, otherwise an infinite 
regress would beckon) 26 • The claim made here is not that associated with 
the constructionist school of thought, whose adherents claim (crudely, 
at any rate) that reality is a fabrication and that no fact exists in a 
purely objective sense27 • It is not denied here that there are such 
things as facts. It is, for instance, a fact that, starved of food and 
water, a human being will die. But it is not a fact in quite the same 
way that human beings, or societies, have a duty to alleviate 
starvation, or remove inequality, or maximise freedom. The problem for 
social policy is that the duties with which social policy accords, the 
objectives at which social policy aims, might ultimately be without 
foundation. And if this is the case, then there may be no ultimately 
satisfactory way of deciding, of a range of possible policy objectives, 
which one or set ought to be pursued. Within the tenns of this thesis, 
25. Emotivists claim, for example, that morality is a question of taste 
and it is clearly true that tastes differ. Emotivists may be wrong 
about the nature of morality, of course, but it is certainly true 
that moral systems differ and even conflict. 
26. Plant et aI, ope cit., p.122 
27. TIlls seems to be the position held by the French historian of ideas, 
Michel Foucault. See, for example, "Space, Knowledge, and Power" in 
Paul Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault Reader, (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1986), p.247 
Chapter I: Social Policy and Autonany Page No. 35 
of course, the ultimate boundary of explanation is the tenn 'liberal 
democracy' and its corresponding traditions of thought. We recognise, of 
course, that the justificatory and explanatory use of traditions is 
itself open to serious critiCism, but such criticisms are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
Our concern here is to explore, within the tenns we have stipulated, the 
possibility of developing an organizing principle which would provide 
either a foundation for social policy (such that it would clearly 
indicate the primary objectives of social policy) or (where there exist 
several candidates) a means by which an ordering of objectives might be 
arrived at. We shall begin this exploration with a discussion of two of 
the most important objectives (the alleviation of need, and the securing 
of liberty) at which social policy has been said to aim, in order to 
establish two things. First, where values enter into claims made in the 
name of these objectives, and second, the extent to which they may be 
said to provide a firm and privileged foundation for policies designed 
to achieve them. We examine first the concept of need, then of liberty, 
before turning to a discussion of two alternative approaches to 
grounding social policy. 
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I.iii: Value and the Objectives of Social Policy 
Need and liberty are not, of course, the only possible objectives of 
social policy and it may be that some other candidate might succeed 
where these fail (equality, utility, and welfare are possible 
alternatives). The advantage of fOCUSSing on these two objectives is 
that they present us with what might be described as test-cases, since 
both need and liberty are generally held to be amongst the most 
important objectives of social policy (for reasons which will be made 
clear). If it can be established that these two objectives are 
inadequate for the task of organizing social policy, or of prOviding a 
fcnmdation upon which to build social policy, then we may, in view of 
the limited space available to us, assume (however contentiously) that 
the alternatives will also be inadequate. 
(a) The Alleviation of Need 
It has been stated that the single most important purpose of social 
policy is the alleviation of need28 • The concept of need, for example, 
has been described as 'absolutely fundamental to the understanding of 
contemporary social policy and the welfare state' 29. But the existence 
of needs in itself is not an adequate explanation for the existence of 
social policy, for everybody has needs, from the fisherman who needs a 
rod and line in order to pursue his hobby, to the cancer patient who 
needs an operation to save her life. The question is, given the vast 
range of possible candidates, what kinds of needs are to be admissible 
28. 
29. 
Jonathan Bradshaw, "The Concept of Social Need" in New Socie!., 30th 
March, 1972, p.640. Of course, need is in practice not the 0 y 
distributive principle employed in welfare legislation. Mothers 
receive child benefit whether they need it or not. An alternative 
account of social policy, then, might see it as a response to a 
right. 
Plant et a1, ope cit., p.20 
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as objects of social policy? To answer this question, it is useful to 
consider the structure of need-statements. Need is a relational concept 
so that statements concerning needs have the following structure (a 
structure, incidentally, that they share with want-statements): 
X needs Y for Z 
In tenns of policy the need (Y) is judged to be of social concern in the 
light of the grolmd (Z) upon which the need arises. It is at the point 
where judgement occurs as to the worth of Z that value, and also the 
possibility of conflict, enters the equation30 • Why is a person's need 
for an operation thought worthy of the attention of society, and not his 
or her need for a fishing-rod? Some means of accolmting for treating 
some objectives as worthy of serious social concern over others is 
required. 
One solution here might be to posit a set of basic needs. Consider the 
following passage: 
But individuals have certain basic needs that arise 
irrespective of their roles in production or the domestic 
system, needs which might therefore form part of the 
substance of equality that makes up the terms of membership 
of society as a whole. We all need food, shelter, warmth, 
light and clothes for physical survival. We also need 
instruction and information to lmderstand the world. We are 
all vulnerable to illness and injury and during infancy, and 
so need special attention when we are very YOlmg, sick or 
wolmded; and we are all mortal, and can expect to be frail as 
we approach death. These are3Iommon shared needs, whiCh are part of the human condition. 
It may indeed be the case that these needs are common to all human 
beings, but it does not explain why society as a whole should be 
expected to ensure that these needs are met. What would seem to be 
30. Plant et aI, ibid. 
31. Bill Jordan, RethiDking Welfare, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 
p.86 
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required is some rationale for selecting any particular need or set of 
needs. One such rationale is implied in the passage quoted above, that 
of physical survival. Unfortunately, what is not made clear in this 
brief passage is Why human beings alone should be the beneficiaries of 
social policy. Animals might also be said to have a need to survive and 
indeed many of the needs specified in the passage are common to other 
members of the animal kingdom. Dogs and cats need food; horses and sheep 
are vulnerable to injury; wallabies and bison can expect to be frail as 
they approach death. Why should society alleviate the needs of human 
animals on these grounds, while at the same time excluding non-human 
animals? The move from stipulating a set of basic needs in this way -
whether or not they confine themselves to the merely biological (food; 
drink; sleep; warmth) or include some socially-relative element (health-
care; a bed on which to sleep; accommodation as opposed to mere shelter) 
- must be accompanied by an argument as to what it is about human beings 
that can be said to create some claim on other human beings (or 
society), such that their needs ought to be met. The assertion that 
human beings have needs cannot do the job of providing a foundation for, 
or justification of, social policy on its own. Let us consider whether 
liberty fares any better. 
(b) The Securing of Liberty 
During the past decade, a concern with liberty (or at least with freedom 
of choice) moved from the margins to the centre of public debate. 
Previously egalitarian policies came to be viewed as a restraint on 
personal liberty, fostering a 'dependency culture' and resulting in what 
was seen to be an increasingly monolithic state. The stated objective of 
the Conservative Government (then in waiting) was to 'set the people 
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free' 32. But does an appeal to freedom or liberty as a fundamental 
principle on which to ground social policy fare any better than need? 
One difficulty here consists in trying to understand what freedom might 
mean, and hence what the implications might be for social policy. 
Berlin, for example, suggests that there are two ways in which we might 
understand freedom - a positive and a negative sense33 , but for now we 
shall circumvent the debate about negative and positive liberty in order 
to examine a general and formal claim concerning statements about 
liberty. According to MacCallum, any statement about freedom will have a 
tripartite, relational character specifying who (or what, since the 
agent might be an institution or association rather than an 
individual34) the agent is who is free; the constraints that the agent 
is free from; and what the agent is free to do or to become3S • 
The importance of MacCallum's account of freedom is that it requires us 
to specify the variables with which we are dealing in discussions of 
freedom. The advantage for social policy of doing this is that we are 
then in a position to evaluate the variables, with a view to admitting 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
The quotation is from Margaret Thatcher's speech to the Conservative 
Party conference, 1977. Source: Conference Proceeds, 1977, 
(Conservative Political Centre), p.134. Cited in Frank O'Gorman 
(Ed. ), British Conservatism: Conservative t Fran Peel To 
Thatcher, London: Longman, 198 ,pp.22D-221 
Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty, 
(Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1969), pp.118-172. See Chapter 
Three section ii for a discussion of Berlin. 
Jom Rawls makes this point, A ~ of Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1972), p.202. See also LiilCO Allison, Right Principles, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p.124 
Gerald C. MacCallum, "Negative and Positive Liberty" in Laslett; 
Runciman; Skinner (Eds.), Philo~ Politics and Society, Fourth 
Series, (Oxford: Basil Blackwel~'2), pp.172-193. This is not, as 
Albert Weale has pointed out, a definition of freedom but an account 
of the construction of statements abOut freedom into which the 
relation existing between the three variables enters as an undefined 
term. Weale, ope cit., p.S1 
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some as legitimate (within the tenns of some, as yet tmSpecified, moral 
theory) while dismissing others. Demands for freedom become specific and 
contextualised. Rather than simply asserting - dogmatically - that 
freedom is valuable, MacCallum's formula brings into focus the various 
points at which value enters discussions of particular freedoms. It has, 
of course, been argued that freedom is valuable in and of itself or in , 
other words, that freedom is intrinsically valuable. For MacCallum, 
however, statements concerning liberty will always belie values other 
than liberty as ultimate objectives36• Freedom, or liberty, is always of 
something to do something, so that what is clearly seen to be valuable 
is what it is that one wants (or perhaps needs) to do. MacCallum's is 
not the only criticism possible against the claim that freedom is 
intrinsically valuable. A further criticism (and one that also applies 
to the presumption of freedom) is that not all freedoms are thought to 
be valuable, or at least not equally s037. If freedom as such were 
valuable, then there would be no criteria for deciding amongst a range 
of possible freedoms, and this seems counter-intuitive for there are 
freedoms which are relatively uninteresting (the freedom to scratch our 
heads; the freedom to hop on one leg) and freedoms which are generally 
held to be of some import (freedom of speech; freedom of thought). In 
the context of practical politics, if freedom is intrinsically valuable, 
then social policy aimed at enhancing or maximising freedom would be 
stymied without some means of ordering or selecting amongst a vast range 
of possible and actual freedoms. In order to do this, one would have to 
36. 
37. 
'Only when we detennine what the men in question are free from, and 
what they are free to do or become, will we be in a position to 
estimate the value for human happiness and fulfilment of being free 
from that (whatever!! is), to do the other thing (whatever it is).' 
- MacCallum, op. cit., p.189 
Joseph Raz, "Dle !tii'8lity of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), pp.12-14 
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specify reasons as to why some freedoms are more valuable than others. 
But those reasons could not be that freedom is intrinsically valuable, 
for even if one held that freedom x was more valuable than freedom y one 
would have to say something more than that x had more intrinsic worth 
than y; for example, that x led to the development of character. Such a 
move would suggest that x was valuable, not intrinsically, but for some 
other good. But if freedom is valuable because instnnnental in attaining 
some other good, goal or end, then the task of the theorist is to find 
some means of evaluating the worth of those goods, goals or ends for 
which freedom is valuable, in order to establish their legitimacy as 
objects of social concern. And if the value of freedom derives from the 
value of the goals upon which those freedoms are contingent, then 
freedom cannot be appealed to as an independent principle against which 
those goals may be evaluated. To do so would be circular. In this 
respect, liberty fares no better than need as an organising principle 
for social policy. 
The problem that concerns us consists in finding some principle that 
would enable the social theorist to decide which from amongst a range of 
actual or potential objectives ought to be given priority. We have seen 
that neither the alleviation of need nor the securing of liberty are 
adequate for this purpose. The difficulty in both cases is that each of 
these objectives is valuable only in terms of some further account of 
the good, not yet specified. What is required is a principle that will 
yield up a clear ordering amongst a set of objectives. In the following 
section, we again concentrate on a representative sample of two such 
principles. The first proposal is that developed by John Rawls, in his 
influential work A Theory of Justice (1972); the second proposal is that 
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made by Raymond Plant, Harry Lessing, and Peter Taylor-Gooby in their 
work Political Philosophy and Social Welfare (1980). Both theories give 
the concept of autonomy a central place. 
I.iv: Grounding Social Policy: Justice as Fairness and Autonany 
(a) Rawls and the Free, Rational Person 
Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, proposes what amounts to a neo-
Kantian system where principles of justice which will define the 
fundamental terms of association between 'free and rational persons' are 
to be chosen from behind a 'veil of ignorance' which, it is claimed, is 
an 'initial position of equality,38 • 
••• we are to imagine that those who engage in social 
cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles 
which are to assign basic rights3~nd duties and to determine 
the division of social benefits. 
If this can be done, then we would have a set of, if not value-free 
principles, then at least a set of value-neutral principles with which 
to guide our policy making. But the conditional in the preceding 
sentence is important. The problem is whether or not it makes sense to 
talk of persons as 'free and rational' in the sense Rawls requires. 
Persons may well be rational (although this would have to be explored in 
greater detail) but are they free? Rawls presents his theory as a 
response to classical utilitarianism, which he criticises as not taking 
seriously enough the differences between persons40• This is a criticism 
38. Rawls, ope cit., p.ll 
39. Rawls, ibid. 
40. Rawls, ope cit., p.27 
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that has been levelled at Rawls' theory itselr+1• Rawls seems to suggest 
that we are capable of shedding our cherished beliefs, our tastes, our 
opinions and so on in order to get ourselves into the original position 
from which we would choose our ftmdamental principles. Even assuming 
this were possible, we might also want to criticise the character of the 
'free and rational' person in the following way. A principle of justice, 
it would seem, assumes that those over Whom it ranges, or those persons 
for whom it is acceptable, are capable of understanding and experiencing 
injustice. Why, otherwise, would we want to set the thing up in the 
first place? But if persons are to understand (however rudimentary such 
an understanding may be) such an experience, then there must be states 
of affairs they can recognise as either just or unjust. In order to 
overcome this difficulty, it is necessary to attribute characteristics 
to the 'free and rational' being, and this is What Rawls does. Rawls' 
'Aristotelian Principle' asserts that: 
• •• other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of 
their realized capacities (their innate or trained 
abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more thZ2 
capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity. 
Rawls also specifies a list of 'primary goods' which all persons may be 
said to value. These include rights, liberties, opportunities, powers, 
income, wealth and 'self-respect and a sure confidence in the sense of 
one's own worth,43. But such characteristics are not logically deducible 
from the concept of a 'free and rational' person. There is no reason, 
41. 
42. 
43. 
Plant et aI, ope cit., pp.128-129. A similar criticism has been made 
by Onora O'Neill, who notes that Rawls, in order to set up the 
'original position', asstnnes a society of mutually independent 
agents. O'Neill argues that, in reality, the desires and attitudes 
typical of human agents are interloCked and cannot meaningfully be 
forced asunder. "Constructivism in Ethics" in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Socie~, LXXXIX, (1989/9), p.5 
Rawls, ope cit., p~26. Cf. Brian Barry, The Liberal 'nleory of 
Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp.27-29 
Rawls, ope cit., p.92; p.396 
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for example, why a free and rational person should not opt for the life 
of a hennit. 
Rawls also suggests that the free and rational agents who are to 
construct the principles of justice: 
• •• know the general facts about human society. They 
understand political affairs and the principles of economic 
theory; they know the basis of social organization and the 
laws of human psychology. Indeed the parties are presumed to 
know whatever general {~cts affect the choice of the 
principles of justice. 
This is a tall order, and, what is more, many of these 'general facts' 
are themselves disputed45 • What, for example, is the basis of social 
organisation? Is it self-interest? Is it security? The upholding of 
property rights? Rawls' theory has been developed as a court of final 
appeal as to the principles that should be adopted When disputes arise. 
Yet it seems to require the resolution of many of those disputes as a 
precondition for its implementation. There is, of course, much that is 
valuable and interesting in Rawls' theory, but, in its account of the 
kind of person required to operate the system, it (paradoxically, given 
the previous discussion of accounts of human nature in policy 
formulation) seems incapable of bridging the gap between abstraction and 
practical life. Rawls' difficulty here is attributable to his account of 
what it is to be a person. It might, of course, be the case that a 
modified account would fare better but it is not our task to test this 
claim. Instead we turn to an alternative attempt to ground social policy 
- that developed by Plant et al in Political Philosophy and Social 
Welfare. 
44. Rawls, ope cit., p.137 
45. Plant et aI, ope cit., p.128 
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(b) The Autonaoous Person and Social Policy 
The problem identified thus far is that there appears to be no ground 
upon Which to build a theory of social policy that does not leave itself 
open to counter-claims from those who happen to occupy a different 
ground. If it is accepted, however, that whatever one's grounding 
principles are, they are also moral principles, then - potentially, at 
least - a way out of the impasse is opened. For although there may be 
rival views as to which set of moral principles is to be the guiding 
principle in the generation of social policy, it is nevertheless the 
case that those arguing for a particular account of social policy will 
have some moral principles. In other words, contenders in the debate 
will be moral agents. If it can be shown that there are certain 
Characteristics that all moral agents share, then it might be possible 
to ground a theory of social policy on these shared characteristics. 
Plant et al suggest that there is one such characteristic which is 
presupposed by any moral system, and this is autonomy. From this premise 
they argue that it is possible to derive a set of basic needs which 
ought, therefore, to provide a minimum but logically compelling rubric 
within Which to set social policy. There is one other conmitment that 
moral systems produce which gives rise to a parallel, but equally 
compelling need, and it is that of physical survival. The justification 
for the inclusion of survival as a basic need is that if there are to be 
moral systems at all, then there must exist moral agents46 • This can be 
readily accepted, provided that we read it as a statement about the 
conditions necessary for morality to exist (i.e. that there be 
autonomous agents, as opposed to robots) and not as an instruction to 
create those conditions (i.e. have babies). What seems less easy to 
46. Plant et al, ope cit., p.38 
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agree to is the subsequent claim that: 
••• if human beings have moral duties at all they have a 
need to survive, which in its turn implies a'duty to help 
each other to survive and to preserve life. 47 
Leaving aside the apparent circularity of this claim (duties are derived 
from needs which are derived from duties) the clear implication here is 
that 'needs create obligations,48 and it is fairly easy to refute this 
claim. I may need a fishing rod in order to spend a weekend on the 
riverbank, but the fact that I need this item does not imply that 
someone therefore has an obligation, or a duty, to supply me with it. 
The claim that human beings have a need to survive because they have 
moral duties is also suspect, not least because some people have, in the 
past, considered it part of their moral duty to give up their lives for 
their country, friends, family or whatever. 
It is also Similarly difficult to support the corresponding, implied 
claim that because a person has moral duties (whatever they might be) 
then others have a corresponding duty to help that person to survive. I 
may consider it one of my moral duties to help preserve the life of 
others, but this duty will be derived from the moral code or system of 
ethics to which I subscribe. Suppose (to employ R.M. Hare's famed 
example) that I were a Nazi, committed to the destruction of Jews, 
homosexuals and several other clearly defined non-Aryans. I would be in 
the peculiar position, according to Plant et aI, of both having a duty 
(since they are moral agents) to preserve all these people's lives and a 
duty (as a good Nazi) to ensure that they forfeit their lives. What 
47. Plant et a1, ibid. 
48. This quotation, attributed to Simone Weil, is used as a legend to 
the chapter "Needs, Welfare and Social Policy", Plant et al ,~. 
cit., p.19 
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these authors appear to want to argue for is a principle of respect for 
others Which encapsulates more than just a negative duty to leave people 
alone and not to interfere with them. The question is whether or not 
they need to construct a separate category of needs, beyond the bounds 
of autonomy, in order to achieve this? 
Plant et al themselves suggest that certain basic needs can be derived 
from the fact that there exist autonomous agents, although these needs 
are expressed as negative freedoms. Autonomy requires freedom from 
exercises of arbitrary power, freedom from ignorance, and freedom from 
ill-health49 • It is, of course, possible to express these positively as 
rights - a right to political freedom (however this is to be defined); 
to education; and to health-care. The list is, of course, open to 
negotiation. Nevertheless, deriving these needs from the principle of 
autonomy does seem to provide a grOtmd upon which to construct social 
policy, if it is accepted that the difficulties of establishing a ground 
for social policy in the first place arose as a result of the existence 
of moral agents, with rival conceptions of morality. This is not 
unproblematic, and in the following section we consider some of the 
difficulties such a position entails. 
49. Plant et al, ope cit., pp.46-51 
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I. v: ltm1l. Autonany and Personal Autonany 
It should, of course, be noted inmediately that Rawls himself has an 
account of autonomy at the heart of his theory of justice. What we need 
to do then is to consider how, if at all, Rawls' accOlmt of autonomy 
differs from that offered by Plant et ale The most important difference 
is that Rawls ties his account of autonomy to the 'free and rational' 
person criticised above. For Rawls, to act autonomously is to act: 
• •• from prinCiples thg5 we would consent to as free and 
equal rational beings. 
Furthermore, these prinCiples are to be willed from behind the 'veil of 
ignorance', and in this sense, claims Rawls, they are or will be 
objective5l • It would be impossible to do justice to the sophistication 
of Rawls' system here, but one important criticism may be reiterated 
concerning the rational status of the principles adopted by the 
autonomous agent. If it is the case that there is a set of principles 
which may be willed from behind a 'veil of ignorance' by a free and 
rational agent, then it would seem to be the case that all free and 
rational agents must also will those principles in a similar situation. 
This is the tmiversalising element in Rawls' theory. The Kantian 
equivalent of these prinCiples would then be what Kant himself referred 
to as 'the Moral Law'. The problem for both Rawls and Kant, is that 
neither the principles chosen from behind the 'veil of ignorance', nor 
the Moral Law, allow for differences (of taste, value, preferences, or 
ideals) amongst moral agents52 • For Kant, the more individuals - in 
their striving to become rational, moral agents - approach the Moral 
50. 
51. 
52. 
Rawls, m. cit., p.516 
Rawls, i ide 
See J .L. Mackie, Ethics: nrellting Right and Wrong, (Harmon<isworth: 
Penguin Books, 1977) pp.83- 02 for a general criticism of 
tnrlversalisation. For this point in particular see especially pp.92-
97 
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Law, the more they look like every other moral agent. Differences 
between individuals (in a moral sense) only occur to the extent that 
those individuals either misinterpret, or fail to understand correctly, 
the dictates of the Moral Law53 • Similarly with Rawls. To the extent 
that individuals divest themselves of their own particular 'attachments 
and interests', to the extent, that is, to which we choose a set of 
principles 'unencumbered by the singularities of the circumstances in 
which we find ourselves,54, then to that extent will we arrive at the 
principles of a just society. But to that extent also do we cease to be 
individuals. Even Rawls' account of autonomy fails to take the 
differences between individuals seriously. Does that offered by Plant; 
Lesser; and Taylor-Gooby fare any better? 
In a sense, it does. All that is required - initially, at least - by 
these authors is that individuals be capable of formulating moral 
principles, and Kantian morality is but one amongst a vast range of 
moral positions one may take up. On these grounds, the difficulty of 
restricting the social obligation to supply resources to human animals, 
and not non-human animals mentioned above might be overcome. Animals are 
(or at least are thought to be, although this remains to be proven) 
incapable of moral thinking. That individuals are to be capable of moral 
thought must be taken to mean that individuals be potentially capable of 
moral thought. Certain classes of humanity are usually taken to be 
presently incapable of moral thought, but potentially capable -
53. A fundamental tenet of Kant's philosophy as such (and so of his 
moral philosophy) is that human beings are fallible. If they were 
not, they would be Gods. Since they are not Gods but human beings, 
they will always individuate themselves in failing correctly to 
discern the moral law (or alternatively in apprOximating closer to 
it than some but not others). 
54. Rawls, ibid. 
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children, for example, and the mentally ill for whom there is some hope 
of treatment or cure. There are, however, some tmfortunate people who 
seem to be permanently incapable of moral thought - the mentally 
deranged or retarded - and these might present a problem to the general 
thesis proposed by Plant et ale The argument that the mentally deranged 
are sufficiently like sane people for them to be treated in a like 
fashion begs the obvious question; in what way are they sufficiently 
like sane people? The reply that they look like us is clearly inadequate 
(so do display marmequins in shop windows), as is the Benthamic reply 
that they feel pain like us (since this invokes the equally Benthamic 
response - so do animals), and in any case neither would be admissible 
within the scope of the general theory advanced. The only admissible 
response within the tenns of this theory is that they are (potentially) 
capable of formulating and acting upon moral principles, or, since Plant 
et al define autonomy as 'the freedom to act morally,55, that they are 
(potentially) capable of acting autonomously56. Either way, there seems 
to be a difficulty here concerning the scope of the theory. 
Even if, sweeping aside the difficulty pointed out above, we accept the 
55. Plant et al, ope cit., p.46 
56. The problem of mental disorder is one of degree. Paternalistic 
intervention is usually justified on the grotmds that the mentally 
deranged or retarded are incapable of looking after themselves. But 
few mentally disordered people are completely incapable of this. 
Daniel Wikler has identified a potential difficulty here, for it 
seems that benevolent intervention by society rests on an assumption 
that those of higher or 'superior' intelligence are in a better 
position to know what is in the interests of those less intelligent 
than themselves. Wikler feels this to be an unfair assumption, 
leading to an mmecessary disregard for the autonomy (such as it is) 
of mentally disorderd people. lhe tmfairness is brought out if one 
generalises the assumption in the following way: that those of 
superior intelligence always know what is in the interests of those 
less intelligent than themselves. Wikler, "Paternalism and the 
Mildly Retarded" in Philosophy and Public Affairs, (1979), Vol.8, 
pp.38D-381 
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argument that human beings are capable of morality, it remains unclear 
as to Why it is this feature of the human condition that creates an 
obligation on the part of humanity in general and society in particular 
and not some other feature. Why morality and not the fact that human 
beings feel pain? The argument that all human beings are potentially 
moral agents seems less secure than the argument that all human beings 
feel pain. Even the mentally deranged, if they ~ incapable of 
morality, are nevertheless capable of experiencing pain. It remains 
unclear as to why the capacity for autonomy - defined thus far as the 
freedom to act morally - is thought to be of greater value than the 
capacity for liberty, or for happiness. 
Another problem concerns the connection between the claim that human 
beings have a capacity for autonomy, a capacity for acting morally, and 
the conditions in which that capacity might flourish. It requires a 
special interpretation of what it is to be a moral agent to enable one 
to conclude that a range of conditions is necessary (or not) for one 
successfully to be morally autonomous. A Kantian view of what it is to 
be moral, for example, makes no reference to a set of external 
conditions which mayor may not facilitate the development of morality 
in an agent. Conformity to a set of rational principles requires no 
particular social arrangements, tmless one can build into the theory an 
argument which suggests that one's ability either to discover those 
rational principles in the first place, or to enact them once discovered 
depends on a set of material circumstances. One way in which this might 
be done is to suggest that we are all - more or less potentially - moral 
agents, but that certain aspects of our environment prevent us from 
developing to the fullest possible extent the morality of which we are 
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ideally capable. This is, crudely at any rate, the position taken by 
I.H. Green for whom the positive benefit of supplying resources to 
individuals is that it enables them to become moral, or at least more 
moral than they already are. It is not that the having of resources of 
itself creates morality, but rather that it removes obstacles to the 
deve10pnent of the se1f-determining (i.e. autonomous) individual57 • 
One possibility as to why there are these difficulties at the heart of 
Plant et a1' s argument, is that they conflate two separate and distinct 
notions of 'autonomy'. As we have already seen, for these authors 
autonomy is 'the capacity to act morally', but as Raz has pointed out it 
is both possible and desirable to make a distinction between moral 
autonomy and personal autonomy. Moral autonomy is associated with the 
Kantian idea of self-enacted moral principles that accord with a 
rational Moral Law. It is itself a theory about the nature of morality. 
Personal autonomy, on the other hand, is 'a particular ideal of 
individual well-being' which is 'no more than one specific moral ideal 
which, if valid, is one element in a moral doctrine,58. For Kant, the 
autonomous person is the person who acts in accordance with the dictates 
of his or her rational will. But this is not the only aCCOlmt of 
autonomy that may be given. It is possible to distinguish, for example, 
between rationality and authorship, such that an autonomous person is 
held to be one whose actions emanate from the self, from his or her 
will, but not necessarily in accordance with a rational principle. 
57. Individuals, for Green, are intrinsically social beings: ' ••• the 
human spirit can only realise itself, or fulfil its idea, in 
persons, and... it can only do so through society, since society is 
the condition of the deve10pnent of a personality', Prolegall226 to 
Ethics, Fourth Edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), pp.2 -227 
58. Raz, ope cit., p.370 (n.2) 
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Autonomous actions may emanate from non-rational, or even irrational 
emotions such as love or loyalty59. It may be rational, or just, or in 
accordance with utility to save the life of Bishop Fenelon rather than 
his valet - who happens to be my brother - but in choosing to save the 
valet I could not reasonably be accused of acting heteronomously. 
A further advantage of keeping moral autonomy distinct from personal 
autonomy is that it goes some way towards clearing up the problem, 
articulated above concerning the conditions for autonomy. If it is 
difficult to relate moral autonomy to a requirement for the resources 
which social policies are designed to provide (and, after all, the most 
ascetic of monks can be as moral as the average non-monadic person, if 
not more so), then the same crumot be said of personal autonomy. This is 
because personal autonomy is not merely about judgements, or rational 
principles, but about enactment. It has a substantial element to it that 
moral autonomy lacks, and it is this substantial element that makes it, 
and not moral autonomy, an object of social policy. In order to 
substantiate this claim, it will be useful at this point to turn to a 
discussion of one aspect of personal autonomy frequently encountered in 
the literature - the concept of a plan of life. 
59. The distinction between rationality and authorship is discussed by 
Richard Lindley in his Aut~, (London: MacMillan, 1986), p.21. 
One should not forget that, or Kant at any rate, rational 
principles are, by their very nature, universalisable. 
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I. vi: Personal Autonany and Plans of Life 
We have so far noticed a distinction between moral autonomy and personal 
autonomy. While our interest is with the latter, it is nevertheless 
worth noticing that it is possible to distinguish between two kinds of 
personal autonomy - occurent (personal) autonomy, or autonomy of the 
moment, and dispositional (personal) autonomy, which takes into aCCOl.mt 
a person's life as a Whole60• It is with the latter that plans of life 
are usually associated. This distinction in part attempts to come to 
tenns with a problem encountered in Mill's On Liberty. This is the 
difficulty, for Mill, of reconciling his accotmt of the limits of 
interference in the private sphere (that is, of self-regarding actions) 
with his argument concerning the selling of oneself into slavery, 
thereby surrending all future liberty. Young suggests that the decision 
to perfonn this act is an example of occurent autonomy, and occurent 
autonomy, since it is of less importance than dispositional autonomy, 
may be over-ridden in favour of the latter61 • Whether or not we agree 
here turns on what we understand by a plan of life. All the same, if 
what Young says is substantially correct then the importance of an 
understanding of the notion of a plan of life to a discussion of 
autonomy is clear. But for our purposes, there is another reason for 
considering what is entailed by the notion of a plan of life. We are, 
after all, attempting to explore the nature of the connection, if any, 
between social policy and autonomy. If, as has been suggested, the 
notion of a plan of life is important in understanding autonomy, we 
shall want to know what the relationship is between plans of life and 
60. 
61. 
Robert Young, Personal Antrm:nr;: !r,om Negative aoi Positive 
I,jbP1ty, {London: Croom He , 198 , p.5 
Young, ope cit., pp. 72-75. Young argues that dispositional autonomy 
will usually override occurent autonomy, but not always. 
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social policy. In order to do this, it will be important, in the 
following diSCUSSion, to emphasise the substantive side of personal 
autonomy. Raz, for example, makes a distinction between autonomy as 
capacity and autonomy as aChievement62 • It does not follow from this 
distinction (and Raz would not claim that it did) that to be autonomous 
one must always achieve one's objectives. But of itself, the mere having 
of the capacity for autonomy is fairly uninteresting. It would be 
difficu1 t to maintain that a person was autonomous if he or she 
consistently failed to enact the projects he or she autonomously decided 
upon. For the same reason, personal autonomy is not merely about 
opporttmi ties to exercise one's capaci ties63 • To be autonomous one must, 
at least some of the time, exercise one's capacity. One must, at least 
some of the time, realise one's objectives64 • If autonomy is really to 
be an object of social policy it must have some content, it must be 
substantial, and not merely formal. Although this claim is not directly 
linked to plans of life, it may be indirectly linked in that persons who 
claim to have a plan of life (or a set of interconnected plans), 
assuming that they are sincere in their claim, will want to implement 
that plan (or set of plans). Insofar as a plan of life is a substantive 
thing, it too may require space in whiCh to flourish, and may require 
resources to enable its owner to implement it. In short, it may be of 
legitimate interest to someone Charged with formulating social policies. 
If this is so, and if the connection between (dispoSitional) autonomy 
and plans of life is well-fotmded, then the contention that autonomy 
62. Raz, ope cit., pp.203-207 
63. YOtmg, ope cit., p.49 
64. Autonomy, says Charles Taylor, is an 'exercise-concept'. Taylor, 
''What's Wrong With Negative Liberty?" in Alan Ryan (Ed.), The Idea 
of Freedan: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, (Oxford: OUP, 1979), 
p.177 
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might justifiably be an object of social policy may itself be 
reinforced. 
David Miller, in Social Justice, offers us an account of a plan of life 
which incorporates the social roles one occupies (work, leisure, family, 
and so on), the social ideals one subscribes to (whether one seeks the 
maintenance of the status quo, or its disruption, for example), the 
projects one has (such as cataloguing all the butterflies in the British 
Isles) and the personal relationships one enters into65 • Plans of life 
(we shall use this as a generic term for all those things referred to by 
Miller) are taken to be those things tha t give meaning to a person's 
life. TIle notion of a plan, or plans, of life has been taken up by a 
number of political and social theorists, and it is worth considering 
why this is so. 
One suggestion for the interest accorded to the notion is the potential 
inherent in it for clarifying and uniting a number of important areas of 
social policy. As we have seen, one of the central problems for social 
65. David Miller, Social Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 
pp.133-134. See also JOM Rawls, A '.ftJeory of Justice, pp.407-416. A 
plan of life, for Rawls, is something that is Chosen with a person's 
'full deliberative rationality' (p.408). Miller's account seems to 
allow for the inclusion in a person's plan of life of eventualities 
not deliberately chosen, but not repudiated either. One does not 
choose one's parents, but one may nevertheless, and without rational 
deliberation, accept and foster the relationship one has with them. 
Albert Weale' s accmmt emphasises the subjectivity of plans of life, 
or projects, in Political Theory and Social Policy, pp.24-29 , while 
Bill Jordan stresses the limiting nature of coomitments made by 
autonomous agents - to friends, relatives, clubs, societies, 
religions, political parties and organisations of many kinds, in 
Re~n1dng Welfare, pp.17-18. On this last point see also Gerald 
])wor in, The '.ftJeory and Practice of Autonany, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 1988), pp.23-24 
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policy is that of scope. What are, and what ought to be, the legitimate 
concerns of social policy? Attempts to be more specific about the scope 
of social policy have focussed on the concept of need. But need, as we 
have seen, is itself too broad a concept to perform the function 
ascribed to it in this case. The problem lies in deciding whiCh, amongst 
a vast array of needs, are to count as an appropriate object of social 
policy. One solution is to invoke a biological standard - those needs 
that are to count as a justifiable object of social policy are those 
directly connected with keeping an individual alive. In a modern social 
context, however, subsistence is rarely used as a criterion for the 
distribution of benefits. This is because in a modern, industrialised 
society there arise needs which have a social dimension. The difficulty 
is well-illustrated with regard to the concept of poverty. Since poverty 
is a relative concept, it will differ from place to place, and also from 
time to time. If this is the case, then needs arising as a result of 
being poverty-stricken will also differ from place to place, and time to 
time66 • The needs one has in the context of a modern industrialised 
66. Although needs defined in this way are relative, they are 
nevertheless objective insofar as they make reference to an 
externally-set standard (i.e. external to those who are said to have 
the need). A. J. Culyer has discussed this with reference to the 
National Health Service, where a patient's needs are, he claims, 
defined and delineated by professionally trained experts in the 
field of medicine. Apart from the authoritarian implications of 
Culyer's claim, it also seems to be counter-intuitive, for it 
follows that, where there is no third party to evaluate whether or 
not a need exists in a given situation, then no need can be said to 
exist. A person dying of thirst in the desert (the example is 
Culyer's own) 'may want [water] as muCh as it is possible to want 
anything, but he does not, by our definition, need it'. A. J. 
Culyer, Need and the National Health Service, (London: Martin 
Robertson, 1976), p.16. For a criticism of Culyer, see Peggy Foster, 
Access to Welfare, (London: Macmillan, 1983), p.20. What Culyer may 
be said to be doing is articulating the moral nature of welfare 
distribution, assuming that morality is a social phenomenon, 
(Cont'd over ••• ) 
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society will differ from those in a primitive tribal society because 
needs, social needs, are tied to the notion of a standard of living. 
Miller suggests that the concept of a social need can be understood in 
terms of harm. The claim here is that, for the purposes of social policy 
at any rate, a person needs something if that person will suffer harm 
without it67 • Miller has two reservations about this claim. Firstly, it 
cannot be sustained without making reference to the aims and aspirations 
of the person who is thought to be suffering, since what is harmful to 
one person may not be harmful to another68 • The second concerns what 
Miller describes as 'strong theories of human nature' which attempt to 
set up a standard for the human condition. Harm is then defined in terms 
of a deviance from this standard. But this may be unwarranted since the 
person may have willingly chosen to deviate, may have decided to 'drop 
out' or become a monk, or an ascetic. In either case, reference must be 
made to the aims and aspirations of the person who is said to be either 
in need, or harmed. Invoking the notion of a plan of life allows Miller 
sinrultaneously to define both harm and need: 
(Cont'd from previous page) 
concerned with relationships and conduct between individuals, or 
groups. If need is a moral concept (and not, for instance, merely a 
biological concept) then it cannot exist outside of a social 
context. We must suppose that this is the point of Culyer setting 
his example of the thirsty man in a desert - a non-social 
environment where one is unlikely to come across a need-Iegitimising 
third party. 
67. Miller, ope cit., pp.13Q-132 
68. Miller uses the example of the philosopher Brentano who became blind 
later on in life. An 'objective' assessment of Brentano's 
predicament might conclude that, since blindness is a form of harm, 
the philosopher suffered as a result. Brentano' s own account of his 
situation disagrees with this assessment. Blindness, he argued, 
freed him from the distractions imposed by sight, enabling him to 
become a more effective philosopher (p.13l). 
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Harm, for any given individual, is whatever interferes 
directly or indirectly with the activities essential to his 
plan of life and correspondingly, his needs must be 
understood to comprise whatever is necessary to allow these 
activities to be carried outoy • 
This may be a good way to define both harm and need, but it remains 
unsatisfactory as a means of defining or delineating the scope of social 
policy. The problem lies in the subjective nature of the notion of a 
plan of life. If, as Miller suggests, a person's plan of life 
incorporates social roles, ideals, projects, and relationships, then 
clearly these will differ from person to person. Given this, the problem 
for the formulator of social policy then becomes one of a practical 
nature: if social policy is to cater for needs then in order for social 
policy to be effective it is necessary to know what the needs of 
individuals are. In other words it is necessary to know what are the 
plans and projects individuals subscribe to. Were the policy-maker 
merely to guess, he may create more harm than he alleviates70• There are 
other problems for policy-makers who are thinking of adopting Miller's 
criterion of need. One person's plans and projects may conflict with 
another person's - in cases where positional goods are at stake, for 
example. It is not unrealistic to suggest, since a person may have 
several overlapping plans or projects in operation at any one time, that 
there may be some internal conflict on occasion. Plans of life need not 
be specific or detailed, and they may be liable to revision in the light 
of new infonnation and changing circumstances. The sheer variety of 
plans and projects amongst individuals makes them unlikely candidates as 
a basis for social policy unless some means of ordering them in terms of 
69. Miller, ope cit., p.134 
70. This, of course, is the problem faced by utilitarians, or at least 
those utilitarians who subscribe to Bentham's hedonistic account of 
human psychology, as set out in his The Princirles ami 1t>rals of 
Legislatioo, (New York: Prometheus BookS, 1988 , pp.1-7 
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priority can be discovered. 
One way in which these problems can be circumvented is to move as it , 
were, to a second-order level of inquiry, and look, not at the plans and 
projects that people have, but at the conditions that can be said to be 
necessary in order effectively to formulate those plans and projects in 
the first place. This is the move made by Plant et a171 and explains 
why, as we have seen, they stress the importance of autonomy (though now 
understood as personal autonomy), for the important thing about a 
person's plans and projects is that they are that person's own and no-
one else's. This is not to say that a person merely identifies with the 
set of plans or projects he or she has (since a person may identify with 
plans, projects, values, opinions , motives and so on, while having been 
duped or manipulated into having them), but rather that the person has 
autonomously chosen them, or has adapted someone else' s 72. The task of 
social policy thus becomes the securing, for all persons, 'of the 
material conditions for autonomy' 73. As already pointed out, for Plant 
et aI, these conditions will include freedom from arbitrary exercises of 
power, freedom from ill-health, and freedom from ignorance. There are 
two points to be made here concerning this list of, what are described 
by the authors as 'basic needs'. 
First, they require some substantiation. 'This might seem obvious, but 
the task is nevertheless far from straightforward. The first condition, 
71. 
72. 
73. 
Plant et aI, ope cit., pp.37-51. See also Raymond Plant's "The Very 
Idea of a Welfare State" in P. Bean; J. Ferris; D. Wbynes (Eds.), In 
Defence of Welfare, (London: Tavistock, 1985) 
For accounts of the problem of identification see Young, ope cit., 
pp.42-46; Dworkin, ~. cit., pp.15-17 
Weale, ope cit., p.98 
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for example, might be said to be the whole problem of liberalism, in as 
much as that branch or mode of political philosophy is concerned to 
establish the correct and justifiable extent of interference with 
personal liberty, by both government and by fellow citizens. The second 
condition is tied to the notion of health, and this in itself is 
problematic for two reasons. The first of these concerns the concept of 
heal th itself and how we are to understand it. The second concerns the 
relationship that can be said to exist between autonomy and health. Both 
of these issues will be expolored in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters74 • The third condition - freedom from ignorance - translates 
both as a demand for infonnation, and for education. Mill himself 
recognised the importance of education, both for those who wish to 
participate in a modern, representative democracy75, and for the task of 
self-improvement 76. Equally important, however, is infonnation. The 
connection with autonomy requires explication at this point. This is 
because it might seem that there is a sense in which, at least the 
quality of infonnation is irrelevant to autonomy. No matter how poor the 
quality of infonnation available to a person, the decision that a person 
makes on the basis of that infonnation might be said, nevertheless, to 
be autonomous. After all, as critics of certain robust accOlmts of the 
free-market point out, individuals rarely, if ever, have perfect 
infonnation. This absence of perfect infonnation, it might be said, need 
not and, as a matter of fact, does not prevent individuals from making 
autonomous decisions. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
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But this ignores the manipulation of infonnation by various parties. If 
autonomy is self-determination, then I carmot be said to be autonomous 
if I make a decision based on deliberately misleading information. I am 
not autonomous if I am being manipulated by some person or institution 
Who is feeding me either false or even partial infonnation without my 
being aware of it. If ensuring the conditions for autonomy is to be the 
task of social policy, some attention must be paid to this problem. In 
fact, of course, in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) attention has 
been paid to at least one important aspect of this problem. Advertisers 
are required at least not to lie in advertisments, because to make false 
claims for a product is to deceive the customer. Outright lying, 
therefore, is not permissible. But the corresponding problem of 
misleading, through presenting only partial truths or partial 
information, is not regulated in the same way, if at all. 'Ibis form of 
deception can be undertaken in a number of ways. It can be done by 
simply failing to tell someone of the pernicious effects of a product or 
practice. This is the activity now widely known as 'being economical 
with the truth'. The argmnent is that, although a person is not being 
told the Whole story, or is not being given the full picture in a 
particular situation, then that person is not being lied to and hence no 
harm is being perpetrated. Such argmnents trade on the moral dilenma of 
Whether or not omitting to do something (or, in this instance, omitting 
to tell someone something) is tantamount to causing them harm. 'Ibis has 
come to be known as 'bad-samari tanism ' 77. There are other ways in which 
information may be made either palatable (if it is unpleasant) or 
77. E. Weinryb, "Qnissions and Responsibility" in Philosophical 
Quarterly, (1980), Vol. 30, pp .1-18; E. Mack, "Bad Samari tanism and 
the Causation of Harm" in PhilOSO~ am Public Affairs, (1980), 
Vol.9, pp.23O-259; J. Harris, "BaSamaritans Cause Harm" in 
Philosophical Quarterly, (1982), Vol.32, pp.6o-69 
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confusing and even impenetrable (if it carmot be made palatable) without 
actually lying about a product or practice. Information may also be made 
difficult to obtain, if it is likely to cause embarrassment to an 
interested party. 
The second point to make about Plant et aI's list of 'basic needs' - the 
conditions for autonomy - is that they may be interconnected. Freedom 
from ignorance, for example, may itself be a condition of freedom from 
ill-health. If, for example, individuals are to become more responsible 
for their health (as the Prevention and Health campaign - discussed in 
Chapter Five (below) proposed), then one important resource is 
information. It has been said that the key to preventive health-care is 
education78 Yet health education - information pertaining to preventive 
activity - may itself be subject to the practices outlined in the 
previous paragraph. If health education is to be successful or, to put 
it another way, if the individual is effectively to assume 
responsibility for his or her own health, then the quality of 
information must be such that it enables that individual to pursue the 
aims effectively. Health then, as a condition of autonomy, may be 
dependent (to some extent at least) on the quality, and even quantity of 
information - another condition of autonomy - that is made available. 
78. This is a long-established contention. It was proposed, for example, 
in the opening decades of this century (and in the context of 
venereal disease prevention), by Charles Osborne in his pamphlet 
Ignorance, The Great FnAny, (London: National Council for the 
Combatting of Venereal Diseases Pamphlet NC6, 1916), p.22 
Chapter I: Social Policy and Antonany Page No. 64 
I. Conclusion 
In section i of this chapter we examined some of the assumptions that 
may be said to underpin both political theory and social policy. We 
suggested that the account one gives of society, and of the individuals 
that make up that society, will influence the way one constructs both 
political theory and social policy. But given that there is a variety of 
often incompatible accounts of society and of human nature, the problem 
arises of arbitrating amongst them. In section ii we examined the idea 
of social policy itself, rejecting positivistic definitions as 
inadequate because incapable of accounting for both difference (between, 
say, one society and another) and change (i.e. the developnent of policy 
within a society). An alternative way of characterising social policy 
was proposed, and this involved focussing on the objectives at which 
social policies are said to aim. In section iii we examined two of the 
more important objectives - the alleviation of need, and the securing of 
liberty - but found each of these inadequate as an organising principle 
for social policy. The reason for this was that each required further 
justification because neither the existence of needs nor the desire for 
liberty could secure the attention of the social theorist without the 
employment of some separate and additional argument, the task of which 
would be to establish a priority of certain needs and liberties over 
others. In section ivwe considered two candidates for this kind of 
argument - Rawls' neo-Kantian account and Plant; Lesser; Taylor-Gooby' s 
account of autonomy. Rawls' account was rejected as too formal, a legacy 
of its overt Kantian heritage. Plant et aI's account was accepted with 
reservations as acconmodating the differences between persons (that 
individuals will differ as to their own account of the Good) while 
pointing to an apparently universal characteristic of the human 
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condition - the capacity for moral autonomy. In section v we considered 
some difficulties with this account, especially its focus on moral 
autonomy, since this invokes once more the shade of Kant. The fomal 
character of Kant's rational moral philosophy makes it difficult to 
derive any practical policy conclUSions, although Plant et a1 claim to 
derive three broadly we1farist conclusions. In order to overcome this 
problem we proposed to replace the formalistic notion of moral autonomy 
wi th the more substantive notion of personal autonomy. In the final part 
of this chapter, section vi, we related personal autonomy to plans of 
life, in order to establish the substantive nature of this account of 
personal autonomy. 
In the next chapter, we explore further some of the issues raised in 
Chapter One. In section i we examine in greater detail the neutrality of 
the concept of autonomy. In sections ii and iii we examine the 
relationship between moral autonomy and personal autonomy in order to 
establish the priority of the latter over the former. In the final three 
sections, we attempt to counter the individualist associations that 
autonomy-based theories are often said to entail by relating personal 
autonomy to a social context through the notion of 'social forms' . 
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II. Introduction 
In the previous section, we made some moves towards establishing the 
credentials of autonomy as an organizing principle for social policy. 
The desirability of finding a tmifying principle arises, as we saw, as a 
result of the allegedly evaluative nature of debate concerning the scope 
of social policy. Since the objectives at which social policies aim are 
(or so the argument goes) essentially contested, then there will always 
be dispute about the nature and scope of social policy. If this is a 
problem (and not everybody will agree that it is), then the advantage of 
a unifying principle will be to secure agreement as to those objectives 
indicated by the principle, allOwing those Charged with the task of 
policy-making to get down to the practical problem of how best to 
aChieve those objectives. In the last Chapter, we examined both the 
alleviation of need and the securing of liberty in this context, but 
found them to be inadequate. It seems that if the organizing principle 
is to arbitrate amongst a variety of evaluative concepts, then it must 
itself be value-neutral, otherwise there will be no reason to look to it 
rather than some other value-laden or value-dependent concept as a guide 
to social policy. If it is not itself value-neutral, then it must either 
be ranked above other value-laden or value-dependent concepts in some 
lexical way, or it nrust be intrinsically valuable. The first part of 
this chapter considers the 'neutrality' of autonomy. Taking personal 
autonomy as the focal point, the discussion in section i considers the 
problem of neutrality from the perspective of a particular theory or 
tradi tion of thought. This is intended to pave the way for a 
consideration (in Chapter Three) of personal autonomy within what may 
broadly be described as the 'liberal-democratic' tradition. In sections 
ii and iii the relationship between personal and moral autonomy is 
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examined in some detail, in order to establish the priority of the 
former over the latter. In the final three sections of this Chapter, we 
examine the criticism, sometimes made of autonomy-centred theories, that 
they are inevitably individualist. This will allow us to explore a 
difficulty that arises from Raz' s flawed accotmt of the relationship 
between personal autonomy and social fonns, while at the same time 
enabling us to demonstrate the social nature of our accotmt of autonomy. 
The importance of first, establishing that there is such a relationship, 
and second, of tmderstanding that relationship, lies in the practical 
implications of our accotmt of personal autonomy, if this particular 
accotmt of personal autonomy is to be successfully and usefully employed 
in the formation of social policy. Some of these implications - with 
regard to an aspect of health policy - will be discussed in the final 
two chapters of the thesis. 
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II .i: Autonany and Neutrality 
Before we conmence our discussion, a difficulty inherent in this project 
needs to be indicated. Autonomy, if it is value-neutral, may not be the 
only value-neutral concept available to those seeking a unified ground 
for social policy. We have, for example, considered a possible 
alternative - Rawls' 'Justice as Fairness'. Although our conclusion 
there was that Rawls' attempt fails, there may still be other candidates 
for a neutral grounding of social policy1. But if there are other 
candidates then, potentially at least, a theoretical difficulty arises 
concerning the choice of mrlfying principle. After all, if there is a 
variety of such principles, has not the difficulty encountered at the 
level of social policy and its objectives simply been reproduced at a 
higher, or 'second-order' level?2 If this is so, then the search for a 
principle of choice at this higher level seems desirable and necessary, 
but there is no reason to think that the second-level problem will not 
reproduce itself at the third, fourth, or even fortieth level. An 
infinite regress seems to be the likely outcome of this approach. It is 
unclear Why one neutral principle should be preferred to another. To see 
1. Of the most important of the neutralist moral principles, Kant's has 
been effectively subsumed under our criticisms of Rawls in chapter 
one, while utilitarianism will be addressed below. Another 
neutralist moral theory - that developed by R. M. Hare in three 
books, "nle Language of }bra1s, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 
Freedan and Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), and 
: Its Levels Method and Point, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981 - will not be ealt with ere. The important 
characteristics of moral deciSion-making - prescriptivity and 
universality - are essentially (and with many qualifications) those 
of Kant. We may, for the purposes of this thesis at least, take it 
that the criticisms that may be levelled at Rawls and Kant might 
also, very generally, be levelled at Hare. Nozick' s neutralism will 
be discussed shortly. 
2. Rawls' broad aims might command our attention, but What is missing 
is an argument suggesting Why his (and not some other) formulation 
of the veil of ignorance ought to be employed. This point is raised 
by Joseph Raz, 'nle ~ty of Freedan, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), p.125 
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how this difficulty impinges on our argument we will look at two of the 
more influential works of political theory published in (fairly) recent 
years - Rawls' A".D!eory of Justice and Nozick' s Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia. 
(a) Rawls and Neutrality 
We shall deal with Rawls very briefly, since we have discussed his 
theory elsewhere. It will be remembered that there are two fundamental 
prinCiples which Rawls suggests will rationally be chosen from behind 
the veil of ignorance. The first of these - the principle of equal 
liberty - need not concern us. The second - the difference principle -
aclmowledges tha t individuals will differ as to the details of their 
plans of life but stipulates a list of 'primary social goods' which, it 
is suggested, all individuals will require in order to pursue their 
diverse goals. These include 'rights and liberties, opportunities and 
powers, income and wealth,3. Rawls' supposed neutrality has been 
criticised on the grounds that these primary goods are themselves far 
from neutral with respect to the conceptions of the good pursued by 
individuals, militating against, for example, non-individualistic 
conceptions while ruling others out altogether4• It has also been 
pointed out that the original position itself presupposes, not a neutral 
theory of the good, but a recognisably liberal, individualistic 
conception: 
3. 
4. 
Jom Rawls, A "nleory of Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 
p.92. Rawls later adds a sense of one's own worth to the list - see 
p.440 
Thomas Nagel, "Rawls on Justice" in N. Daniels (EeL), Reading Rawls, 
(Oxford: OUP, 1975), pp.8-10 
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• .• according to which the best that can be wished for 
someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own path provided it 
does not interfere with the rights of others.) , 
The criticism here is of a second order variety. It is not suggested 
that the neutralist elements of Rawls' theory - the original position; 
the liberty principle; etc. - are in fact agent-relative. Clearly, these 
elements are neutral amongst persons (at least insofar as they accord 
with the accotmt Rawls gives of what it is to be a person). The 
criticism is rather that these neutralist principles are embedded in a 
theory supported itself by a set of assumptions which are themselves far 
from neutral. 
(b) Nozick and Neutrality 
A similar difficulty seems to infect Robert Nozick's 'neutrality' in his 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia. For Nozick, if a state is to claim the 
allegiance of its citizens, it must be 'scrupulously' neutral between 
them6• It is not the business of the state to promote an ideal of the 
good. Nor is it the business of the state to enable individuals to do 
this. These remarks concerning the scope of state action are premised 
upon the claim that: 
••• there is no social entity ••• There are only individual 
people, different
7
individual people, with their own 
individual lives. 
This is itself a recognisably individualist position, and as we saw in 
chapter one it is not the only position that may be adopted with regard 
5. Nagel, ibid. It has also been suggested that Rawls' difference 
principle, and the specific benefits to which it is applied, can be 
used to support a materialist ideology which asserts the centrality 
of constnnption in htnnan life. John Watt, "John Rawls and Human 
Welfare" in Radical Philosophy, (Sumner, 1988), No. 49, pp. 3-9 
6. Robert Nozick, .Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1974), p.33 
7. Nozick, Ope cit., pp.32-33 
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to the nature of society. 
Nozick is sensitive to the accusation that his account of the reach of 
the state is non-neutral. After all, Nozick' s minimal state is 
constructed (maybe 'dismantled' would be better) so as to support a 
particular account of property rights, a particular distribution of 
property, a particular legal framework, and so on. Nozick suggests that 
the accusation of non-neutrality here arises because in enforcing 
(neutral) prohibitions, the state may sometimes differentially benefit 
its citizens. Differential consequences are not intended by the state, 
and so long as a given prohibition is 'independently justifiable' - that 
is, so long as the prohibition is justified by independent reasons and 
not by the fact that it results in differential benefits - then, 
according to Nozick, there is 'no reason to condemn it as non-neutral,B. 
Whether or not the independent reasons justifying the enforcement of a 
prohibition must themselves be neutral is unclear. Nozick does not tell 
us, for example, whether or not a neutral prohibition can be justified 
by independent non-neutral reasons. Nozick' s example is the enforcement 
of a prohibition against rape. This prohibition differentially benefits 
the citizenry (it safeguards women and not men because the legal system 
does not recognise that a man can be raped, though he can be assaulted) 
but is justified by a set of independent reasons - that people (male or 
female) have a right to control their own bodies; that they have a right 
to choose their own sexual partners; and that they have a right to be 
secure against physical force9• These independent reasons are indeed 
neutral amongst persons (they apply to all people), but the choice of 
B. Nozick, ope cit., pp.272-273 
9. Nozick, ibid. 
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independent reasons carmot be said to be neutral. Why these and not 
another set of rights? Why rights at all? The point is, of course, that 
the rights cited in the example look suspiciously like the kind of 
rights that come with Nozick' s libertarian terri tory, and not everyone 
will share Nozick's libertarian presuppositions. 
Even if this difficulty in Nozick' s account of neutrality were to be 
overcome, it is still possible to question the assumption that the 
state, in pursuing neutrality, must always be blind to the consequences 
of its actions. A utilitarian, for example, might want to abandon 
Nozick's procedural neutrality for a consequentialist version, which 
required the state to treat people differentially in order to achieve a 
neutral outcome amongst its citizens. This might be the case with state-
administered health care where the object is to achieve a neutral 
outcome (health for all), but where some people (diabetics, for example) 
require a level of resources not needed by others in order to achieve 
this goal. Nozick' s difficulty may stem from a presumption (again 
perhaps part of his libertarian baggage) that inaction on the part of 
the state is on the whole more likely to be neutral than action. As we 
saw in the previous Chapter, this is morally suspect. Remaining aloof 
while two il11latChed people fight, and knowing that one could 
successfully intervene to stop the stronger beating the daylights out of 
the weaker, is not to remain neutral. It is tacitly to acquiesce in an 
already imbalanced contest. Nozick' s argument, of course, is about 
retaining one's neutrality when acting (or, more specifically, enforcing 
prohibitions) rather than omitting to act, and this is achieved by 
acting for some independent reason, rather than some differential 
outcome. But consider how odd it would be to claim that in the Gulf War 
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the British and American armies, because they were fighting for an 
independent reason (the right of small nations to determine their own 
destiny, for example) were therefore neutral in the conflictlO• 
We have marshalled a number of criticisms of neutrality here. We must 
now consider how these criticisms relate to our previous discussion (in 
Chapter One) of autonomy. The problem can be stated in the fonn of a 
question: is autonomy a neutral principle such that it would serve as an 
adequate organizing prinCiple for social policy? Before we answer this 
question, we need to recall a distinction, articulated in the previous 
chapter, between two kinds of autonomy - moral and personal. We shall 
consider moral autonomy first before turning to personal autonomy. 
(c) Moral Autonany and Neutrality 
In the previous Chapter, we noticed that Raz distinguished moral 
autonomy from personal autonomy on the grotmds that the fonner was a 
particular type of moral doctrine, usually associated with the (Kantian) 
notion of acting in accordance with a set of rational (and therefore 
universalizable) principles - the Moral Law, or similar. It looks as 
though, on this reading at least, moral autonomy is by its nature a 
neutral principle, exemplified by the Kantian categorical imperative to 
treat people, regardless of any personal characteristics they may have, 
as ends in themselves, and never as a means to some further end. Of 
itself, of course, the Kantian injunction here has a recognisably 
10. This is to adapt Raz's example concerning the sale of arms to one of 
two combatants, for the independent reason of making a profit. Raz's 
example leads him to conclude that Nozick's state is not a neutral 
one, and that he does not, in fact, have a principle of neutrality. 
Raz, ope cit., p.116 
--
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liberal ring to itll. If this is so, then we might reasonably level the 
kind of criticism at the notion of moral autonomy that we levelled at 
both Rawls and Nozick, i.e. that moral autonomy itself is contentious 
and far from neutral. The problem is that a moral theory may advocate 
neutrali ty, but the moral theory might not itself be neutral amongst 
moral principles generally. This is partly because the criteria of 
neutrality are themselves constructed within a particular moral or 
political context. This is clearly the case with Nozick, but it is no 
less the case with Rawls or Kant. Both the original position and the 
Kantian injunction are criteria of neutrality, and while either might 
command widespread acceptance, they are nevertheless contentious 
prinCiples from the outset, liable to second-order criticism. If this is 
so, it begins to make the task of finding a neutral principle upon which 
to secure agreement over the objectives of social policy look 
ftmdamentally hopeless. The question now is whether or not personal 
autonomy might serve as a candidate for a neutral principle. 
(d) Personal Autonomy and Neutrality 
As we saw in chapter one, Raz suggests that personal autonomy is itself 
'no more than one specific moral ideal which, if valid, is one element 
in a moral doctrine' 12. If this is so, then there seems no reason to 
suppose that it is the kind of principle that we (and Plant et al) are 
looking for. Personal autonomy (at least on Raz's account) is 
supervenient upon a moral doctrine, and moral doctrines may be agent-
relative or neutralist. There is no reason to believe that personal 
11. 
12. 
T.H. Green utilised the Kantian injunction in his Prolegomena to 
Ethics. For an example of his use of the injunction see section 183. 
Rawls also employs the device, or at least an interpretation of it, 
in A 1heory of Justice, pp.179-183. 
Raz, ope cit., p.370, (n.2) 
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autonomy is incompatible with agent-relative moral principles. In fact, 
it might actually be better-suited to an agent-relative accOtmt of 
morality, since these, generally speaking, attempt to take some account 
of the differences between persons13• However, the fact that personal 
autonomy might theoretically be compatible with both agent-relative and 
neutralist moral theories suggests that, at the second order level, it 
could prove to be the kind of principle we are looking for. In order to 
conclude that personal autonomy were a neutral principle of the type we 
require, we would have to show that it was, in fact, a feature of all 
moral doctrines. This is conceivably what Plant et al mean to suggest 
when they claim that autonomy (that is, personal autonomy) is the 
capacity to act morally. There are two ways that we might possibly 
proceed at this point, in order to establish whether or not personal 
autonomy is a neutralist prinCiple. 
First, we might explore in some detail what it is to be a moral agent. 
The intention here would be to consider whether or not personal autonomy 
is relevant to morality as such. If, for example, it could be shown that 
personal autonomy was, in fact, a feature of all moral activity then 
Plant et al' s project might receive a considerable boost (though it 
still might not do all the work they require of it). We shall explore 
the relevance of personal autonomy to morality through a discussion of 
Raz's aCCOmlt of the relationship in his The ~ty of Freedan. 
13. This is the position taken by Bernard Williams in his critique of 
utilitarianism. See J. Smart; B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For am 
~t, (Cambridge: Cambridge ~~ersity Press, 1973) •. See also his 
'Persons, Character and Morality m!bral Luclc, (Cambr1dge: 
Cambridge Uni versi ty Press, 1981). 
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The second avenue of exploration would involve us in recognising the 
limitations of neutralist principles, thereby allowing us to work within 
a set of acknowledged constraints. The constraints we have in mind here 
are those imposed by history.. This sounds grandiose, but what is 
intended is a recognition that the importance accorded to autonomy 
derives in part (and a substantial part at that) from a particular 
dominant tradition of political practice. In this case, and broadly 
stated, liberal democracy. This strategy will be pursued in Chapter 
Three (section i) through an account of the liberal democratic 
tradition. 
II. ii: Autonaoy and lbrality 
In the following section we explore the connection between autonomy and 
morality. The central purpose is to consider the status of personal 
autonomy as a neutral concept upon which to ground social policy. 
However, a subsidiary purpose will be to expand on, and clarify, the 
distinction noticed in the previous Chapter between personal and moral 
autonomy. This task will be pursued largely through a critique of the 
account of personal autonomy developed in Joseph Raz' s The ~ty of 
Freedan. It will be shown that Raz' s account of personal autonomy is 
restrictive, and that the connection between it and what Raz terms 
'social forms' is problematic. 
Before we turn to a discussion of Raz, let us restate an ambiguity 
noticed earlier in the account of autonomy given by Plant et a1. It will 
be remembered that autonomy is defined by these authors as the freedom 
to act morally. This is ambiguous because it is not yet apparent how we 
are to understand the term 'morally'. It may mean either of two things. 
Chapter II: Autooauy and Neutrality Page No. 78 
Firstly, the term 'moral' may be set against the term 'inmoral', where a 
person acts as a moral agent, but in consciously breaking a moral code. 
To act morally, in this sense, is to act in accordance with a moral code 
of some sort. Secondly, the term 'moral' may be set against the term 
'amoral', where a person either breaks or acts in accordance with a 
moral code of some sort but does not do so consciously or willingly. In 
this case, the person who breaks a moral code (or acts in accordance 
with it, albeit lmWittingly) is not morally culpable (or praiseworthy), 
since the person is not, strictly speaking, a moral agent. If the 
moral/immoral distinction is intended by the authors, then they seem to 
be saying that the purpose of society's distributing benefits is to make 
people moral, or good, rather than immoral, or wicked. If the 
moral/amoral distinction is intended, then the purpose of society 
supplying benefits to its citizens is to enable them to become moral 
agents as such, and this for better or worse, since they may 
autonomously then choose wickedness over good, or vice versa. 
It would seem that it is the latter distinction that is intended by the 
authors for two reasons. Firstly, the former distinction seems too 
strong. It may be desirable that the members of a society act morally 
rather than immorally, but social policy cannot guarantee this or, at 
least, the kind of social policy envisaged by Plant et al cannot. 
Survival might reasonably be thought to be a condition of morality, 
since without moral agents there can be no morality. But freedom from 
ignorance - one of Plant et a1' s basic conditions for living the 
autonomous life - need not necessarily lead to moral, as opposed to 
inmoral, behaviour. It is true that the ancient Greeks, and especially 
Aristotle, generally associated morality with knowledge so that to be 
Cllapter II: Antonany and Neutrality Page No. 79 
ignorant of one's duties was to be inmorall4 • But to be ignorant of 
one's duties would now be more readily associated with amorality than 
inmorali ty. To be inmoral, in contemporary terms, is to know what one's 
duties are but to shirk them all the same. Knowledge may lead to 
inmorality just as easily as it might lead to morality - as when someone 
uses knowledge in order to blackmail a third party. Health too, can be a 
condition of morality in the second sense. This is most obviously the 
case when it is one's mental health that is of concern. For example, an 
accusation of guilt may be waived if it can be established that the 
accused acted in a condition of 'diminished responsiblity'. To regain 
one's mental health is not therefore to become moral in the first sense, 
since, having emerged from a bout of mental illness, one might then go 
on to perform immoral acts, if one so Chose. 
The second reason for opting for the morality/amorality distinction can 
be illustrated if we consider the second strand to Plant et aI's 
argument for society's guaranteeing a certain level of resources to each 
individual. This is the connection with plans of life. The authors 
14. This is R.M. Hare's fonnulation of the logic of moral statements in 
his ~ra1 Th:inking, (Oxford: Oxford Uni versi ty Press, 1981), p. 24 • 
Hare also considers rationality a Characteristic of moral thinking, 
and in this he perhaps betrays his Kantian allegiences, problems 
wi th which we have already dealt (in Chapter One). Hare's is not the 
only accotmt of morality one can give, of course. Even butterfly-
collecting could be made part of a moral enterprise if some 
Aristotelian notion of virtue were to be adopted, suCh that there 
could be virtuous (i.e. morally praiseworthy) butterfly-collectors -
those who thoroughly and diligently indexed and cross-referenced 
their collections, say - and vicious butterfly-collectors - those 
whose collections were none of these things. Something of this 
notion is to be fotmd in Alasdair MacIntyre's accotmt of the goods 
(virtues) internal to practices - see his After Virtue, (London: 
Duckworth, 1981), esp. Chapters 14 and 15 passim. This accotmt of 
morality has its problems. We would not, for example, think a serial 
killer a Good Man because he went about his chosen hobby 
conscientiously and with zeal. 
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accept that there are many different kinds of plans and projects _ goods 
- pursued by the members of any society. It would therefore be 
impossible for society to cater directly for the minutiae of the various 
plans and projects individual members might conceive of. But what 
society can do is to ensure that, as far as possible, the plans and 
projects that its members make are autonomously chosen, and it is to 
this end - ensuring that individual members of society are in a position 
to choose autonomously - that social policy is to be geared. But if we 
are to understand Plant et al as equating autonomy with acting morally 
or rightly, as opposed to immorally or wrongly, then we must conclude 
that the plans and projects with which individuals give their lives 
meaning are by their nature moral pursuits. If the freedom to act 
morally is the freedom to act rightly, then the plans and projects 
pursued by each individual must be moral goods. The conclusion would be, 
on this reading, that whatever a person chose autonomously to do was 
right. 
But this is a curiously rigid understanding of morality, for it is 
difficult to see how a person could ever act inmorally. What is missing 
from this accOlmt is any sense that morality has a social content. We 
shall explore this shortly when we turn to Raz' s accOlmt of personal 
autonomy. But reading Plant et al in this way also ignores the 
possibility that some plans and projects that a person adopts might have 
little or no moral content anyway. To set oneself the task of 
cataloguing the butterflies of the British Isles might be interesting 
and useful in itself, but it is unclear that it is a moral pursuit. If, 
as some have argued, it is a logically necessary component of moral 
thinking that it incorporate both universalizable and prescriptive 
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elements, then some plans and projects are clearly not moral pursuits14• 
A butterfly collector would presumably be loathe to prescribe universal 
butterfly collecting since to do so would be self-defeating - there 
would not be enough butterflies to go around. Some plans and projects 
might even depend on positional goods, the value of which might derive 
from the fact that obtaining them excludes others from obtaining them 
too. 
A more sophisiticated account of the connection between morality and 
autonomy can be found in Joseph Raz's The lbrality of Freedm, and it is 
to this account that we now turn. What interests us especially with 
regard to Raz' s account of personal autonomy is its connection with 
morali ty through the idea of a 'social fonn'. However, before we turn to 
this aspect of the theory, we shall set out some difficulties inherent 
in Raz' s account of the distinction between personal and moral autonomy. 
II.iii: Joseph Raz - The lbrality of Autonany 
Raz, in his important work The Morality of Freedm, is concerned (in 
part at least) to clarify the cormection between autonomy and morality. 
According to Raz, amongst the conditions necessary for the exercise of 
autonomy is a requirement that a person have an I adequate range of 
options' from which to choose15 • What counts as an adequate option is, 
Raz admits, difficult to specify, but certain criteria are thought to be 
important. There should, for example, be options of 'long term pervasive 
consequences as well as short term options of little consequence' in 
order to allow a person to exercise control over all aspects of his (or 
her) life, and there should be a variety of options too, rather than an 
15. Raz, ope cit., pp.372-378 
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abundance of uniform or similar options16 • But whatever these options 
are, they must share at least one characteristic - they must be 'morally 
acceptable ,17. This is because personal autonomy, according to Raz, 'is 
valuable only if it is exercised in pursuit of the good' 18. If 'good' 
here means morally significant, then Raz' s claim, on his own admission, 
is false. This is because the 'adequacy of options' criterion ranges 
over profound, but also over trivial Choices 'such as when to wash or 
when to comb our hair' 19. It is true that, if personal autonomy is but 
one ideal amongst a number wi thin a moral doctrine, the moral doctrine 
might conceivably transform washing or combing one's hair from a trivial 
matter into one of some moral force. Washing my hands in the morning 
might be a fairly trivial action to me, but to a moslem personal 
cleanliness is an act of devotion and far from trivial. All the same, 
this is not what Raz is claiming. He does not say that the 'adequacy of 
options' criterion ranges over trivial Choices which are no longer 
trivial because they have been given moral significance by the over-
arChing moral theory in which personal autonomy is embedded. On the 
contrary, and despite Raz' s claim that autonomy is valuable only if used 
in pursuit of the good, it seems that trivial options, options of little 
or no moral worth, are to be included in the options to be made 
available to autonomous agents20• 
16. ibid., pp.374-375 
17. ibid., p.378 
18. ibid., p.379 
19. ibid., p.374 
20. In the section on "Personal Well-Being" (~ cit., pp.288-320) Raz 
introduces the notion of ' comprehensive go s i. These are based on 
social forms and are, as such, morally significant. Social forms 
will be discussed in some detail below, but for now we need only 
note that Raz's distinction here may be said to eCho Lindley's 
distinction between dispositional and occurent autonomy. We may 
assume that, for Raz as for Lindley, trivial, or less comprehensive, 
goals may plausibly be sacrificed in favour of more comprehensive 
goals. 
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The general claim that autonomy is valuable only if it is exercised in 
pursuit of the good admits of two possible criticisms. 
The first concerns the status of any moral system in a person's life. If 
what COlIDts as good (or bad) is derived from a system of morality, then 
it seems to follow that, even if one were brainwashed into acceptance of 
that particular moral system, one may still live the Good Life simply by 
obeying the tenets of that system. The range of choices may be wide 
within the terms of that system, tlrus ensuring that one has (on Raz's 
terms) considerable personal autonomy. But surely something has gone 
wrong here? We would be happier with it if we could be sure that the 
moral system itself were (autonomously) chosen by the agent. This, after 
all, is why we do not necessarily think of nuns and monks as dupes or 
robots for we assume that their mode of life has been (autonomously) 
chosen by them. We would also want to ask what kind of a decision one 
makes when choosing amongst rival moral systems. If personal autonomy is 
one element within a moral system, and moral autonomy is itself a moral 
system, what kind of a decision is one making when one accepts (or 
rejects) Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, Christianity, Islam, or New Age 
mysticism? If such a decision is autonomous then it follows that the 
value of personal autonomy for Raz rests itself on a presupposition of 
autonomy - the ability to freely choose a moral doctrine for oneself. If 
Raz's two-fold distinction exhausts the notion of autonomy, then it 
seems that a choice between moral doctrines could not be made 
autonomously. This is surely wrong. The conclusion must be that Raz's 
accmmt of the distinction between moral and personal autonomy is either 
too restrictive or it is circular. 
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If Raz's account of personal autonomy is too restrictive, then a second 
difficulty also arises. It involves the notion of blame, or culpability 
and may be approached through a question Raz himself poses. Raz says: 
No one would deny that autonomy should be used for the good. 
The question is, has autonomy any value qua autonomy when it 
is abused? Is the autonomous wrongdoer a ~£rally better 
person than the non-autonomous wrongdoer? 
Raz is surely correct to answer, as he does, in the negative. The 
autonomous wrongdoer is clearly more culpable, from the moral point of 
view, than the person who is driven by hunger, or neuroses, or some 
other form of compulsion. But what Raz misses is that autonomy is itself 
then a prerequisite, a condition of morality. (This is the second of the 
senses discussed earlier, with regard to Plant et al) It is by no means 
clear that a person, acting under some compulsion or other, could 
properly be said to be acting morally or immorally at al122 • A person 
who, while hypnotised, commits an act of murder at the suggestion of the 
hypnotist is not morally culpable, not even as an accessory to the 
murder. This is because he or she is not autonomous. On the other hand, 
a person who coldly plans and executes a murder is culpable precisely 
because he or she is autonomous. The value of autonomy here is not that 
it is used for the pursuit of some good, but that it enables us to 
21. Raz, ibid., p.380 
22. Admittedley the nature of compulsion is disputed. There are 
complusions and there are compulsions. The case of someone 
hypnotized differs from the person who steals because he is hungry 
and cannot afford to buy food. The person who is hypnotized has no 
idea that the act they are performing is wrong. On the other hand, 
the person who steals because he is hungry and cannot afford food 
may know that his act is 'wrong' (in the sense that it goes against 
the prevailing morality where stealing is thought to be wrong) but 
may perform it all the same. He may even think it 'right' (either 
because he disagrees with the prevailing morality or because he 
thinks that other considerations - a right to life say - ought to 
override the injunction not to steal). unlike the hypnotized 
murderer, the thief is an autonomous agent but acting under the 
compulsion of hunger. 
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discriminate between two kinds of act: on the one hand, blameworthy or 
praiseworthy (or simply moral acts) and on the other, ~~ral acts. 
Autonomy as such may be necessary to living the Good Life, but it is 
also necessary for living the Bad Life, if one so chooses. The 
autonomous wrongdoer is not 'morally better' than the non-autonomous 
wrongdoer because the non-autonomous wrongdoer is not a moral agent. 
This might seem overly strict. After all, children sometimes perfonn 
'wicked' acts, incurring the displeasure and condenmation of their 
parents and (sometimes) society, and children are not usually thought of 
as autonomous agents (or at least not fully autonomous). We do then, it 
might be concluded, hold people responsible for acts they have perfonned 
regardless of whether or not they have been perfonned autonomously. But 
to punish a child for a 'wicked' act is not to punish them for 
wickedness as such. It is rather to instill in them a sense of what 
wickedness is and of the kind of behaviour that is required of them in 
society23. 
It is the capacity for autonomy that enables us also to make a 
distinction between two kinds of responsibility. In the examples given 
above, both the hypnotised 'murderer' and the murderer proper are 
undeniably responsible for the death of their respective victims. Both 
undeniably caused their victims to die, in a straightforward physical 
sense. In the case of the hypnotised 'murderer', the relationship he had 
23. There are acts which are wrong (they offend against the prevailing 
morality) but do not result in the perpetrator being labelled 
'inmoral'. Killing someone is usually wrong, but if a murder is 
perfonned accidentally or through ignorance of the prevailing moral 
codes, then the actor is not necessarily acting immorally. Ignorance 
does not make the act right but it does not make the ignorant 
iDmoral either. 
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wi th his victim was of the same kind as the person who dies in a flood 
or avalanche. There is no blame (in a moral sense) to be attached to 
merely physical causes of death. In this sense, it is not the hypnotised 
killer who is responsible for the murder; it is the hypnotist who 
implanted the suggestion. The hypnotist - in a paradigmatic ant i-Kant ian 
sense - is using the hypnotised person as a means to his own end, as a 
mere instrument. The same is not true of the murderer proper who not 
only physically causes the death of the victim, but also intends that 
death to happen. 
Personal autonomy, as we shall understand it, will be that capacity that 
allows us to choose the kind of life we are to lead, including which 
moral doctrine we wish to adopt. It is therefore not itself a moral 
doctrine but a characteristic of human nature, a condition of living a 
certain kind of life, whatever that life may be. We have, in other 
words, turned Raz' s account on its head. It is personal autonomy that is 
prior to moral autonomy, and not personal autonomy that is contingent 
upon a moral doctrine. 
We have suggested that autonomy is not a component part of a moral 
doctrine, but is itself a precondition of moral activity. One problem 
with this account is its tendency to make individuals look like self-
contained units, free from external pressure, and devoid of social 
context. In order to counter this criticism, we will turn now to the 
second aspect of Raz's theory that interests us - the connection he 
attempts to make between morality and what he calls 'social forms'. 
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II.iv: Autonany am Social Forms 
In 1he ~ty of Freedan Raz attempts to overcome the morality versus 
prudence (or altruism versus self-interest) dichotomy by focussing on 
the idea of well-being. Briefly, the well-being of a person, according 
to Raz, consists in 'the successful pursuit of valuable goals'. Baldly 
stated, this is quite compatible with any individualist accOlmt of the 
good, and also with any account that trades on a notion of self-
interest. But although he is self-avowedly developing a liberal 
poli tical theory, Raz is concerned to rescue liberalism from the 
accusations its critics often make that it ignores the essentially 
social nature of human beings. To this end, Raz develops his account of 
well-being through the notion of a social form. We shall quote in full 
the passage from Which the previous quotation was exerpted before 
offering some tentative criticisms: 
Given that the well-being of the agent is in the successful 
pursuit of valuable goals, and that value depends on social 
forms, it is of the essence of value that it contributes to 
the constitution of the agent's personal well-being just as 
much as it defines moral objectives. The source of value is 
one for the individual and the commmity. It is one and the 
same from the individual and from the moral point of view. 
Individuals define the contours of their own lives by drawing 
on the communal pool of values. These will, in well-ordered 
societies, contribute indiscriminately both to their self-
interest and to other aspects of their well-being. They also 
define the field of moral values. There is but one source for 
morality and personal well-being. 2q -
Raz 's claim is that well-being is a broader, more accomodating concept 
than self-interest, and is not, unlike that concept, to be contrasted 
with morality. But what gives it its special edge in Raz' s theory is its 
connection with social forms. Let us now examine this connection. 
The striking thing about Raz' s account of the relationship between 
24. Raz, ope cit., pp.318-319 
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individuals and their community is its similarity to Wittgenstein's 
account of the nature of meaningful behaviour, as set out in his 
Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein's project, of course, is not 
Raz's, but let us explore the similarities. Wittgenstein's concern is 
with Knowledge, but his focus is on the importance, to our understanding 
of the world, of language. Language is the key to knowledge, but it is 
also the key to understanding society. This is because language is rule-
governed, and rules, for Wittgenstein, are essentially social 
phenomena25 ). Meaning, and hence understanding, is possible insofar as 
words and concepts are used according to rules. This linguistic argument 
is generalised in the Philosophical Investigations to society. For human 
behaviour to be meaningful it must be carried out in accordance with 
socially-generated rules. For human behaviour to be intelligible then it 
must be rule-governed. There are two consequences of this account of 
meaningful behaviour. 
The first is that, if it is true, it demonstrates the essentially social 
character of human interaction. An individuals's life will only be 
meaningful in a rule-governed (i.e. a social, or potentially social) 
environment. Meaningful existence therefore is social existence. It 
depends, that is, on the existence of What Wittgenstein calls forms of 
life26 • These are given, in that they precede any individual's 
existence. This is not to say that individuals are powerless to affect 
these rules, or that they are entirely shaped by them - there need not 
25. This forms part of Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility 
of a private language - since any language must, if it to be 
intelligible to its user, be rule-governed, and since rules, in. 
principle, may be discovered and learned by other people, then lt 
follows that no language cannot be learned by other people. 
26. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953), II, xi., p.226 
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be, to employ (in a modified fashion) Raz' s disclaimer about his own 
account, 'an inevitable identity between [social] and personal 
concerns ,27 • Wittgenstein does not specify in any precise way what is, 
or is not, to count as a form of life. Given our initial account of his 
concerns in the Investigations we might conclude that a form of life is 
a linguistic Community, but this notion is unclear. It is unclear 
because there is not only a multiplicity of languages, but also of 
dialects of languages. There are also linguistic sub-cultures which 
develop particular linguistic usages as a means both of identifying 
those who are 'in' and marking off those who are to be excluded. Pop 
culture provides the best examples of this phenomenon, but other 
examples abound - 'Gay' slang, for instance. 
On the other hand, a form of life might be a rule-governed enterprise. 
When one is at work, one implicitly obeys a set of rules concerning what 
one does and how one does it. The same goes for a variety of other 
activities (in fact, all intelligible activities) such as worshipping at 
one's church, buying one's weekI y provisions, walking one's dog, and so 
on28 • If, for Wittgenstein, there is no identity between social and 
individual concerns it is because the social is not monolithic. 
IndiViduality is guaranteed, at the very least, by the sheer variety of 
forms of life one may attach oneself to. One person may be a member of 
the Raman Catholic church, a local counCillor, a keen tennis-player and 
a good husband - all rule-governed activities; while another may also be 
27. Raz, ope cit., p.319 
28. One need not be aware that one's behaviour is so governed. The 
sociologist may want to elucidate the rules that a person is 
implicitly obeying, but one need not (always) do this for oneself. 
It is nevertheless always possible in prind!;le to do this. See 
Peter Winch's account of this in his 1be I of a Social Science, 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp.Sl-57 
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a member of the Roman Catholic church but also a shop-assistant, an 
opera buff, and unmarried; and so on. Indeed, in a sense one could say 
that there are as many forms of life (read, say, as a network of 
attachments rather than a linguistic community) as there are people. 
This captures the sense in which, for Raz, an individual, while drawing 
on the 'communal pool of values', can nevertheless create something 
unique and valuable for themselves - their own life29 • 
Raz is himself unclear about what we are to understand by a social form. 
He is clear (and here he echoes Wittgenstein) that behaviour is given 
significance through social forms, but although he initially refers to 
social forms as 'forms of behaviour which are in fact widely practised 
in. •• society' 30, he does not want to focus narrowly on human behaviour. 
For this reason he suggests that social forms 'consist of shared 
beliefs, folklore, high culture, collectively shared metaphors and 
imagination, and so on' 31. He is equally clear that the importance of 
social forms relates to the COmprehensive goals a person finds valuable. 
Social forms underpin the goals that a person values even if those 
forms, despite being widely practised, are not 'socially approved,32. We 
shall return to this point shortly. 
The second consequence to be drawn from the Wittgensteinian account of 
meaningful behaviour is that any criterion of intelligibility also 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
See Raz on how combining 'elements of two [or more] exisi tng 
socially recognizable forms' may lead one significantly beyond those 
forms to create something entirely new, ope cit., p.309. See also 
p.3B7 
Raz, ope cit., p.30B 
Raz ope cit., p.311. Although he does suggest that social forms are 
'fo:ms of behaviour which are in fact widely practised in ••• 
society', p.30B 
ibid., p.310 
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provides us, simultaneously, with a criterion of ~telligibility, that 
is, it provides us with a criterion of correctness but also for error. 
As Winch has noted, 'the notion of following a rule is logically 
inseparable from making a mistake' 33. If Wittgenstein is right about the 
importance of rule-following to intelligibility, then it would seem we 
have a criterion by which to evaluate the actions of individuals. More 
importantly, since rules are in principle discoverable, we have a 
criterion by which we might evaluate our own actions. In this resides 
the possibility of morality. As Winch again puts it: 'I understand what 
it is to act honestly just so far as and no further than I understand 
what it is not to act honestly,34. One can only be moral if one 
understands the alternatives open to one in a given situation. One 
cannot properly be called moral if, through ignorance of alternatives 
(whether intrinsic to the agent or externally imposed by someone else), 
one is not aware of alternatives to what one is doing. Here we see a 
cormection with Raz' s account of autonomy, and his stress on the 
importance of adequate choices. A person who has no option but to 
perform an act, no matter how good the consequences might be of 
performing it, is not morally praisewort~5. 
The social specificity of Raz's account of morality rests on two 
33. Winch, ope cit., p.32 
34. Winch, ope cit., p.65 
35. A consequentialist might disagree, of course. For utilitarians, an 
act is moral if it produces an excess of pleasure over pain, and 
wrong if the opposite. The intentions of the agent are irrelevant -
see John Stuart Mill's statement regarding this in "Utilitarianism" 
in H.B. Acton (Ed.), Utilitarianisn, On Liberty, and Considerations 
on Representative Govenmmt, p.l7. It is equally irrelevant, of 
course as to how autonomous an agent is when performing a 'moral' 
act. A~ts performed by hypnotised agents may be judged on the basis 
of their consequences, in the same way as those performed by agents 
free from hypnosis. 
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different claims. Firstly, morality is itself drawn from the 'comnunal 
pool of value', so that even if it is reinterpreted extensively (as with 
some breakaway religious sects) it nevertheless owes a debt, as it were, 
to society. There is, it may be said, a dialectical relationship at 
work. The second aspect of morality rests on the criteria of success, 
which may underpin the notion of well-being. For Raz, it is a person's 
well-being that depends on his or her ability to 'make sense' of their 
own lives36• Now it is true that this may well be a personal criterion 
(as in 'doing one's best' or ' giving it one's best shot') and this might 
bring some satisfaction to an individual, knOwing that they have tried 
their best even though they may have failed to achieve the goal. But 
sometimes success is more than merely a personal criterion. A person who 
requires to pass an exam to either obtain a job or earn promotion will 
hardly be fully satisfied with knOwing that they did their best. To do 
one's best is not enough to succeed. One must also, in order to succeed, 
meet the accepted, public criteria of success - a certain number of 
marks in the exam. 
Raz's account of the relationship between morality and social fonna is 
interesting, but ultimately problematic. The difficulty for the account 
lies in the vagueness of the notion of a social fonn. We turn now to a 
consideration of the difficulties inherent in Raz's account of the 
concept. What we shall be particularly concerned to explore is the 
tension between public standards of success and private standards. 
36. Raz, ope cit., p.319 
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II. v: Personal Goods, Moral. Goods and Social Forms 
According to Raz, social forms consist of 'shared beliefs, folklore, 
high culture, collectively shared metaphors and imagination, and so on'. 
As forms of behaviour, these are 'widely practised' in society. The 
'comprehensive goals' that a person has must be based on a social form. 
On the face of it, Raz appears to be offering us a stipulative 
definition of the term 'comprehensive goal'. If a person claims to have 
a comprehensive goal not based on a social form Raz would presumably be 
conmi t ted to the claim that they are simply wrong. There can be no such 
thing as a comprehensive goal that is not based on a social form. Raz, 
however, offers a qualification: 
The view to be defended... is that a person can have a 
comprehensive goal only if it is based on existing social 
forms ••• which are in fact widely practised in his society.37 
The distinction we are offered is between goals based on widely 
practised social forms, and goals which are not. The former are 
comprehensive goals, while the latter, presumably, are not. The question 
we need to address here is whether or not this distinction holds up. The 
crucial idea expressed in Raz's qualified formulation is that of a 
widely practised social form and it is in pursuing this point that the 
distinction can be seen to break down. 
Raz might mean by 'widely practised' that a lot of people, perhaps a 
majori ty, wi thin a society engage in a given social form. The term 
'majority' itself can be understood in a variety of ways, ranging from a 
simple majority (about 51% of a population) to just short of unanimity 
(up to 99% of a population). This is a numerical interpretation of 
'widely practised', but Raz may intend here a spatial metaphor. A widely 
37. Raz, ope cit., p.308 
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practised social form in this sense might be one practised throughout a 
society rather than localised within a specific Community, even if this 
practise were to be undertaken by a relatively small number of people. 
Playing football on Sunday mornings is, in this sense, widely practised 
even though, taking the population as a whole, very few people actually 
play the game. One of the few hard examples discussed by Raz is the 
institution of marriage suggesting the spatial metaphor (since there are 
substantial numbers of the population of Britain - those yet to marry, 
those who have no desire to marry, those who are divorced or widowed, 
those ineligible for marriage such as children - who do not practise 
this particular social form). All the same, the spatial metaphor is 
itself problematic. How small a number can the practice get away with 
and still be a social form? Raz mentions the medical profession, yet 
very few people, on the whole, are doctors. 
Some social forms, it is suggested, are institutionalised. They require 
an institutional setting not merely in order that a practice be engaged 
in, but because some social forms are impossible outside of an 
institutional setting. It is impossible to pursue a legal or medical 
career, claims Raz, in a society that is not governed by law or that 
does not recognize the practice of medicine. We should not take it that 
a social form can only be something officially recognized, sanctioned by 
the state, although this conclusion might be drawn from Raz' s examples. 
Indeed, it is explicitly suggested that comprehensive goals may be based 
on social forms that are not sociallyapproved38• This is at least 
ambiguous. We may take it in a neutral sense, where society does not 
explicitly bestow its approval on a practice but does not register its 
38. Raz, ope cit., p.310 
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disapproval either. Such a practice is not approved, in a positive sense 
at any rate. Alternatively, we may take it, in a negative sense, to mean 
those practices of which society has explicitly registered its 
disapproval. 
In fact, of course, we must assume that the approval of society is 
largely irrelevant to the notion of social forms. A member of a criminal 
fraternity, for example, the mafia, will tmdoubtedly COtmt the aims and 
objectives of the organisation to which he belongs as his own. The 
comprehensive goals that the mafia henchman pursues then have a social 
element. They do not originate spontaneously from within him, but are 
drawn from a communal pool of values - the community, in this case being 
the 'family'. However, society at large may thoroughly disapprove of the 
activities of that tightly-knit community. 
That the community is 'tightly-knit' might seem to disqualify it from 
inclusion as a social form, since these are supposed to be widely 
practised. But there are at least three possible responses to this 
criticism. Firstly, we are not sure exactly what the social form is that 
we are dealing with. Is it, in this case, the particular mafia 'family', 
or mafia families generally, or, more generally still, organised crime, 
or, at its widest, crime as such? Secondly, even if we deny that the 
mafia family itself is a social form, it would be odd to deny that, 
because of this, the goals pursued by the individual members were not of 
the comprehensive variety. Certainly, for the individual members at 
least, those goals would be thought comprehensive in that they touch 
every aspect of their lives. The third possible response requires more 
careful elaboration. 
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In suggesting that the comprehensive goals pursued by a person must rest 
on social fonns Raz is clearly open to the charge that his thesis is 
conventionalist. As stated, it looks as though the comprehensive goals 
open to a person are simply drawn from a collective pool of socially 
sanctioned conventions. However, Raz does allow that individuals may 
work transformations upon the basic material that the social milieu 
presents to them. There may be many deviations from any given social 
form, but they will be 'deviations on a COImlon theme' so that the 
general thesis advanced by Raz is compatible with experimentation39 • 
Deviations appear to consist in simply combining elements of two or more 
existing 'socially recognised foms'. There is nothing objectionable so 
far. However, we might reasonably wonder how far one has to go before a 
deviation from a common theme becomes itself something entirely new? Are 
homosexual marriages really marriages at all? Some would no doubt argue 
that they are merely an extension of (or deviation from the norm of) the 
concept of marriage. Others would argue that such marriages are indeed 
deviations - in the pejorative sense of the word - or even that they 
were not marriages at all in any sense. Clearly, there is scope for 
argument as to whether or not a social form is being extended or 
subverted in such cases - assuming we can agree that it is a social form 
in the first place. Revolutionary socialism, after all, is a development 
from within capitalism, but it is not capitalism all the same, and it is 
not intended to be compatible with capitalism. 
There are essentially two fundamental problems then with the account of 
a social form. The first concerns scope. What is it for something to be 
'widely practised' throughout a society? A subsidiary point here is why 
39. Raz, ope cit., p.309 
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it should matter how widely practised an activity is for it to achieve 
the status of a social form? In a sense, even the most maverick activity 
within a society takes place in a social setting and therefore might be 
said to relate to other social forms, even though this might be in a 
purely negative way. The recluse, for example, relates to the social 
forms of his or her society by rejecting them. Punk Rock, with its 
emphasis on anarchy and/or nihilism, was a revolt against the 
established stalwarts of the rock world. It was therefore closely 
related to that world, even to the extent of being dependent upon that 
world for its very existence, but its goal was to undermine it all the 
same. 
The second problem is one of clarity. It is simply unclear - beyond 
Raz's cluster of examples (marriage, the medical and legal professions, 
bird-watching societies) - what precisely a social form is. Some (but 
not all) social forms require an institutional setting, but it is even 
unclear what an institutional setting might consist of. Two of Raz's 
social forms are professional bodies. But is bird-watching an 
institutionalised practice in the same sense? There may be a society of 
bird-watchers, but it is surely not necessary to belong to that society 
in order to engage in the activity of bird-watching - and we do not mean 
here on a casual basis (where any 'sighted person in the vicinity of 
birds' may be said to be 'bird-watching'). A person, or group of 
persons, may be throughly serious about their bird-watching hobby and 
still not belong to the society of bird-watchers. 
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II. Conclusion: Autonany and Social Policy 
Given the above criticisms, the most important and fundamental 
difficulty for Raz' s account of a social form, is in finding an activity 
not, in some way, related - however tangentially - to such an entity. 
This, after all, might be Raz's point. It is fairly clear that Raz, in 
introducing the notion of a social form, intends to make explicit the 
social nature of much human activity in order to defend liberalism 
against those of its critics who accuse it of having too abstract an 
account of the individual. The difficulty for us, however, concerns the 
implications of this for autonomy as a neutral concept, and it is now 
time to tie up the various threads of the argument underlying the 
critical account of social forms. 
Our concern, it will be remembered, was to establish whether or not for 
the purposes of social policy autonomy could be said to be a neutral 
concept. We proposed to approach this through the subject of morality. 
Taking it as read that human beings are potentially moral agents, we 
suggested that, if it could be shown that personal autonomy was a 
prerequisite of moral (and inmoral) behaviour, the claim might fairly 
well be established as something more than conjecture. The sticking 
point with our claim is the conflation, by Raz, of two senses of in 
which an activity could be said to be valuable. When Raz suggests that 
autonomy 'is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good', we may 
agree wholeheartedly with him40• But when he then goes on to state that 
'the ideal of autonomy requires only the availablity of morally 
acceptable options' we want to know what the connection is between 
morally acceptable goods and goods as such. Are they, for example, the 
40. Raz, ope cit., p.381 
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same thing? Recall the example of the butterfly collector discussed 
above. Here is a pursuit, a goal, a good - and it may well be a 
comprehensive good at that - which is not self-evidently a moral good. 
The pursuit may be autonomously chosen, but this consideration does not 
make it a moral pursuit, although it might significantly increase the 
value of the pursuit to the butterfly collector. 
It might be that goods linked to social forms are morally acceptable, 
but to claim this falls prey to two difficulties. Firstly, to whom must 
the pursuit be morally acceptable? The activities of the mafia may not 
be acceptable to certain sections of society, or to society at large, 
but they are surely morally acceptable to the mafiosa themselves. If Raz 
is attempting to defend a Millian position in The MOrali~ of Freedom, 
he must be aware of the duplicity surrounding the idea of a broad moral 
consensus informally legislating for the tastes and pursuits of 
'eccentric' minorities. On the one hand, minorities are to be protected 
from the 'despotism of custom' or the tyranny of public opinion, while 
on the other hand public opinion is to rein back 'anti-social' elements, 
administering a variety of punishments as it does so. This, of course, 
is Mill's problem, but until we are sure that nothing of any consequence 
rests on the attachment of comprehensive goals to 'widely accepted' 
social forms, then we might justifiably treat Raz's argument here with 
some caution. 
The second difficulty picks up on the problem of specifying which 
activities (if any) do not, in some sense, attach to a social form, 
however indirectly. This problem is analogous to the difficulty, which 
some attribute to Mill, of sustaining a meaningful distinction between 
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self-regarding and other-regarding actions - it being notoriously 
difficult to specify acts which are not also other-regarding, however 
indirectly41. The effect of this difficulty when it is attributed to 
Mill is to trivialize the notion of a self-regarding act. The effect of 
this difficulty for Raz is to trivialise the notion of a social form, 
for what is not, in some sense, a social form, or connected to, or 
derived from, a social form? If this criticism is well-f01.mded then , 
what special work does the notion of a social form now do? And if the 
goods linked to social forms are morally acceptable, then what is to 
count as morally unacceptable? 
In conclusion then, the comprehensive goals a person values may be those 
that are linked to social forms, or they may not. The comprehensive 
goals a person pursues may be morally acceptable to society at large, or 
they may not be (they may be morally unacceptable to society at large 
but of great moral import within a sub-culture - as with the activities 
of terrorists). In a pluralisitic society, after all, there will be a 
plurality of moral positions, as of everything else. Where does this 
leave the concept of personal autonomy? There are two possible 
conclusions regarding autonomy as a neutral concept, as a ground for 
social policy. 
First, autonomy does seem to be a condition of moral activity, whether 
or not that activity results in acts which are morally right or morally 
41. We might also distinguish between those self-regarding actions where 
the consequences fallon the agent performing them, and those that 
fallon others who have consented to the agent's performing them, as 
Albert Weale does in his "Invisible Hand or Fatherly Hand? Problems 
of Paternalism in the New Perspective on Health", in Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, (1983), Vol.7(4), Winter, pp.787-
788 
----
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wrong. Without an assumption of autonomy, morality would make little 
sense. It is itself a good, or valuable, insofar as we value moral 
activity Which itself rests on an allocation of responsibility. In this 
sense, to be autonomous is to be responsible. This admittedly is a 
fairly weak account of autonomy, although it is strong enough to cope 
with accounts of morality that apparently do not require agents to be 
autonomous. A morality of duty, such as Hegel posited, requires agents 
that are not mere tmthinking robots. What persons ought to do may be 
circumscribed by their station in life, but all the same they are 
required to accept the duties and obligations responsibly. It is, in 
other words, always - in principle at least - possible for them to shirk 
the duties of their station. One serious difficulty might come from 
consequentialist accounts of morality, since these, as we have already 
remarked, could feasibly cope with a complete absence of autonomy42. 
Second, autonomy is by its nature a social concept since the choice of 
goods available to a person, from Which that person will construct his 
or her life, are intrinsically social goods. This, too, is intended to 
be a fairly weak statement - indicating that Where we talk of autonomous 
persons we are not talking in abstract terms but of social beings, 
responsible not only for their moral acts but also for shaping their 
lives in the most general, fundamental of senses. In this respect, we 
concur with Raz While disagreeing that it is only morally worthwhile 
options that are valuable. If the choices an individual makes are 
valuable (for Whatever reason) to that individual, they may nevertheless 
42. Although it might be possible to develop a consequentialist account 
that employes autonomy as the good that is to be maximised. For such 
an account see Lawrence Haworth, Autonany: An Essay in PhilO~ca1 
~10gy and Ethics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19~ 
pp.1 9-182 
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be considered immoral by society at large (as with homosexuality and 
sado-masochism - although it would perhaps be going too far to suggest 
that these "states" are autonomously chosen). There must therefore be 
some value to autonomous beings in non-moral, and possibly immoral, 
activities. Autonomy then may be said to be neutral in two senses. It is 
a condition of moral activity such that anyone who is to be a moral 
agent requires to be autonomous; and it is a source of value such that 
in order to give one's own life meaning, one must be able to fashion 
one's life for oneself, that is, one must (again) be autonomous. 
We begin the following chapter by (in section i) locating our discussion 
of autonomy in the context of a tradition of political theory. If our 
account of autonomy is to be practically useful (rather than merely of 
theoretical interest) it might be useful at least to indicate how it 
relates to contemporary political discourse. This will be done through a 
consideration of two broad traditions of political thought the 'liberal' 
tradition, and the 'marxist' tradition. Section ii relates autonomy to 
liberty, while sections iii and iv continue the attempt, begun in this 
chapter, to contextualise our account of autonomy through a 
consideration of the notions of independence and rationality. The final 
two sections of the chapter situate autonomy in relation to persons, and 
especially through the notion of the body. The point of this is to avoid 
'intellectualising' autonomy. It also allows us to introduce the notion 
of health, for if the body is an important aspect of autonomy, then 
health and its opposite assume importance within the context of our 
discussion of social policy. 
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III. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we established that personal autonomy is a 
necessary condition of moral agency. It is in this admittedly weak sense 
that personal autonomy is to be viewed as neutral amongst contending 
moral theories. Personal autonomy is not itself a moral concept. It is 
necessary for moral agency in the same way that the having of a body is 
necessary for moral agency. Neither personal autonomy nor having a body 
is sufficient in itself for moral agency. Bodies, as suCh, are not moral 
agents, but even bodies invested with the capacity for autonomy are not 
moral agents, for they are still too abstract. Autonomous individuals 
require a context in which to be moral, and this was the point of the 
discussion, in the final three sections of the previous chapter, where 
we attempted, through a discussion of Joseph Raz's notion of 'social 
forms' to relate our account of personal autonomy to a social context. 
In the first section of this chapter, we relate the concept of autonomy 
to one particular, if diffuse, social form - liberal democracy. The 
point of this exercise is to indicate, albeit roughly, that there are 
good historical reasons for focussing on autonomy as a unifying 
principle for social policy. We mean to suggest in this opening section 
that such a focus would not be alien at least to the British political 
tradition. In order to do thiS, we shall distinguish between two 
historical traditions of political thought, relating our discussion of 
autonomy to each in turn. It might reasonably be argued that this 
discussion too readily forces a wide variety of political theories and 
traditions into two ill-fitting closets. This criticism is, of course, 
both valid and important, but for of a work of this size such drastic 
reductions are unavoidable. We merely acknowledge the fact here. 
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In section ii we examine the relationship between autonomy and liberty. 
In Chapter One, section iii(c) we argued that liberty was inadequate as 
an organising principle of social policy. It is nevertheless the case 
that a number of writers appear to conflate autonomy with liberty, and 
especially with Berlin's account of positive liberty. The relationship 
between the two concepts is clarified. In Section iii we examine the 
notion of independence in the context of our account of personal 
autonomy, and in section iv the relationship between autonomy and 
rationality. In both cases our intention is to build on our previous 
argument that autonomy (whether personal or moral) makes little sense 
unless it is contextualised. The problem that is identified in relation 
to both independence and rationality is the tendency to view persons as 
self-contained. In these two sections it is contended that the very idea 
of what it is to be a 'person' involves references to a context beyond 
mere independent or rational beings. In section v this contextualising 
of the autonomous person is explored through a discussion of the - quite 
literally - embodied nature of autonomy. The body, it is argued, is the 
primary means of enacting one's autonomous deciSions, so that the 
condition of the body might reasonably be held to have some effect upon 
one's capacity for autonomous behaviour. Through a discussion of the 
uni ty of the person we avoid an 'intellectualist' account of autonomy, 
and also open the way for the discussion of the relationship of health 
to autonomy undertaken in section vi. 
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III.1: The Idea of Autonauy. 
Concepts have histories, and autonomy is no exception. The word 
'autonomy' is of ancient Greek origin and referred, in that context, to 
city-states rather than to individuals. Although the concept survives in 
much the same sense today - we still talk of the autonomy of states - it 
can reasonbly be said to apply to any social grouping or society that 
makes its own rules or laws. In its application to individuals, it can 
be traced back through the writings of Kant and Spinoza, the 
Philosophes, and at least as far back as St. Thomas Aquinas1. A word of 
caution must inevitably be sounded about such exercises though, because 
the word 'autonomy' was not used by many of those whom it is claimed 
contribute to the history of the concept. Until fairly recently, only 
Kant appears to have used the word itself, and this with reference to 
his moral philosophy. The problem is that in constructing a tradition or 
a history one may make the mistake of forCing a set of diverse thinkers 
and philosophers into a conceptual straight-jacket, thus producing an 
appearance of coherence where, in reality, difference may be more in 
evidence. The problem may be illustrated in the following way. Autonomy 
is commonly said to invoke some notion of self-detennination. Kant seems 
to have held that moral autonomy combines both freedom and 
responsibility, autonomous moral agents being those people Who place 
themselves under the authority of rules that they have discovered (by 
the use of reason) for themselves2 • For Rousseau, on the other hand, it 
is obedience to laws that one has made for oneself that comprises, not 
1. 
2. 
Steven Lukes, Individualism, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), pp.52-
58 
Inmanuel Kant, The ~ Law, Translated and Edited by H.J. Paton, 
(London: Hutchinson, 1956), pp.71-73 
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autonomy, but libertr. Kant also places great emphasis on the 
importance of free will to the autonomous agent, but Hobbes, a 
thoroughgoing detenninist for whom the idea of a free will was an 
absurdity, can also be said to have held that individuals are 
autonomous, in that they are the authors of their own lives and can be 
said to govern themselves4 • If John Stuart Mill can be said to have had 
a theory of autonomy, it seems to have primarily consisted, not in 
conformity to rational laws but in non-confonnity in the face of 
convent ion 5 • Even in a contemporary context, the tenn 'autonomy' is 
taken, by some moral and political philosophers, to be synonymous with 
liberty, sovereignty, self-determination, freedom of the will, and a 
wide variety of other ideas6• 
Even where it seems apparent that the same concept is used, it would be 
rash to assume that the authors either understand or mean the same thing 
in their use of the term. According to MacIntyre, 'concepts are embodied 
3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Dle Social Contract and Discourses, 
Translated by G.D.H. Cole, (London: J.M. Dent, 1973), p.178. See 
also Andrew Levine, 'Dle Politics of Aut : A Kantian of 
Rousseau's Social Contract, Massachussetts: University of 
Massachussetts Press, 1976), pp.57-59 
4. Hobbes refers to the introduction of sovereignty by individuals as a 
'restraint upon themselves' - Leviathan, Edited by C.B. MacPherson, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1951), p.223. In the state of nature, 
individuals are self-governing, and it is the right of self-
government that is ceded to the sovereign on the implementation of 
the covenant (p.227). 
5. For Mill, conformity to 'the traditions and customs of other people' 
undermines one of the 'principal ingredients of human happiness' and 
hinders both the development of a person's character and social 
progress. Jolm Stuart Mill, Utili~anism, On Li~l~, and 
Representative Goveul .. ent, Edited~H.B. Acton, LOIl on: J.M. Dent 
& Sons, Ltd., 1972), p.115 
6. Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonany, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.6 
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in and are partly consitutive of forms of social life,7. If this is so, 
then it follows that 'different forms of social life will provide 
different roles for concepts to play' 8 • MacIntyre's argument is intended 
to emphasise the historical, social, economic and political context of 
concepts, and we shall be concerned to locate autonomy within the 
liberal democratic tradition. An alternative approach which need not 
necessarily emphasise the context of concepts is that proposed by 
Dworkin who suggests (following Hart and Rawls), that there is one 
concept, but many conceptions of autonomy, where the abstract notion 
(" autonomy" = "self-govennnent" or "self-determination" or similar) may 
be filled out in a variety of ways9. Kant, Rousseau, Rawls, Sartre, Marx 
- all these people, for example, posit a self-determining being, yet all 
of these have very different accounts of what kind of being self-
determination gives rise to. For Sartre, the self-determining being is a 
being condenmed to freedom, a being for whom self-determination is a 
condition of anguish10• For Marx, human beings make themselves what they 
are through the kind of work they perform, yet there is an important 
7 • Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1967), p.1. MacIntyre is concern is with moral 
concepts, but there seems no reason Why his thesis should not be 
applied to concepts generally. 
8. Ibid., p.2. This suggests a relativism about which MacIntyre is 
elsewhere more explicit. After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981) maps 
out the source of what MacIntyre sees as the inherent relativism of 
modem moral discourses (Chapters I-III) and outlines a solution 
based on a reading of Aristotle's account of the virtues coupled 
with a theory of tradition. See also section iv 'Autonomy and 
Rationality' pp.124-129 below. 
9. Dworkin, ope cit., pp.9-10 
10. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Translated by H.E. Barnes, 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1969) 
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sense in which human beings are not free to make themselves as they 
please, for the Character of work is historically situated11. 
If it is accepted that thinkers as diverse as Hobbes Kant Marx Mill , , , , 
Rawls, Rousseau, and Sartre all have divergent theories of autonomy, 
then the claim that autonomy 'means' self-government, or self-
detennination, or whatever is true, but trivial. Focussing on the 
concept rather than the conceptions might also lead one to conclude that 
autonomy is less politically contentious than in fact it is. The claim 
that liberals (Kant; Rawls) and libertarians (Sartre, in his pre-marxist 
writings), communists (Marx) and 'possessive' individualists (Hobbes) 
all have some notion of autonomy tmderpinning their account of what it 
is to be human suggests that autonomy as such is devoid of ideological 
content. Yet it is clear that autonomy can be, and is, a politically 
problematic concept, and this can be illustrated by identifying two 
broad historical strands12• 
11. "Men," says Marx, "make their own history, but they do not make it 
just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances Chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encotmtered, given, 
and transmitted from the past" from "The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte" in David MacLellan (Ed.), Karl Marx Selected 
writings, (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1977), p.300 
12. Bill Jordan, The State: Aut~ and Authority, (Oxford: Basil 
BlaCkwell, 1985); Lolle Nau~Historical Roots of the Concept of 
Autonomy in Western Philosophy" in Praxis International, (1985), 
Vol.4, pp.363-377. Both Jordan and Nauta identify two distinct 
traditions in this way, although Jordan is primarily concerned with 
the relationship between the citizen and the state, while Nauta is 
concerned essentially with the concept of autonomy itself. The 
notion of an 'exemplary situation' is Nauta's, pp.365-366 
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(8): The Liberal Tradition 
The liberal tradition may be characterised by the 'exemplary situation' 
of the market, where the individual is taken to be, as it is claimed is 
the case with Hobbes, the 'proprietor of his own person,13. On this 
ground, the liberal tradition takes political obligation in civil 
society to rest on equal and voluntary exchange between individualsl4 • 
It therefore assumes some level of autonomy amongst citizens at the 
outset. The very concept of 'Liberal Man' is said to rest upon the 
notion of an 'autonomous and controlling' being who not only can but 
does choose his own life, or at least aspires to, and through such 
choices as he makes overcomes 'the contingencies of background, 
Circumstance, and environment' 15. What is more, he does this on his own, 
without waiting for the rest of the proletariat (or whatever) to catch 
up with him. The characteristic contemporary political configuration 
associated with the liberal tradition is liberal democracy, with its 
emphasis on the plurality of values, the primacy of the individual, and 
the voluntary nature of political obligation. Liberal democracy is said 
to be premised upon the claim that people ought to have the equal right 
to run their own lives free, as far as is possible, from interference by 
government or society, and in this it requires autonomous individualsl6 • 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
C. B. MacPherson The Political. of Possessive Individual j SID, 
(Oxford: Oxford university Press, 19 2 , p.3 & p. 3 
This point is made by MacPherson, op. cit., p.83 and also pp.272-
274. See also Jordan, op. cit., p.9 
Susan Mendus, "Liberal Man" in Philosophy and Politics, G.K. Hunt 
(Ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1990), pp.46-47. See 
also Peter Birms, "Liberal Man: A Response" for a critique of 
Mendus, ibid., pp. 59-76 
For the characterisation of liberal democracy, see Carole Pateman, 
The Problem of Political. Obligation, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1979), pp.5-6; also C.B. MacPherson, The Real World of DeJoocracy, 
(Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1966), pp.I-12. MacPherson 
considers liberal democracy to be inseparable from capitalism (p. 4 ) • 
(Cont'd over ••• ) 
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This is not to say that autonomy is canpatible only with liberal 
democracy. It has been suggested however that liberal democracies hold 
autonomy to be a 'quintessential value,17. 
(b): The Marxist Tradition 
With regard to autonomy, the marxist tradition differs from the liberal 
tradition primarily in locating autonomy in the future. The liberal 
tradition assumes some level of autonomy amongst individuals from the 
outset. In as much as the marxist tradition emphasises the alienation of 
individuals from their 'real' or 'true ' selves, in as much as it asserts 
the exploitative nature of interpersonal relationships under capitalism, 
in as much as the free capacity to labour has become a necessity, in as 
much as labour, under capital, reduces human beings to performing a set 
of basic animal functions, then it has little or no room for autonomy 
amongst its premises. Indeed, for some marxists, to claim to be 
autonomous is to exist in a condition of illusion, and, as Marx himself 
put it, the 'demand to give up the illusions about their condition is a 
demand to give up a condition that requires illusion,18. For the marxist 
tradition, autonomy can reasonably be said to be the - or at the very 
least a - goal of political action and only possible When capitalism has 
(Cont'd from previous page) 
He also argues that the roots of liberal democracy lie in 
seventeenth-century political theory, conmencing with Hobbes -
MacPherson, ".DIe Political 1beory of Possessive Individualism, 
pp.263-271. On this latter point, see also Pateman, ope cit., pp.11-
14. See also Richard Lindley, Aut~, (London: Macmillan, 1986), 
pp.7-10 for a brief account of li~ democracy in the context of a 
discussion of autonomy. 
17. Lindley, ope cit., p.7 
18. The 'Frankfurt School', for instance, exemplified by Herbert 
Marcuse, One-Dimensiona.l Man, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1964), pp.19-20. The quotation is, of course, from Marx himself -
"Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction" in 
D. McLellan (Ed.), Karl Marx Selected Writings, (Oxford: Oxford 
university Press, 1977), p.64 
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been superceded by Conmunism19 • It has been suggested that, if there is 
a political configuration characteristic of the marxist tradition, then 
it is the centrally-plarmed, or Communist model, where, it is said, the 
individual is sUbordinated to the interests of either the State or the 
community at large20• There is, of course, dispute amongst marxists as 
to whether or not such a system existed. Those who denounced the USSR as 
itself a version of capitalism argued that it did not. If they were 
right, then the Soviet peoples were not then autonomous wi thin the terms 
of the marxist model. We are content, at least for the purposes of this 
discussion, to leave this dispute to the marxists. 
These two traditions, of course, serve to mask a wide range of very 
different political positions. For example, if the liberal tradition 
does indeed encompass 'liberal democracy', then the stark ideological 
contrast exhibited by setting up the two models in the way that we have 
shown runs into difficulty. Liberal democracies, since they are 
Characterised by a plurality of values, themselves encompass a wide 
range of political positions including conservatism, liberalism, social 
democracy, socialism, comnnmism, Raving Loonyism and many others. There 
are, of course, other ways in which the two traditions may be 
Characterised. It has been suggested, for instance, that within liberal 
19. Eugene Kamenka, Marxism and Ethics, (London: MacMillan, 1969), p.12. 
But see also Richard Archer, "Personal Autonomy and Historical 
Materialism" in Radical Philosophy, (1976), No.1S, who argues that 
the working class must be autonomous if they are to achieve freedom 
in comnnmist society (p.11). Archer equates revolutionary 
consciousness with autonomy. This has the advantage over the liberal 
tradition in that it suggests that autonomy can be a collective 
phenomenon, although it also leads easily to the Leninist conclusion 
that the autonomous (those who have achieved revolutionary 
consciousness) comprise an elite, distinct from the mass who have 
not. 
20. Jordan, ope cit., pp.9-10 
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democracies there is characteristically a concern to mark out a realm of 
activity which is private and into which government may not enter, and 
there is a concern to protect What Berlin has called 'negative' 
liberties (freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of thought) 
Which themselves ought not to be restricted by governments21 • By 
implication, the marxist tradition is concerned less with negative 
liberties than with so-called positive liberties which focus on 
entitlements. It is, of course, clear that this accotmt of liberal 
democracy is idealistic. The realm of private activity varies from one 
liberal democracy to another, as does the nature and extent of the so-
called 'negative' liberties. It must therefore be borne in mind in the 
subsequent discussion of health policy that this is not a comparative 
study but a study of an area of British social policy. That there are 
sometimes wide variations in the actual character of liberal democracies 
need not present us with any difficulties. 
We have so far suggested that some level of autonomy is assumed by 
liberal democratic theory. This suggests two separate, though connected, 
issues. Firstly, it raises the question of What level of autonomy is to 
be considered adequate for an individual to function as a member of 
society? Full autonomy might, for example, be an ideal, and therefore 
possibly tmattainable. But social policy, it would be realistic to 
suppose, must restrict itself to What is possible. Where then, and by 
What criteria, should the line be drawn? The second, and perhaps more 
fundamental question requires us to specify in more detail than we have 
done, What it is to be autonomous; for if we have no understanding of 
21. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty, 
(Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1969), pp.122-131 for the 
discussion of negative liberty. 
Qlapter ITI: Autonany and Health Page No. 114 
what autonomy is and what conditions it requires in order to sustain 
itself, then social policy will have nothing to get to grips with. There 
may be many things that autonomy requires, but our aim in this chapter 
is to consider the specific issue of health. It will be recalled that 
Plant et al include freedom from ill-health amongst their list of basic 
needs. Freedom from ill-health is a basic requirement of autonomy. It is 
also true that, in most liberal democracies, health-care consumes a 
larger portion of public revenue than any other single policy area. This 
is no less true of the United Kingdom. We shall begin therefore with a 
review of some accounts of autonomy, and especially that offered by 
Berlin, in order to ground our discussion of health and its cormection 
with autonomy. 
lll.ii: Autonany and Liberty 
There are many ways to define autonomy. We have already considered, at 
some length, the claim that autonomy consists in 'the freedom to act 
morally' and have argued that this should be understood as only a 
partial account of autonomy. There are many other definitions open to 
us, from the simplest and most direct rendering of the Greek original -
'self-rule', or 'self-government' - to the rather more complex account 
offered by Berlin in his essay 'Two Concepts of Liberty': 
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on 
external forces of Whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument 
of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a 
sub ject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious 
purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as 
it were from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a 
doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not 
acted on by external nature or by other men as if I were a 
thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human 
role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and 
realizing them ••• I wish, above all, to be conscious of 
myself as a thinking, willing , active being, bearing 
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responsibility for my Choices and able to explain them by 
references to my own ideas and purposes.Z2 
This definition is interesting, because Berlin is not offering an 
account of autonomy at all, but of 'positive liberty'. In his essay, 
Berlin identifies a concern for positive liberty with political 
theorists such as Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx. It might therefore seem 
more appropriate to situate positive liberty within the marxist 
tradition described above. Berlin identifies negative liberty with 
political thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Constant, Tocqueville and John 
Stuart Mil123 • In other words, negative liberty - defined as the absence 
of external constraint - is to be identified with the liberal tradition. 
But one might reasonably object at this point that autonomy has now been 
identified exclusively with the marxist tradition. How can this be? 
There are two ways in which one might respond to this. 
One response would involve breaking down the negative/positive 
dichotomy, and we have already considered one way in which this might be 
done24• It is also possible to blur the over1y-neat distinction that 
Berlin makes between the two concepts and their respective traditions. 
Although John Stuart Mill is firmly situated in the liberal tradition, 
it is clear that his conception of liberty involved more than protecting 
22. Berlin, Ope cit., p.131. Amongst those who take this to be an 
account of autonomy are Dworkin, ope cit., p13; Lindley, na. cit., 
p.6; Lukes, ope cit., p.SS. Robert Young, on the other han , argues 
that accounts of autonomy generally have more in common with 
Berlin's account of negative liberty in that they appear to see 
autonomy in terms of 'freedom from' interference by others. Yotmg, 
Personal Autf986!Y: ~ Negative and Positive Liberty, (London: 
Croom Helin, 19 ,pp. 7-
23. Berlin, ope cit., pp.123-12S 
24. Gerald MacCallum, "Negative and Positive Freedom" in Las1ett; 
Runciman; Skirmer (Eds.), PhilO~ Politics and Society, Fourth 
Series, (Oxford: Basil Bla2kWel~'2), pp.i74-193. See Chapter 
One, section iii(b), pp.38-41. 
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individual actions from interference by other individuals. I t is true 
that the essay On Liberty focusses on what, for Berlin at any rate, are 
the classic negative liberties - freedom of thought, speech, and 
publication. But Mill also recognised that mere absence of interference 
was inadequate as an accOtmt of liberty. Mill seems to have understood 
that people require and ought to be entitled to resources, especially 
education, in order to make the most of their liberty25. Mill, in other 
words, recognised no distinction between negative and positive 
liberty26. Thomas Hill Green, on the other hand, did distinguish between 
negative and positive liberty, but recognised explicitly (as Mill seems 
implicitly to have done) that a full account of liberty requires both 
aspects27 • The distinction may be further undennined if one accepts that 
negative liberties might themselves be re-cast as entitlements, or 
positive liberties, and vice versa28• We have already suggested that the 
right to freedom from ill-health amounts to an entitlement to heal th-
care. Similarly, both Mill and Green would presumably agree that the 
right to freedom from ignorance amounts at least to an entitlement to 
education. If this is accepted, it is possible to situate positive 
liberty (and hence, on this reading, autonomy) within the liberal 
tradition. In fact, Berlin himself appears to conflate the two senses of 
liberty. If we look closely at his definition of positive liberty we 
find that it subsumes also the notion of negative liberty. 'I wish,' 
25. Jolm Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" in Utilitarianism, On Liberty and 
Considerations on Ref972r.tative Goverll1ent, Edited by H.B. Acton, 
{London: J.M. Dent, 1972 , pp.16D-163. See also Jolm Gray, 
Liberalism, (Mil ton Keynes: Oxford Uni versi ty Press, 1986), p. 59 
26. John Halliday, Jom stuart Mill, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1976), p.115 
27. Thomas Hill Green, "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract" in 
Harris; Morrow (Eds.), T.H. Green: IA!ctures on the Principles of 
Political Obligation aDd Other Writings, ( Cambridge: CaIilbiidge 
university Press, 1986), p.199 
28. MacCallum, ope cit., p.182, n.9 
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writes Berlin, 'to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts 
of will' and, later, 'I wish to be ••• self- directed and not acted upon 
by external nature or by other men' (emphases added). It must also be 
said that breaking down the distinction between positive and negative 
liberty in the ways described also has the effect of blurring the 
distinction made between the two traditions alluded to. 
The second response would require distinguishing clearly between the 
concept - or concepts - of liberty, and the idea of autonomy. But can 
this be done? Some of those writers who offer Berlin's accmmt of 
positive liberty as a definition of autonomy thereby imply that there is 
no distinction between the two concepts, while others suggest that 
autonomy incorporates both negative and positive concepts of liberty29. 
Dworkin, on the other hand, argues that, although the two concepts are 
closely related, liberty is not equivalent to autonomy. To conflate the 
two is to miss an important difference between the concepts because 
autonomy can be restricted in different ways and by different means than 
liberty. Deception is a case in point. It is possible, argues Dworkin, 
to restrict a person's liberty by shutting him in a cell. However, if 
one only deceives that person into believing that the door is locked 
when, in fact, it is left unlocked, then one is not restricting that 
person's liberty since that person is free to leave. One is, however, 
restricting that person's autonomy. 'Deception,' says Dworkin, 'is not a 
way of restricting liberty. ,30. This is tmconvincing for it rests on the 
view of liberty as the absence of external constraints - the negative 
view. The person in the cell is free, because there is no external 
29. Lindley, ope cit., p.6; YOtmg, ope cit., pp.3-6 
30. Dworkin, ope cit., 14 
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restraint on his ability to leave. This ignores that the source of the 
deception is itself external to the agent, so that the prisoner's 
inability to leave might itself be understood as a failure of negative 
freedom. It is also possible to interpret negative freedom as freedom 
from interference by other people31 • Yet clearly the prisoner is the 
subject of interference by another person. The deceived person, Dworkin 
claims, 'will feel used, will see herself as an instrument of another's 
will' 32. This too suggests that we have here an account of the failure 
of negative rather than positive liberty. Either way, it seems erroneous 
to claim that deceiving someone does not restrict their liberty. 
The tenns 'autonomy' and 'positive liberty' might be interchangeable, 
but (bearing in mind the previous discussion) whichever tenn one 
employs, negative liberty - freedom from interference; freedom from 
compulsion or restraint - will be required in some measure. The prisoner 
may be 'free' when deceived into erroneously believing the prison door 
to be locked, but locking the door does not make the prisoner 
autonomous. The relationship between negative liberty and autonomy (or 
posi ti ve liberty) could be envisaged as concentric circles, where 
negative liberty is contained (and necessarily so) within the larger 
circle of personal autonomy/positive libert~3. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
MacCallum, ope cit., p.181 
Dworkin, ope cit., p.14 (emphasis added). Of course, they will only 
feel used once the deception has been revealed to them, which is to 
say when they are no longer deceived. 
The same argument is also applied by Dworkin to coercion (ibid.). 
But see also Joseph Raz, '!be ~ty of Freedm, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1986), pp.154-156. Raz argues that coercion might sometimes 
be ~tifiable precisely in order to secure the conditions of 
autonomy. 
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ill .iii: Autonany and Independence 
It is tempting, at this point, to see the distinction between freedom 
and autonomy as a distinction between external and internal phenomena. 
Freedom - and this may be said of both negative and positive liberty _ 
might be thought of as an aspect of an individual's relationship to the 
world, and the people in it, about him (or her), while autonomy might be 
thought of as a kind of internal, intellectual activity, a relationship 
one has to oneself. Frankfurt, for example, suggests that what 
distinguishes human beings from other animals is their capacity to fonn 
desires about their desires34• Animals as such are 'wantons' acting 
always on their most immediate desires - When they are hungry, they eat; 
when they are tired, they sleep, and so on (although this remains 
tmproven). They are free to the extent that they can satisfy their 
desires, but they are not autonomous because they lack the necessary 
intellectual or critical faculties. HUman beings, because they do 
possess such faculties, may have a desire to eat but they can also 
develop a higher-order desire not to eat, because they are fasting, or 
are on a hunger-strike. Human beings, in other words, can have desires 
about their desires; they can self-consciously re-order their 
preferences. The idea that autonomy is something wholly internal to the 
agent invokes the notion of a split-level or 'higher' self, where higher 
self is taken to be more 'real', more authentic. This has been described 
by Berlin as 'the retreat to the inner citadel,35. It is a form of 
rugged individualism, which sees any influence on an individual as 
somehow malevolent, as diminishing autonomy. In terms of political 
34. Harry Frankfurt, "The Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person" in G. Watson (Ed.), Free Will, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), p.82; also Dworkin, ope cit., p.1S 
35. Berlin, ope cit., pp.135-141 
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theory, the result, for some adherents of this View, is anarchism of the 
kind advocated by Robert Paul WOlff36. 
Wolff's position has been criticised as untenable and possibly 
incoherent. Wolff's argument is designed to show that obedience to 
authority can never be justified, hence the State can never be 
legitimate. But he seems at times to suggest that all obligations, even 
self-imposed ones, restrict one's autonomy and are therefore 
illegitimate37• If this were true, then social life would either be 
impossible or insufferably Hobbesian. What is more, many of the 
relationships that we form, and which give our lives meaning, involve 
obligations and duties that we willingly - even autonomously - accept, 
value and enjoy38. Contracts of employment set up formal obligations 
between employers and employees, yet many people value the jobs they do, 
and highly. Similarly, marriage may be viewed as a contract between two 
people that results in duties and obligations to one's spouse. One's 
freedom may be quite seriously curtailed by such a contract but -
shotgun weddings (and possibly some arranged marriages) aside - these 
are restrictions that one willingly accepts and imposes on oneself. 
36. Robert Paul Wolff, In Defence of Anarchism, (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1970) 
37. '[A] promise to abide by the will of the majority creates an 
obligation, but it does so precisely by giving up one's autonomy' , IT. cit., p.41. Wolff's argument is to be distinguished from other 
ibertarian arguments which suggest that we always act autonomously, 
or that autonomy can never be diminished. See, for example, Jean-
Paul Sartre, ope cit., p.441 
38. Raz suggests, for example, the relationship between children and 
their parents, a relationship not freely chosen (at least not by the 
children) but often willingly embraced, ope cit., p.369. See also 
Bill Jordan, Rethiriking welfare, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 
pp.17-18 
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Wolff's account of authority has been criticised as being too strong (it 
appears to consist in obeying commands just because they are commands) 
and he ignores the many kinds of authority to which we may be subject39. 
For example, it has been suggested that it is perfectly compatible with 
the idea of autonomy, on appropriate occasions, to relinquish authority. 
One might autonomously (free from deception, coercion or manipulation) 
decide to join the army, thereby willingly placing oneself under the 
authori ty of a hierarchy of commanding officers. One may also, by the 
same token, enter into a social contract without thereby diminishing 
one's autonomy (although one may diminish one's liberty by doing so, as 
Hobbes recognised). Wolff would be on firmer grotmd were he to argue 
that, since the majority of people (and possibly everybody) in the world 
had not deliberately and willingly entered into a contract with their 
governments, no state was in fact legitimate, although this would not 
preclude such a state from coming into existence. One may also accept, 
and act upon, information received from people whom one has good reason 
to believe are better placed to understand the complexities of an issue, 
or who are trained in some way that the recipient of that information is 
not40• Such might be the case with a member of the medical profession 
(we shall return to this issue in our discussion of the phenomenon of 
medica1isation in Chapter Four). Indeed, in a complex society such as 
ours, it would be difficult to conduct our lives if this were not the 
case, for 'the chain of testimony can only be as strong as the first-
hand knowledge to which it is anchored,41. Few of us have either the 
39. Dworkin, ope cit., discusses Wolff, pp.25-29 
40. John Benson, "Who is the Autonomous Man?" in Philosophy, (1983), 
Vol. 58, pp.6-7 
41. Do we even accept the source documents, or must we conduct the 
experiments or research ourselves in order to verify it? Benson, 
ope cit., p.7 
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time, the inclination, the financial resources , or the relevant 
knowledge of Where to look in the first place to check the truth of 
every proposition that comes our way. There is also good reason to think 
that, if this were necessary for autonomy, then paradoxically our status 
as autonomous individuals would itself be diminished. If every 
propoSition had to be checked for authenticity in this way, there would 
be little time to engage in the many other activities we might otherwise 
consider worthWhi1e42 • 
Such a level of independence is incoherent for another reason. When, for 
example, the Government issues a piece of advice concerning health, it 
is likely to be based on an interpretation of the available evidence. It 
is highly lIDlike1y that this evidence will be conclusive. It will itself 
have required interpretation by those familiar with the methodological 
pitfalls and other areas of dispute and uncertainty within the field of 
enquiry. In other words a judgement will have to be made by the 
'experts' concerning the relative merit of a body of evidence. If one 
were, in the interests of autonomy, to acquaint oneself with the sources 
and the various problems of interpretation, one would then have to judge 
for oneself the merits and demerits of the evidence. But, of course, one 
may also exercise one's judgement concerning the end product of the 
experts' judgemental process - one may judge the merits or demerits of 
the advice offered by the Government. To go to the original sources is 
not often, if ever, to cut through to the 'truth' of the matter. It may 
result in 'certainty' - the certainty delivered by the Government -
42. This predicament is well-captured by Raz's example of the Hounded 
Woman (op. cit., p.374) Who, despite the fact that all her faculties 
are constantly engaged in avoiding the animal that constantly hunts 
her, does not live an autonomous life. 
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being tmdermined. Either way, one may exercise one's judgement 
concerning the relative worth of a proposition at a number of levels. 
The real danger to autonomy comes, not from surrendering authority as 
such, but from the tmcritical acceptance of authority43. 
The ' rugged-individualist' accotmt of autonomy (as this may be 
described) carmot adequately encompass what it means to live in a 
society. We saw in the previous chapter that it makes little sense to 
conceive of individuals as other than social beings. It is not that 
individuals form their desires in some private 'inner citadel' and then 
take them into the social sphere (where they are likely to be thwarted 
by other individuals who have formed their own plans and projects). It 
is rather the case, as Raz suggests, that the plans and projects 
individuals have are formed from inside a social context; they are, in 
fact, drawn from that context. We suggested, extending Raz' s argument, 
that it is almost, if not entirely, impossible to conceive of 
individuals outside of a social context. Even the anti-social define 
themselves in terms of the social. It is inevitable therefore, that our 
autonomy is going to have a social element. It cannot be the case that 
autonomy is an internal phenomenon. Insofar as we are situated in a 
social context, our autonomy must be so too. 
43. Benson, ope cit., p.6 
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III.iv: Autonomy and Rational i ty 
There is another notion often associated with the idea of a 'higher' 
If ' . , If se ,or an 1nner se ,or even a 'real' self. This is the notion of 
the rational self. Philosophically, the notion of the rational self , 
like the notion of autonomy, has a long history. It can, for example, be 
traced back to the ancient Greeks where something like it can be fotmd 
in the Platonic theory of the Fonns. Its clearest modern exponent was 
Rene Descartes, for whom the rational self (comprising of the mind, or 
the soul) was the more flmdamental mode of being. The rational self was 
logically more fundamental than the body, for, after all, the rational 
self would survive the body in death. Although Kant was concerned to 
subvert the radical distinction between mind and body (through uniting 
empiricism with rationalism), nevertheless, in his moral philosophy he 
is undoubtedly a rationalist, for the Moral Law is to be discovered by 
reason, not experience. In this distinction is also to be found the 
notion that, in order to approach nearer to the 'self', one must shed 
those aspects of one's person that are irrational, such as the emotions 
- a view famously opposed by HUme44 • 
Now, the autonomous person requires rationality45, but this does not 
mean that the autonomous person has to be purely or wholly rational. The 
rationality that is required by the autonomous person, at times, need 
only be of the practical variety, involving the assessment of means 
towards an end or goal one has set upon. But this kind of calculating 
44. 
45. 
Hume describes reason as 'the slave of the passions' in A Treatise 
of IJJwnan Nature, Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), p. 415. Lindley, ope cit., discusses Hume' s 
account of deliberative rationality at length, pp.28-43 
S.I. Benn, "Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person", 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (1976), Vol.76, p.124 
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rationality, of itself, is not a sufficient account of what rationality 
might involve for the autonomous person. After all, animals seem often 
to exhibit this kind of rationality - the cat stalking a bird, or 
winding itself around its owner's legs, are both examples of behaviour 
designed to procure the satisfaction of its hunger. The problem for the 
autonomous person, is that the goals he or she has might not be their 
own, they might have been implanted - by a hypnotist, or by the 
capitalist economic system - or they might be the result of some 
compulsion. The neurotic who compulsively washes his hands might employ 
a very low-level of practical reasoning in working out the best way to 
perform his repetitive task, or he may employ a significantly higher-
level of practical reason if his habit is such that he requires to 
conceal it in order to maintain the appearance, to neighbours, friends, 
or family, of normality. The neurotic may be employing a relatively high 
level of practical reasoning in this sense, but he would not be thought 
autonomous • 
Autonomy requires that a person be able to give a reason or reasons for 
pursuing the goals, aims, plans, or projects they pursue, or the acts 
they perform, or attempt to perform46 • Yet this too should not be over-
estimated, for the kinds of reasons required to justify an act will 
differ from one situation to another. MacIntyre has suggested that all 
reasoning takes place within the context of an 'historically extended, 
socially embodied' tradition47 , although it is tmclear as to what a 
tradition might be. He is clear, however, that the concept of the self 
is partly drawn from the traditions into which one is, as it were, 
46. YOtmg, ope cit., pp.lD-12; Rawls, ope cit., pp.408-410; Weale, ~ 
cit., pp.45-47 
47. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.207 
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inserted. But it is also in part constructed, in narrative fashion, by 
the person his- or herse1:r48• This 'narrative concept of se1fhood ,49 
recalls our discussion, in the previous chapter, of social forms, for it 
implies that even the rational self is, for MaCIntyre, defined in social 
terms: 
If the narra ti ve of our individual and social lives is to 
continue intelligibly ••• it is always both the case that 
there are constraints on how the story can continue and that 
within these constraigOs there are indefinitely many ways 
that it can continue. 
Rationality is tied then to historical and social contexts. In a purely 
Kantian world, it is irrational to act on a maxim that does not conform 
to the criterion of universalizability. Reasons, given for actions, that 
do not conform are not reasons at all. In a Barbara Cartland novel, on 
the other hand, a single reason - love - motivates and explains in their 
entirety the actions of the protagonists. Stretched between the two 
extremes is our own world. Sometimes an emotion may be an acceptable 
reason for performing an act, and sometimes it may be inadequate. It is 
reasonable to do something for one person - a member of one's family 
perhaps - that one would not do for an outsider, on the basis that one 
loves that person. It would also be acceptable, if asked Why one loves 
that person, to offer, as a reason for doing so, that they are a member 
of one's family. It would possibly be irrational for an adult (though 
perhaps not for a Child) to push for further reasons. The autonomous 
person does not necessarily have to be an intellectual - the autonomous 
life does not require the level of argument and justification found in 
academic treatises, neither is it the case that human actions require 
48. Ibid •• , p.194 
49. Ibid •• , p.202 
50. Ibid •• , p.201 [second emphasis added]; On constraints on autonomy, 
see also Raz, ope cit., p.155; Weale, ope cit., p.50 
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chains of reasoning of the kind to be foltrld underpirming logical 
f 51 At· . . proo s • cer aln conBlstency ln one's actions may be all that is 
required 52. 
Reason is also important to autonomy in another sense, in terms, that 
is, of the capacity for critical reflection. According to Benn, the 
autonomous life is marked by a 'continuing process of criticism and re-
evaluation' 53. This does not mean that the autonomous person must 
continually and incessantly undertake a review of his or her belief-set 
for, as with the neurotic who constantly washes his hands, this would 
seriously restrict autonomy. All that need be required is the 
disposition to resolve incoherences in one's life by 'rational 
reflection,54. The person who uncritically accepts what he or she is 
told by other people is not autonomous. The person who accepts what 
other people tell them without good reason is acting, we may say, 
irrationally - although the 'good reason' requirement must be flexible 
enough to cope with the fact that information-gathering is a costly 
business. It is rational therefore to hold a belief for which one lacks 
hard evidence, or pending further investigation55 • It would, however, be 
irrational to hold on to such a belief if one were to discover that it 
was based on error or mistaken inference. Full rationality then is not 
necessary for autonomy, but lack of rationality seriously impairs one's 
51. Young, ope cit., p.11 
52. Roy Edgeley, Reason in Theory and Practice, (London: Hutchinson, 
1969), p.18 
53. Benn, ope cit., p.124, echoing Socrates' remark, in 'Dle Apology, 
that the unexamined life is not worth living, Plato, The Last Days 
of Socrates, Translated by Hugh Tredermick, (Harmondffivorth: Penguin 
Books, 1969), p.72 
54. Berm, ope cit., p.128 
55. Lindley, ope cit., p.47 
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autonomy by impairing one's capacity for critical evaluation, and for 
making sense of one's 1ife56 • 
The crucial point which we have sought to stress in the foregOing 
discussion is that autonomy should not be seen as an isolated, internal 
quality of abstract individuals, the kind of individuals, that is, one 
reputedly finds in 'classic' liberal (and economic) theory. Just as 
individuals are embedded in a social context, so their autonomy will 
also be contextua1ised. This is why it makes sense to think of 
organisations, sects, SOCieties, and perhaps even cultures (including, 
possibly but contentiously, 'dependency cultures') that do not value 
autonomy highly, whilst others do. What seems reasonably clear, however, 
is that a society that lacked autonomous members - a society of 
autonomata - would hardly be a society at all. 
There is, however, another dimension to autonomy Which is implied by the 
contextua1ised account just given, for if autonomy is situated in the 
world, then it is related to that world. It is for this reason that, in 
order to be autonomous, one needs more than just the capacity for 
autonomy. One needs more than the capacity for critical or rational 
reflection; the capacity for ordering and re-ordering one's preferences, 
and so on. One also needs to be able to exercise one's capacities -
autonomy is therefore an exercise-concept57 • If autonomy is valuable, it 
cannot be so merely because one possesses the capacity for it - it is 
56. 
57. 
Lindley, ope cit., p.70; Young, ope cit., p.12 
Charles Taylor, ''m1at' s Wrong with Negative Liberty?" in Alan Ryan 
(Ed.), The Idea of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1979), 
p.177 
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rather, as Raz suggests, that its ~ makes it valuable58 • In order to 
be autonomous, one must be in a position to make effective in one's 
actions the choices one makes as the result of one's reflections and 
evaluations 59 • 'TIris in turn implies that in order to be autonomous, one 
nnISt be in a position to choose from a range of possible - which is to 
say achievable - options. There must be a range of options, because a 
choice of one is not a choice at all. But quantity is not of itself 
important - there must be variety too60• It is here that liberty is 
important to autonomy, for one must be free to implement one's choice 
when one has made it. It is this - the implementing of one's autonomous 
Choices - that we shall understand as exercising one's autonomy. It is 
important to recognise this in order to avoid falling back into the 
intellectualist trap. A choice that one cannot implement is not a choice 
at all. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
Raz, ope cit., p.372; but see Lindley, ope cit., pp.68-69 who 
suggests that it is desirable to distinguish clearly between the 
capacity for and the exercise of autonomy, although he doe~ not . 
think this desirable when one is concerned - as we are - W1 th soc1al 
policy 
Dworkin, ope cit., p.17; Franfurt, ope cit., pp.89-90 
Raz, ope cit., pp.374-375 
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III. v: Autonany, Health, and the Unity of Persons 
We have so far been at pains to stress the social nature of the 
autonomous person. The importance of this lies partly in giving an 
adequate accotmt of autonomy, in acknowledging, that is, some of the 
limitations of the concept, but also partly in laying down a fotmdation 
upon which to build a substantive body of social policy. We are, after 
all, interested in the possibility of employing autonomy as a tmifying 
principle for social policy. It is important therefore to understand the 
nature of the concept, the better to construct that policy. This is 
certainly true of the specific area of policy - health - with which we 
shall be concerned in the remainder of this work. The tendency to view 
the person as comprising of two distinct parts - body, and mind (or 
soul) - received its classic statement in the work of the French 
philosopher Rene Descartes61 • The legacy that Descartes has bequeathed 
us has survived in the notion of the 'rational' self, or the belief in 
an 'inner citadel,62. To read an accotmt of autonomy onto such a 
conception would have important consequences for the kinds of health 
policies one develops. For Cartesian dualists, it is conceivable that 
one's body could suffer great hanns without in any way affecting one's 
mind or, since autonomy is a feature of the mind, one's autonomy63. If 
61. Descartes, esp. "Second Meditation: The Nature of the Human Mind" 
and "Sixth Meditation: The Existence of Material Things", in 
Elizabeth Anscombe; Peter Thomas Geach (Eds.), Descartes: 
Philosophical writings, pp.66-75 & pp.109-124 respectively. 
Translation by the Editors. 
62. Gilbert Ryle's attack on the Cartesian '~h' is amongst the most 
strident of its kind. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (Hannondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1963), pp.13-25 
63. For Descartes, the body (matter) is caught in a deterministic chain 
of cause and effect. It carmot therefore be autonomous. The mind, 
however, is free from causal pressures and can be autonomous -
although it is difficult to see how, if this is the case, the mind 
can exercise any control over the body. It is, to use Ryle's 
expression, a 'ghost in a machine' • 
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autonomy were a purely mental phenomenon, then one might conclude that 
the only form of health care that could be derived from employing 
autonomy as a unifying principle of social policy would be psychiatric 
care. The point of such care would be to restore as quickly as possible 
one's ability to reason in order that one may once again take control of 
one's life. We have, in the preceding section, attempted to establish 
that, despite - perhaps even because - of its employment of reason, 
autonomy is a social phenomenon. Post-Cartesian dualism cannot be made 
easily to fit the description of the autonomous person we have sought to 
develop. The mind - whatever this might be - is not separate from the 
body, and even if we concede to the dualists that mind and body are 
distinct substances, it remains the case that they interact closely. 
What happens to the body will have some effect upon the mind, and vice 
versa. It has been recognised only recently in the field of sociology 
that, for human beings as social actors, the body is an integral medium 
of 'self-presentation, personal control, and identity,64. Even for those 
Who hold the dualist view, it must be accepted that the body we have is 
the most social of our primary aspects - it is clearly and 
tnlcompromisingly located both temporally and spatially, while the mind -
at least for Cartesian dualists - is neither of these things65 • 
64. 
65. 
Peter E.S. Fretmd, "Bringing society into the body: Understanding 
socialized human nature" in Theory and Society, (1988), Vol: 17, 
p.840. Fretmd is referring at this point to the work of Erving 
Goffman. 
The difficulty for the Cartesians is that, if my mind is neither 
temporally nor spatially located, then there seems to be no r~ason 
to believe that it is in my body, or indeed any body. ParadoX1cally, 
Descartes himself believed that the mind (i.e. the soul) resided in 
the pineal gland, which at least suggests that it is located in 
space. 
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For the Cartesians, the mind governs the body. But even if we accept the 
dualist premise it is clear that the body can sometimes 'govern' the 
mind. For example, it is now recognised that pre-menstrual tension, 
Which has its origins in the physical, can have seriously debilitating 
effects on the mental. That 'Chemical castration' is an acknowledged 
treatment for sex-offenders also suggests that some personality-traits 
are driven by the physical (or, in both of these cases, the hormonal). 
It is not just honnones that have the capacity to alter a person's 
behaviour. High blood-pressure can make a person tense, even angry66. It 
is, of course, difficult to be specific as to how such phenomenon might 
affect a person's autonomy. It might, for example, depend on the extent 
to whiCh one's normal behaviour-patterns, or personality traits, are 
disrupted. This in turn requires some understanding of what one's 
'normal' behaviour-patterns, in fact, are. We shall return to the idea 
of normality shortly. But what we need to stress here is the extent to 
Which changes in the physical aspect of a person will have some 
determinate effect on the mental aspect of that person. The process is 
not all one way, of course, for changes in the mental life of a person 
might also result in Changes in the physical life, in tenns of behaviour 
or personality traits. The depressed person can be lethargic, whereas he 
might previously have been energetic (although it is not tmknown for 
depressed people to maintain a facade of 'normality'). The essentially 
simple point to be made here, however, is that the condition of the body 
impinges upon the mind, and vice versa, so that it is misleading to 
maintain a dualist account of the person, at least as far as health is 
concerned. Just as the posi ting of a 'ra tiona! self' described in the 
66. At least anecdotal evidence exists for this claim. See Cannon and 
Einzig, Dieting Makes You Fat, (London: Century Publishing, 1983), 
p.155 
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previous section can be misleading, so too, in terms of health care, can 
be the Stmdering of the person into two irreconcilable substances, mind 
and body67. Autonomy is, as we have stressed, a characteristic of 
persons, and persons are more than merely either minds or bodies. An 
adequate autonomy-derived health policy would have to recognise this, 
and would consequently have to treat of 'the whole person' • 
One inmediate difficulty with such a policy would be its scope. In order 
to understand what this difficulty entails, it will be useful to 
consider one particular account of how ill-health might affect one's 
autonomy. The example we shall employ will be drawn from Joseph Raz' s 
The ~ty of Freedan. Raz himself employs the example to demonstrate 
the way in which coercion can be said to restrict one's capacity for 
autonomy. However, the example may be adapted to illustrate one facet of 
the relationship between ill-health and autonomy. Raz suggests that 
autonomy rests not only on a capacity for chOice, and of choosing 
between options, but also on the adoption of personal projects, the 
development of relationships, and the acceptance of conmitments68 • The 
choices one makes and the projects, relationships and commitments that 
one adopts are (morally) valuable to the agent, and make that agent's 
life a life worth living. Raz ties the notion of a worthwhile life to a 
set of necessary conditions - he calls them 'personal needs' - and these 
are 'what is necessary to have the life one has or has set upon,69. A 
pianist, for example, will need (amongst other things) a set of fingers; 
67. It is worth recalling the etymology of the word 'health', which is 
derived from the Old English words 'hal' meaning whole and 'haelo' 
meaning wholeness. Jom D. Jago, "'Hal' - Old Word, New Task: 
Reflections on the Words 'Health' and 'Medical'" in Social Science 
and Medicine, (1975), Vol.9, p.2 
68. Joseph Raz, '.Dle !t>ra1ity of Freedom, p.1 54 
69. Ibid, pp.152-153 
Chapter lIT: Autonany and Health Page No. 134 
a footballer (amongst other things) a set of legs, and so on. Coercion, 
for Raz , involves the intentional narrowing of a person's options, by 
another person (or set of persons), to the point where the choice made 
is dictated by the coerced person's personal needs. The pianist who is 
threatened with having his fingers crushed is not acting autonomously in 
choosing to obey his coercer, because in doing so he is dictated to by a 
personal need (given that the pianist values his ability and considers 
his chosen career a life worth living)70. The more one's choices are 
dictated by personal needs, the less capacity for autonomy one has71 • 
Raz goes on to say that: 
Of course natural conditions may also force people to make 
choices determined by the need to secure the necessities of a 
worthwhile life ••• An autonomous personality can only develop 
against a background of biological and social constraints 
which fix some of its htnnan needs. Some chOices are 
inevitably determined by those needs. Yet, harsh natural 
conditions can reduce the degree of autonomy of a person to a 
bare minimum ~t as effectively as systematic coercive 
intervention • 
If it can be shown that health - or lack of it - aligns one's choices 
with one's personal needs, then it will be possible, at least 
tentatively, to conclude that there is a link between health and 
autonomy. In fact, this is relatively easy to do. Consider, since it is 
Raz's own example, the pianist. Suppose that this pianist one day 
discovered that the headaches from which he had been suffering for some 
time had been caused by a brain tumour. This, or so his doctor infonns 
him, also explains the occasional numbness that he has experienced in 
his hands and fingers from time to time. The pianist is infonned by his 
doctor that one likely effect of the brain tumour is paralysis of the 
hands, and that an operation would prevent such an eventuality. The 
70. Ibid, p.153 
71. Ibid, p.155 
72. Ibid, pp.155-156 
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pianist (like most of us) dislikes the idea of an operation and of 
cancelling various perfonnances that he has agreed to give. Yet, if he 
considers his career as a pianist worthwhile, then he really has few 
options. He is not coerced, since there is no intentionality involved on 
the part of the brain tumour. But his personal needs (fingers; ability 
to play the piano) can be said to 'dictate' his chOice of action in 
agreeing to the operation. 
This example shows that ill-health can affect one's autonomy. It would, 
however, be wrong to conclude from this that all manifestations of ill-
health affect a person's capacity for autonomy. This is partly a problem 
of definition. The idea of ill-health is parasitic upon the idea of 
health, but it is unclear as to what we are to understand health to be. 
It is possible, for example, to define health negatively - as the 
absence of disease or illness - or positively - as a 'state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being not merely the absence of disease 
and infirmity,73. The negative definition is problematic in itself, 
since it is now customary to distinguish between 'illness' and 'disease' 
- the former attaching to the experiential or subjective character of 
ill-health; the latter attaching to the objective character, where ill-
health is tied to norms and criteria developed usually by the medical 
profession. 'Illness' is said to be a cultural phenomenon 'dependent on 
folk definitions of normality which mayor may not have a relationship 
to biomedical definitions', while 'disease' is said to be 'independent 
73. The quotation is from the World Health Organisation's 'Constitution 
Basic Documents 10th Edition' (1965), cited in Christopher Ham, 
Health Policy in Britain 2nd Edition, (London: MacMillan, 1985), 
p.162 
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of social behaviour' 74, though it must be said that such a distinction 
is difficult to maintain. The activities of the medical profeSSion who 
provide 'biomedical definitions' are themselves an aspect of social 
behaviour, and as such may be located, in cu1 tura1 terms, in modern 
industrial society. Distinguishing 'illness' from 'disease' in this way 
also means that it is possible to be 'ill' when no disease is present, 
d o 75 Thi 0 °b1 an V1ce versa. s 1S one POSS1 e consequence of Parsonian 
definitions of ill-health. Parsons defines health in terms of one's 
ability to perform one's social roles - ill-health being an inability to 
fulfil one's obligations and duties as a social being76 • On Parsons' 
terms, one is ill if one is prevented from performing one's a110ted 
roles by, for example, a broken leg. A broken leg is not a disease, but 
since remedy is sought through the medical profession then it is a 
medical problem77• The example of the piano player, as it is employed 
here, suggests a variant on the Parsonian model of health and illness, 
where these concepts might be tied to autonomy through engagement with 
social forms (where social forms might serve an analogous purpose to 
74. Judith Allsop, Health Policy and the National Health Service, 
(London: Longman, 1984), p.145 
75. Allsop, ibid. 
76. Parsons defines health as 'the state of optimum capacity of an 
individual for the effective performance of the roles and tasks for 
which he has been socialized. It is thus defined with reference to 
the individual's participation in the social system', Talcott 
Parsons, "Definitions of Health and Illness in the Light of American 
Values and Social Structure" in E. Gartly Jaco (Ed.), Patients, 
Physicians and Illness, Third Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 
1979), p.132. A recent version of this appears in ']be Nation's 
Health: A Strategy for the 1990' s, Edited by Alwyn Smith and Bobbie 
Jacobson from a report by an independent multidisciplinary 
Committee, chaired by Professor Alwyn Smith, (London: King's 
Fund/Oxford university Press, 1988), where health is defined as the 
capability 'of meeting the obligations and enjoying the rewards of 
living in [one's] comrmmity', p.3 
77. 'Medical' refers 'primarily to the treatment and curing of disease 
and the restoration of health', while 'health' means 'freedom from 
disease, pain and abnonna1i ty'. Jago, ope cit., p.2 
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Parsons' Durkheimian notion of roles). On this model, , illness' would be 
defined as the inability to act autonomously through reasons which are 
attributable to the malftmctiOning of the autonomous person's body _ 
where, in view of the discussion in the previous section, 'body' is 
taken to refer to the whole person. 
III. vi: Antonany and Health Policy 
The previous discussion has established two things: first, that autonomy 
is affected by health; and second, that it is affected by the health of 
a person viewed as a totality, and not just as a mind, an intellectual 
entity. It is not only the capacity for autonomy that can be affected by 
ill-health; one's ability to exercise one's autonomy might also be 
affected by ill-health. The account of autonomy that we have developed 
so far can be likened to Dworkin's 'weak' account. For Dworkin, autonomy 
is a condition of moral thinking. It is, therefore, a 'relatively weak 
and contentless notion,78 because, if it is a condition of moral 
thinking, then no substantive moral principles follow from it. Our 
concern is not only with moral thinking, but also in what it takes to 
formulate possibly non-moral plans and projects. But if we adopt the 
weak account of autonomy, the question then arises as to what kinds of 
substantive policies - if any - might be derived from focussing on the 
relationship between health and autonomy? The remainder of this work 
will essentially be devoted to considering this problem, but for now we 
tum our attention to some of the preliminary difficulties in developing 
an autonomy-based health-policy. 
78. Dworkin, ope cit., p. 31. Dworkin distinguishes between the 'weak' 
concept of autonomy, and the substantive, Kantian conception of 
Moral Autonomy, ibid., p.47 
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There is one potential advantage derivable from our concern to employ 
autonomy as an organising principle for social policy. As it stands, the 
medical profession is obliged - in theory at least - to provide blanket 
coverage for ill-health amongst the population of the United Kingdom. 
One acknowledged problem with this situation is the difficulty of 
restricting demand for health care. Despite Beveridge's initial 
assertion that the cost of prOviding health-care would diminish over 
time as the health of the nation improved79 , the reverse has, in fact, 
been the case. One Minister of Health - Enoch Powell - stated (in 1966) 
that there is 'virtually no limit to the amount of medical care an 
individual is capable of absorbing,80. There are a number of reasons for 
this including demographic changes - there are more, elderly people now 
than there were when the National Health Service was established, and 
elderly people require more health care than their younger 
counterparts81 - and technological innovation - where the cost of 
diagnosing and treating disease has risen through the development and 
employment of high tecmology machinery and drugs82 • People do not even 
have to be ill now to absorb medical care - one result of the diagnostic 
application of medical tecmology, and the screening programmes in which 
it is sometimes employed. The question is whether or not linking health 
to autonomy might provide some rationale for more explicitly restricting 
the distribution of finite resources than the rather ad hoc process that 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
Sir William Beveridge, Social Insurance and Alljed Services, 
(London: HMSO, Cmd. 6404 , 1942), p.201; See also Brian Abel-Smith; 
Richard Titmuss, "]he Cost of the National Health Service, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp.1-2 
Enoch Powell, A New Look at Medicine and Politics, (London: Pitman 
Medical, 1966), pp.26-27 
Rising from arotmd 6 million in 1961 to nearly 8 million in 1981 (in 
the 65 and over age-group). Source: DHSS, Growing Older, (London: 
HMSO, 1981), Chart 'A'. 
Allsop, Ope cit., p.40 
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appears to operate at present, where health professionals, or so it is 
sometimes claimed, are forced (and reluctantly) to make clandestine 
decisions as to who should be given priority and when in the face of 
tight budgets and the absence of official guidelines. If the notion of 
health were to be linked to autonomy, then it might be the case that, 
where a particular ailment had no appreciable effect on a person's 
capacity to exercise his or her autonomy, the state would not be 
required to fund such treatment as might be considered necessary. For 
example, it might be the case that the removal of lIDsightly tattoos will 
not have any effect on the autonomy of a person, while the removal of a 
tumour might have a significant effect on the same person. 
But if this sOlIDds initially plausible, there are substantial 
difficulties to be overcome before one could utilise autonomy in this 
way. To do so would not, for example, successfully bridge the gap 
between the objective and subjective accolIDts of illness. Objectively, 
it might be possible to draw up a list of ailments that theoretically 
impinge upon some model person's autonomy. But a model person is not an 
actual person, and what is damaging to one person's autonomy might not 
be so to another's. This is largely because, as we have already 
indicated, the way ill-health impinges upon a person's autonomy is tied 
to the particular life one has Chosen for oneself. For a pianist, Whose 
chosen life revolves around piano recitals, to lose his fingers is to 
lose his chosen life. For a footballer, the loss of the odd finger might 
not seriously affect the pursuit of his chosen career. It is not so much 
that an individual 'deviates' from some objective norm of health, for 
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what is 'normal' to one individual might be abnormal to another83 • For 
the novelist and poet Christopher Nolan 'normality' consists in complete 
dependence on other human beings; Nolan has known no other condition 
since he was deprived of oxygen during birth. Nolan's condition, 
however, would be severely abnormal for the athlete Daley Thompson84• 
The difficulty is signalled by Raz's employment, in the example utilised 
above, of the tenn 'personal needs'. In Chapter One, we suggested that 
utilising the concept of need as an organising principle for social 
policy was problematic precisely because needs were tied to subjective 
factors. Furthennore, we suggested (following Plant et al) that 
focussing on the conditions necessary for the autonomous formulation of 
plans and projects might generate a set of basic needs shared by all 
autonomous (or at least potentially autonomous) agents. We seem to have 
turned full circle to arrive back at the problem we set out to solve. 
The task is made more difficult by two further considerations. Firstly, 
in order to gauge, for each individual, how a particular ailment 
affected their ability to act autonomously, it would be necessary first 
of all to discover which aspects of their life they valued, and to what 
extent. This assumes that the policy-formulator will have the resources 
(time; money; labour-power) available to conduct the necessary 
interviews to determine such things. More problematically, it also 
assumes that individuals will be in a position to supply a clear-cut 
answer to the policy-formulator' s query, and this may be assuming too 
much. Autonomous persons, as we have already suggested, do not 
necessarily need to have contemplated each Choice they have made to 
83. Andrew C. Twaddle, "The Concept of Health Status" in Social Science 
and Medicine, (1974), Vol.8, p.35 
84. This point is discussed in Chapter Five, section i. 
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date. They need not have categorically ranked their preferences 
following a process of critical soul-searching and indeed the autonomous 
person, we may assume, reserves the right to alter the ordering of his 
or her preferences at a moment's notice, if they so wish, so that any 
list supplied to the policy-formulator would be far from definitive. It 
is also possible that, in the face of an illness, a person might 
radically alter his or her priorities. The person who ranked cigarette-
smoking amongst her most pleasurable of activites might nevertheless 
decide to give this pursuit up on being told that she has a progressive 
smoking-related disease, in order to protect the level of health she 
currently has. Another person might decide that - disease or not - a 
life without cigarettes is a life not worth living. 
The second difficulty arises if one views health as a resource, for 
there seems to be little reason why the autonomous person should not 
forego health in the cause of some autonomously-chosen pursuit. When 
Pete Townsend of The Who penned their hit record My Generation in 1965 
he included the line 'hope I die before I get old'. What was important 
to Townsend then was not health or anything as fuddy-duddy as that. The 
things that were important to Townsend and others of his generation -
scooters, drugs, sex, holding running battles along Brighton front etc. 
- were at that time more important than health or the prospect of a long 
life85 • Clearly, an important consideration to bear in mind in any 
discussion of health ~ resource is that many pursuits (and not just 
the rock'n'roll lifestyle) involve some element of risk. That is to say, 
they involve potential harm to a person's health. Of course, this is not 
85. This consideration connects with the first in that one's priorities 
change over time. Townsend would probably not endorse his earlier 
declaration now, having advanced in age. 
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usually why a person engages in risky behaviour. Smokers, for example, 
do not seem generally to derive an added thrill from their habit because 
there is a strong possibility of their contracting some form of serious 
or fatal disease. But if health is a resource that may be traded, it 
cannot be assumed that the person who decides, for whatever reason, to 
trade that good or at least to place it in jeopardy is thereby acting 
heteronomously. Soldiers who, during World War I, rendered themselves 
unfit for combat by maiming themselves - usually by shooting themselves 
in the foot - were deliberately and consciously trading their health for 
safety86. This is to be distinguished from those instances where only 
the risk of ill-health is contingent upon the perfonning of some action. 
A person who indulges in hang-gliding and, through an accident, maims 
him: or herself, is not trading health for the enjoyment of hang-
gliding. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the accident will prevent 
any pur sui t of the sport in future. The difference appears to be one of 
deliberation and intent. The soldier deliberately maims himself; the 
hang-glider does not. The soldier intends to shoot himself in the foot; 
the hang-glider pilot does not intend to break his leg. Given that some 
people may be willing to trade health for other goods, it may be 
difficult to retain health amongst the basic needs necessary for 
autonomous behaviour. 
But on the whole, neither the person who injures his- or herself 
partaking in some risky sporting activity (or similar) nor the person 
who contracts a disease, chooses their ailment. unlike the soldier who 
86. It could be said that the soldiers who maimed themselves in this way 
were trading health for health, where the injury consequent upon 
shooting oneself in the foot was to be offset against the strong 
possibility of a more serious disability - or even death - being 
inflicted upon one by the enemy. 
Chapter III: Autonany and Health 
Page No. 143 
maims himself, the injured hang-glider pilot did not choose to break his 
leg, and as such his injury can be said to thwart his autonomy. The 
soldier's injury serves some further purpose; the same is not true of 
the hang-glider pilot87• Similarly, the person who develops multiple 
sclerosis does not choose to contract this debilitating disease (neither 
could they if they wanted to, although this is not true of all 
diseases). If we are to use the link between health and autonomy as a 
means by which to restrict the distribution of health-care resources, it 
would nevertheless be problematic to focus on the aleatory aspects of 
the relationship. There are considerable 'grey' areas, some of which 
have received attention recently, especially with regard to 'high-risk' 
activities such as Cigarette-smoking, using other drug-addicts 'works', 
and having unprotected sexual intercourse with several partners. One 
crucial difficulty would be in establishing whether or not the person 
who indulged in anyone of these activities understood the risk he or 
she was supposed to be taking. This would not be at all a 
straightforward task. It would be made more difficult if, as is often 
the case, the level of risk varied from locale to locale. Even if the 
smoker who contracts lung-cancer late in life had known the risk she was 
taking, it would still be illegitimate to conclude that she had intended 
to develop the disease as the soldier intended to damage his foot. There 
is also the medical problem of establishing anything more than a 
statistical cormection between her habit and the disease. Just because 
someone who smokes develops lung-cancer does not mean that the smoking 
caused the lung-cancer. Smoking, after all, is not the only cause of the 
87. It is possible, with hindsight, that the hang-glider pilot may come 
to appreciate breaking his leg. He might, ~or example,.~scover th~ 
delights of reading books whilst recuperat1ng - an act1V1ty that h1s 
dare-devil lifestyle might until then have precluded. 
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disease - there are many non-smokers Who contract smoking-related 
diseases. 
Conclusion 
We have sought, in this chapter, to contextualise our account of 
personal autonomy in order to overcome a number of difficulties 
generally associated with the idea of autonomy. Amongst the most 
important of these difficulties was the abstract, fonnal nature of the 
concept as it appeared in its Kantian, or neo-Kantian guises. In view of 
the project, set out in Chapter One, of employing some version of 
autonomy as an organising principle for social policy, it became 
important to substantiate our account of personal autonomy to avoid, as 
much as possible, the abstractions associated with moral autonomy. In 
Chapter Two, sections iv and v this aim was pursued through a discussion 
of the relationship between personal autonomy and social forms. In 
section i of this chapter, we contirrued this task by relating autonomy 
to one such (albeit diffuse) social fonn - liberal democracy - in order 
to distinguish our account of autonomy from the potentially 
revolutionary marxist account. Having located our discussion of autonomy 
within a liberal tradition of political theory, we proceeded, in section 
ii to consider the relationship of personal autonomy to what is usually 
taken to be a central concern of liberal theory - liberty. Having 
established the priority of autonomy over liberty, we then moved on, in 
sections iii and iv to counter the individualism sometimes associated 
with both autonomy-based and liberal political theories. Focussing on 
the idea of 'personhood' and building on our discussion, in the previous 
chapter, of social forms, we argued that the idea of the autonomous 
person can only be made intelligible through reference to a social 
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context. In section v we argued against the 'intellectualist' tendencies 
of some accounts of autonomy, by focussing on the unity of persons. In 
effect, we argued for a 'materialist' account of personal autonomy, 
where the body of autonomous persons assumes importance as the means 
through which they exercise their capacity for autonomy. This brought 
the condition or health of the body within the tenns of our discussion 
of autonomy, and so within the scope of any social policy that utilises 
our account of personal autonomy. In the final section, we considered 
some of the difficulties for social policy that might be thought to 
follow from this account of personal autonomy. 
Having established the importance of health to autonomy, we turn, in the 
next chapter, to consider a set of arguments which hold that aspects of 
health policy and of health care have the effect of diminishing, rather 
than restoring autonomy. These arguments focus on the phenomenon of 
medicalization. 
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Introduction 
In the preceding three chapters, an account of personal autonomy has 
been developed. This account suggests that if personal autonomy is to be 
employed as an organizing principle for social policy, then it is 
important to understand the relationship between autonomous choices and 
their implementation. Since the body is the primary means of 
implementing autonomous choices, the condition of the body must assume 
importance in any social policy that values autonomy. In other words, if 
personal autonomy is employed as an organizing principle, health becomes 
an important issue in social policy. In the next two chapters, this 
account of personal autonomy is set against two issues relating 
specifically to the field of health policy. However, before this task is 
commenced, it would be as well to say something about the shift we are 
making from the realm of theory to that of social policy. 
In the introduction to this thesiS, it was suggested that the role of 
theory in this work was intended to be 'fairly weak' (p.4). By this we 
mean that the account of personal autonomy developed thus far need not 
strongly suggest hard courses of action for social policy makers to 
adopt. As we stated in the Introduction, we understand the task of 
theory to be that of merely delineating the area in which political 
action may take place. There may, therefore, be plenty of scope within 
our theory of autonomy for political debate amongst adherents of many 
political persuasions. In this sense it might be said that our account 
of personal autonomy could conceivably transcend the boundaries within 
which the thesis has sought to locate itself - those of liberal 
political discourse. Whether or not this is so need not detain us here. 
What must detain us is the notion of a 'weak' rather than a 'strong' 
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theory. What does this distinction entail, and how is it to be utilised 
in the subsequent discussion? 
A useful way in which to understand the distinction between weak and 
strong theories is through an analogy with the Popperian view of 
scientific endeavour. It has often been said that scientists seek truths 
about the world, where 'truth' suggests 'finality and certainty,l. If a 
'truth' could be discovered, then argument about that 'truth' would 
cease. Strong theories will admit of no further debate, or at least of 
very little debate, concerning their content and conclusions. Popper 
himself is aware of the implications of applying this analogy in the 
fields of social science and political theory. His claim is that strong 
social or political theories will tend to be authoritarian, stifling 
debate and hence also progress (Popper is fond of citing Marx in this 
context, although debate within marxist circles has not ceased 
altogether, as is attested by the bewildering variety of rnarxisms that 
exist in the world). 
Popper's is an essentially pragmatic view of the role of theory in 
social science (and in science generally). However, it would be wrong to 
conclude that 'weak' theories, just because they are weak, are not 
therefore also prescriptive. They may be. But they differ from 'strong' 
theories in that their prescriptions are tentative in character. Bearing 
this in mind, our exploration of some of the implications of our account 
of personal autonomy will be conducted negatively. Instead of developing 
positive proposals based on the previous three theoretical chapters, we 
1. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Fnemies. Volune 1: The High 
Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Mtennath, (London: 
Routledge, 1966), p.12. 
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shall 'test' two issues in the field of health-care against our theory 
of personal autonomy. On this basis, our approach, in the subsequent two 
chapters, will be essentially eliminative, ruling out possible courses 
of action but stopping short, in this work at least, of proposing 
alternatives. 
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IV. i: The Idea of Medical j zation 
We have argued that, although there may be difficulties in understanding 
the precise nature of the connection, health is nevertheless an 
important condition of autonomy. It might be thought therefore that the 
provision of health care could only enhance autonomy. There is however a 
substantial body of thought which argues precisely the opposite. 
Although there are a number of different interpretations of the central 
thesis, the process said to be at work may be described by the single 
term 'medicalization'. The central thesis covered by this term is fairly 
straightforward - the word 'medicalization' refers to a process whereby 
the influence, authority, or power (or all of these) of the medical 
profession is said to extend or grow at the expense of individual 
autonomyl. It has been suggested that there are, broadly speaking, three 
versions of the medicalization thesis2• The first of these suggests that 
doctors, in the process of medicalizing society, act in their own self-
interest, or in the interest of their profession. The second version 
suggests that, in the process of medicalizing society, doctors are 
simply responding to, rather than initiating, broader social processes. 
On this view, medicalization is either a by-product of the crises of 
capitalism (as Navarro suggests) or of some other social process (such 
as Ivan Illich's 'industrialism'). The third view is that in 
medicalizing society, the medical profession performs either a 
1. M. Morgan; M. Calnan; and N. Manning define 'medicalization' as 'The 
exPansion of modern medicine into areas which were not previously 
within the medical sphere' in SociolOgical Approaches to Health and 
Medicine, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p.22; while Ian Kennedy 
suggests 'the conversion of social and political ills into 
illnesses' in The unmasking of Medicine, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1981), p.13. 
2. Morgan, Calnan, & Manning, ope cit., pp.22-28. 
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policing function or a legitimising function where for example access 
" , 
to statutory benefits may either be permitted or denied on the 
production of a sick-note, provided by a qualified doctor. Of course, 
these three categories need not be mutually exclusive. They may exist 
co-extensively, and may reinforce each other. Since our interest in the 
phenomenon of medicalization lies in its possible consequences for 
personal autonomy, our strategy in the following chapter will be to 
critically assess each of the three accounts in turn in light of the 
preceding chapters. 
One important point to be made about the process known as medicalization 
is that, if there is such a process, then it must be systematic. There 
is no doubt that individual members of the medical profession may have a 
detrimental effect on some of their patient's capacity for autonomy. 
Doctors are, after all, human beings. They might prescribe a pill that 
unwittingly injures a patient; they might fail to diagnose a life-
threatening disease until it is too late; surgeons have been known to 
perform operations on the wrong patient. But these are not the 
systematic restrictions on autonomy that the three medicalization theses 
seem to imply. After all, there are other occasions when the doctor will 
diagnose the disease and when the surgeon will perform the correct 
operation on the correct patient. What we are concerned with in the 
following chapter is the implied claim that there is some logic 
underlying the practice of medicine that necessarily impinges upon 
patients' (and potential patients') capacity to exercise their autonomy. 
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IV. ii: Medicalization and the Medical Profession 
There have undoubtedly been revolutions within the field of medicine. 
The discovery of the circulation of the blood by William Harvey in 1628; 
the development of the 'germ' theory of disease-causality following the 
work of Louis Pasteur in 1864; the discovery of penicillin by Alexander 
Fleming in 1928 (though penicillin was not employed clinically until 
1941) - these are but a few of the many innovations which have 
revolutionised the practice of medicine. But the medical profession is 
not self-contained and isolated from society, and medical practices can 
and do impact on the wider social environment so that revolutions within 
the profession of medicine might conceivably have revolutionary 
consequences for society at large. This may be difficult to demonstrate 
in any definite, quantitative sense. It would, for example, be plausible 
to assert, but difficult to prove, that the permissive attitude to 
sexual activity said to be characteristic of the nineteen-sixties, owed 
something to the introduction of penicillin - an effective cure for what 
were then the most widespread of the sexually-transmitted diseases. It 
would, of course, be trite to attribute the sexual revolution solely to 
the introduction of penicillin, for there are a number of other factors 
which may also have contributed (the contraceptive pill; the 
legalisation of abortion; a consciously-articulated desire to overthrow 
prevailing attitudes and prejudices, to name but three possible 
candidates). All the same, if the presence of a disease has an effect on 
how people conduct their lives, then the removal of that disease through 
preventive or curative measures might itself have some palapable effect 
on the lives of sufferers. Insofar as the medical profession is the 
agent of that prevention or cure, then it may be concluded that the 
medical profession is responsible for creating the possibility of such 
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change in the lives of sufferers. For example, prior to the appearance 
of the Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), bath-houses were an integral part of the 
'fast track' lifestyle of many male homosexuals living in San 
Francisco3• Had HIV/AIDS not appeared, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that the bath-houses would still be an important aspect of San 
Franciscan 'gay' culture. It is also not unreasonable to suppose that, 
were a cure for HIV / AIDS to be introduced in the near future, the bath-
houses might resume their former role. 
One might wish to conclude from this superficial discussion that we 
already have an account of medicalization. If the medical profession can 
affect the way people live, indeed, can assist people to live (or not), 
then the medical profession could be said to exercise a measure of 
control over the lives of individuals. But it would be illegitimate to 
infer that simply because developments take place within the field of 
medicine, then the medical profession - who administer these 
developments to the public at large - thereby exercise control over the 
public. At least, this is not the implication of the particular account 
of medicalization currently under discussion (although it may be implied 
by Illich's account - see section ii(a) below). What we are interested 
in here is the phenomenon of medicalization said to derive from 
professional self-interest. That the medical profession is self-
interested could be said to have been demonstrated by the profession's 
insipient conservatism. This has shown itself as much in the recent 
3. For an account of the political debate surrounding San Francisco's 
gay-men's bath-houses in the context of a discussion of autonomy see 
Patricia Illingworth, AIDS and the Good Society, (London: Routledge, 
1990), pp.86-89 for an account in the context of a discussion on 
autonomy. 
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objections to Conservative-inspired attempts to alter the nature and 
structure of the National Health Service (including the doctors' working 
contract), as it did to Labour-inspired attempts, in 1946-48, to create 
a National Health Service in the first place. This indicates that the 
medical profession itself is liable to be influenced - willingly or not 
- by broader social developments. It could be said, of course, that 
conservatism is common to most professions in that they exist, in part 
at least, to defend the interests of their members. But paradoxically, 
an important part of the profession's defence of its members consists in 
a defence of that characteristic which has made it one of the most 
revolutionary of professions. This is its Scientific status. The 
importance of scientific status to the medical profession has been 
acknowledged by some of the leading figures of the medical 
establishment4• There are several reasons why scientific status might be 
important to the medical profession. 
First, scientific status might be important to the profession when it 
comes to commanding resources. If a Government wishes to finance the 
health of its citizens, it will choose those branches of health care 
which are SCientific, over those which are or appear to be unscientific. 
What makes science ostensibly so important is its methodology. The 
philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper has suggested that what is 
characteristic of the scientific method is its attempt to test 
4. For example, Sir Douglas Black, (Chief Scientist to the D.H.S.S. 
from 1973-77 - during which time he chaired the influential 
committee on Inequalities in Health; President of the Royal College 
of Physicians, 1977-83; President of the British Medical 
Association, 1984-85; and recently Emeritus Professor of M~dicine at 
the university of Manchester) in his Rock Carling Fellowshlp 
monograph An AnthOl0~ of False Antithes~s, (Nuffi:ld Provi~c~al 
Hospitals Trust, 1984 , p.17. See also hlS The Log1c of MediC1Oe, 
(London: Oliver and Boyd, 1968), passim. 
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hypotheses to destruction. This in turn implies that testability is of 
pararnOlmt importance to the scientific endeavour - if something carmot 
be tested, it cannot possibly be falsified and cannot therefore claim to 
be scientific5• Testability is important as a criterion for the funding 
of medicine (and other endeavours - weapons systems, for example) 
because claims about particular practices, medicines, or pieces of 
equipment will stand or fall under such scrutiny as a test provides. The 
testability of a drug, practice or piece of machinery is closely linked 
to an assessment of the effectiveness of that drug, practice or machine, 
and effectiveness is an important consideration in deCiding where funds 
ought to be placed. In addition to this, the scientific endeavour is 
sometimes said to be 'value free'. In other words scientific practices 
are thought to be objective and therefore morally and politically 
neutral. Where the political complexion of a government might waver 
between ideological poles the neutrality of a scientific medicine ought, 
in theory at least, to protect the profession from the vagaries of 
political life6• So long as the medical profession can maintain its 
scientific and therefore neutral stance, it can, in theory at least, 
5. 
6. 
Popper cites psychoanalysis as an example of a pseudo-science since 
it is, or so he claims, a practice for which there exists no 
possibility of falsification. Marxism, on the other hand, is 
scientific, but its claims have been invalidated by history. See the 
essay "Science: Conjectures and Refutations" in Conjectures and 
Refutations, Fourth Edited: Revised, (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1972), p.37. In the case of Marxism it is possible to turn 
Popper's argument against itself, for it is unclear that Marx's 
'prophecies' (the term is Popper's) have adequately been tested. If 
Popper accepts the scientific status of Marxism, then he must accept 
that it is testable. But that a theory is testable does not imply 
that it has, in fact, been tested. A Marxist might wish to argue 
that Marx's theories have yet to be falsified. 
Peter Conrad and Joseph Sclmeider, Deviance and Medicalization: From 
Badness to Sickness, (St. Louis, Missouri: C. V. MosbY & Co., 1980), 
p.249; see also Sylvia Noble Tesh, Hidden Arguments: Political 
ldeolo and Disease Prevention Poll , (New Brunswick, N. J • : 
Rutgers University Press, 1988 , p.33 
Chapter IV: Medica1ization and Autonany Page No. 156 
continue to command a substantial share of the public purse. 
The scientific status of medicine also enables it to exercise some 
measure of control over which health practices are to be admitted to its 
ranks, and which are to be excluded. It is partly on the grounds that 
they are not scientific that many so-called alternative medicines or 
health practices are not officially recognised by the medical 
profession7• A patient will not usually find a doctor recommending that 
they visit the local herbalist, or the local acupuncturist, and rarely 
will a visit to a hypnotist be prescribed. Doctors in the main fight shy 
of sending their patients to 'outsiders' - that is, to anyone who is not 
a qualified member of the profession. 
The claim to scientific status is also important in another respect. As 
Ian Kennedy has suggested, for the medical profession, the appelation 
'scientific' connotes: 
working in the realm of truth and lmowledgee light years away from the barber and the bleeder of the past • 
The history of the medical profession can be read as an onward and 
upward march out of the gloom of ignorance, and so away from the 
7. Joel Richman points out that attempts to distinguish alternative 
from orthodox (or 'cosmopolitan') medicine will always nm into 
difficulties. If effectiveness is to be a criterion for inclusion in 
the canon of 'official' medicines, then some currently unofficial 
practices would have to be included since, for many of those who 
utilise them, alternative medicines do in fact work, often after 
orthodox medicines have failed to do so. Indeed, homeopathy - whose 
practitioners do not necessarily claim scientific status - has been 
noticeably successful in treating allergies, and is accepted as 
complimentary to more mainstream practices. The N.H.S. apparently 
operates six homeopathic hospitals. Ricrnnan, Medicine and Health, 
(London: Longmann, 1987), pp.209-210. See also Richard Taylor, 
Medicine Out of Control: The Anatany of a Malignant Technology, 
(Melbourne: Sun Books, 1979), p.40 
8. Kennedy, ope cit., p.22 
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superstitions, myths and magic spells that ignorance sometimes entails. 
The claim to scientific status is also a claim which engenders a 
distinction between 'primitive' medicines and modern, or scientific 
medicine, not only primitive in terms of the kinds of practices one 
might find in the third world, but also some of the so-called 'fringe' 
practices or alternative medicines practiced in first world societies. 
The link with science associates the medical profession not only with 
the search for truth and knowledge, but also with progress9• 
But the scientific character of the medical profession is open to 
criticism. According to Popper, testability is of prime importance to 
the scientific endeavour. But there are both practical and theoretical 
difficulties with Popper's account of how scientists conduct their work. 
One important problem with Popper's criterion of demarcation between 
science and non-science (or pseudo-science) is that scientists test for 
particular reasons and therefore (usually) look for particular results. 
It is possible that this blinds them to other, unintended consequences 
of the process, drug, or machine they are investigating. During the 
1940s, for example, high doses of oxygen were administered to immature 
babies in order to give them a healthy pink complexion. It did, but it 
also irreversibly blinded many of them. This unintended consequence was 
not connected with the practice until controlled trials were conducted 
in 195410• 
9. The generally utopian attitude to scientific medicine is well-
captured in the following quotation from 1944: 'Science has shown, 
and is showing us, what can be done to make human beings sotmd in 
bodily and mental health. By the application of SCience, ~e can make 
ourselves longer-lived, taller, stronger, less prone to dlsease, 
anxiety and pain. From half men we can become whole men'. James 
Mackintosh, 'nle Nation's Health, (London: The Pilot Press, 1944), 
p.5 
10. Richman, ope cit., p.35 
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A further problem with Popper's account is its inconclusiveness. It is 
, 
claims Popper, characteristic of a scientific theory that it can never 
be confirmed absolutely, only falsified. The best that could be hoped 
for is that, in the absence of falSifying instances, an hypothesis will 
be corroborated by further tests, although the possibility of its 
refutation by some future test will always remain. The task of the 
scientist is to devise ever more difficult tests for the theory, since 
the theory that withstands the hardest tests will be the most effective 
for us now, or at least until a better theory can be found. This, of 
course, amounts to the survival of the fittest amongst scientific 
theories. The practical problem that arises is in deciding at what point 
one is satisfied that enough tests have been conducted for a particular 
theory (or drug, or practice, or machine) to be declared effective. It 
has been pOinted out that, as a matter of fact, the effectiveness of a 
particular drug, practice or machine will not always have been 
established prior to its introduction11 • Of course, the introduction of 
a drug, practice or machine need not be taken as evidence that it is 
considered to be fully effective, or that all of the effects or defects 
are fully understood. It would seem to be in keeping with the spirit of 
Popper's account of science that there should exist a system whereby new 
drugs are tested for effectiveness before they are made available for 
use, and are monitored for side-effects after their introduction. It has 
been pOinted out though, that whereas regulatory mechanisms exist with 
11. Taylor cites the case of computerised axial tomography (C.A.T.) used 
for pinpointing malignant tumours. For this, a machine is required 
which can take multiple X-rays of the body. These, when processed by 
a computer, produce a detailed and clear picture of the 's~ft' parts 
of the body. Although the machine is astronomically expenSlve and 
there exists almost no assessments of its effectiveness, a number of 
American hospitals have purchased one, and some have purchased 
several. Taylor, op. cit., p.66-67 
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respect to drugs, there as yet exists - in the Uhited Kingdom at least _ 
no regulatory mechanism with regard to teclmological innovation12 • It is 
possible that the urgency with which some drugs are required might mean 
their introduction prior to what would count as adequate testing in less 
urgent times. Indeed, the testing of some drugs amounts in some cases to 
their introduction, albeit amongst selected groups of volunteers when, 
for instance, this is necessitated by the unavailablity of suitable 
alternatives. Attempts to find a vaccine for HIV/AIDS have been hampered 
by the uniqueness of the human inmune system. The only suitable 
alternative to the human subject appears to be the chimpanzee, and there 
is now a shortage of these animals for experimental purposes - the 
result of increased demand amongst scientists engaged in a search for an 
effective vaccine. 
Popper's account of the scientific endeavour has also been criticised as 
to whether or not it is an accurate account of what, in fact, scientists 
do. It has been suggested by Thomas Kuhn that, far from continually 
seeking ever more difficult tests for their hypotheses, scientists in 
fact readily accept as scientific doctrine (or dogma) sets of theories 
and hypotheses as a starting point for their subsequent research, and 
that they are far more reluctant to jettison theories in the face of 
apparently falsifying instances than Popper allows13 • Kuhn argues that 
scientists, on joining a scientific community, are inducted or 
indoctrinated into a set of beliefs and practices - a paradigm - which 
12. 
13. 
This is not the case in the U.S. for example, where, since the 
1970s, there has existed the Uhited States Office of Technological 
Assessment. Riclnnan, ope cit., p.35 
Thomas Kuhn, 'nle Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second 
Edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp.1O-11 and 
p.35 
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at once sets the parameters of their research, shapes the kinds of 
problems with which they will be concerned, and also shapes the kinds of 
answers that they will find to those problems. Although it is tempting 
to see Popper's and Kuhn's respective theories as incompatible, this 
need not be the casel4 • However, Kuhn's theory does (and Popper's does 
not) indicate the extent to which SCience, for all its claims to 
objectivity, may itself be shaped by subjective factors. Kuhn's claim 
implies that science is not the objective, value-free enterprise it is 
often claimed to be. Once this is granted, it follows that scientists 
might be expected to bring their prejudices to bear upon their workl5 . 
What is not clear is that this must result in the medicalization of 
doctors' patients. Since doctors are themselves embedded in a social 
context (they are, as a profession, one of Raz's exemplary social forms) 
they will, at least as indiViduals, reflect the prevailing mores and 
attitudes of their own society. 
All the same, professional self-interest (with or without the support of 
scientific kudos) of itself does not seem to do the work that the 
medicalization thesis appears to require. There are two reasons why this 
account of medicalization need not unduly affect an individual's 
personal autonomy. First, an important component of medical practice is 
directed at alleviating suffering. In a sense then professional self-
interest is tied to a concern for the welfare of others (and this is 
true of all the 'caring professions'). If our previous argument - that 
ill-health restricts the capacity of persons to exercise their autonomy 
- is well-founded, then there seems no real reason to conclude that 
14. 
IS. 
Bryan Magee, Popper, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1973), p.41 . 
E. Friedson, Profession of Medicine A S of the Sociolo of 
Applied Knowledge, New York: Dodds, Mead and Co., 19 2 , pp.253-254 
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medicalization through professional self-interest necessarily reduces 
autonomy. If the concern of the medical profession is to restore health 
to sick indiViduals, then it should also have the effect of restoring 
the capacity to exercise autonomy to those individuals, Where the 
illness had either thwarted this capacity, or threatened it. 
The second point to be made concerns the way in which medicalization, as 
professional self-interest, may be said to proceed. Some commentators 
have suggested that the medical profession is an imperialistic social 
phenomenon, seeking, through its ability to exclude alternative 
practices as unscientific, to monopolise the practice of medicine. 
Medicalization is sometimes said to occur when an activity that has 
previously been considered to be, say, a moral failing, and hence not 
the business of the medical profession, is labelled an illness and 
therefore legitimately becomes the subject of medical intervention16 . 
Thus, if alcoholism is labelled a disease by the medical profession (as 
it has been), it may be that the alcoholic is no longer seen as morally 
culpable, but as someone who has succumbed blamelessly to a disease. The 
alcoholic may then be accorded treatment formerly denied to him17. The 
imperialistic face of medicalization can be said to be revealed in the 
16. Several writers about medicalization make this point. See, for 
example, Irving K. Zola, "Healthism and Disabling Medicalization" in 
Ivan Illich et al Disabling Professions, (London: Marion Boyars, 
1977), pp.43,53; Taylor, ope cit., p.224; Kennedy, ope cit., p.13; 
Robert Crawford, "Healthism and the Medicalization of Everyday Life" 
in International Journal of Health Services, (1980), Vol.10( 3) , 
p.368. 
17. The process may be also be reversed. In the united States, for 
example, the medical profession has recently announced that 
homosexuality is not, in fact, an illness at all. This has the 
effect of de-medicalizing homosexuals, although the benefits of this 
are ambiguous since it may also be said to foist responsibility for 
their sexual preference back onto individual homosexuals. This opens 
up the possibility of blaming homosexuals for any detrimental 
consequence of their 'chosen' lifestyle. 
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following way: if the medical profesSion does indeed have a legitimate 
role as the arbiter of disease, then the possibility exists for the 
medical profession to create a constant and expanding clientele upon 
which it may practice its art18• Edwin Chadwick, the great nineteenth-
century sanitary reformer, suggested that his proposals for sanitary 
reform would render the medical profession redundant19 • As we have 
already seen, William Beveridge, architect of the British welfare state , 
suggested that as the health of the population improved, so the costs of 
operating the welfare state would decrease. Both men were in a way 
suggesting that the medical profession's role in society would 
ultimately be residual. Medicalization can thus be seen as a process 
Which ensures that this is not, and never will be, the case. But even if 
this is an accurate description of the medical profession's rationale 
(and it must be said that the medical profession is often reluctant to 
'offically' declare something a disease - witness the current dispute 
within the profession concerning 'post-viral syndrome') it need not 
result in a further restriction of personal autonomy. It has been 
suggested, for example, that medicalization represents not so much a 
reduction of autonomy in the face of expanding medical practices, as a 
new division of labour within the social services generally20. If this 
is the case, then medicalization loses much of its interest for our 
purposes since we are concerned with how the medical profession might 
idiosyncratically affect a person's capacity for autonomous behaviour. 
18. Taylor, ope cit., p.190 
19. R.A. Lewis, Edwin Chadwick and the Public Health Movement, 1832-
1854, (London: Longman, Green & Co., 1952), p.77 
20. This is argued with regard to paediatrics by Sydney A. ~lpern, 
"Medicalization as Professional Process: Postwar Trends ln 
Pediatrics" in Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, (1990), 
Vol.31 (March), pp.28-42 
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One characteristic of the scientific aspect of medicine has been the 
increasing predominance of technology as an aid to investigation, 
diagnosis and cure of the sick. But some commentators have suggested 
that the medical profession has developed a romantic attachment to 
machinery, and that this has affected the way that doctors, surgeons and 
so on now approach their work. It is argued that the medical profession 
prefers technological solutions to the problems of ill-health than less 
machine- or drug-intensive therapies, and that this is not always to the 
benefit of the patient21 • It has been pointed out, for example, that 
technological advances have almost always been invasive, the body of the 
individual becoming ever more narrowly the focus of concern and the site 
of treatment - resulting in an almost exclusive dependence on the 
medical model - or 'germ theory' - of disease causality, a model for 
which the explanatory base of ill-health is 'the internal structure of 
the individual,22. This model is sometimes criticised for ignoring or 
failing to give adequate significance to environomenta1 sources of il1-
health. 
One important problem with technological solutions to illness is that 
they do not always solve the problems they are designed to solve, and 
often create further problems for the patient. Transplant surgery, for 
example, can have beneficial effects. Kidneys are transplanted into 
patients suffering from kidney problems almost as a matter of routine 
now. But the limited success of kidney transplants has not been 
generalised to other organs of the body. Even with kidney transplant 
21. 
22. 
Ivan I1lich, T.jrnjts to Medicine. Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation 
of Health, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p.97. See also 
Taylor, ope cit., p.3 
Riclunan, op.cit., p.33 
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surgery, a patient's chances of survival are better if the grafted organ 
comes from a close relative rather than an anonymous donor. Any fonn of 
transplant surgery requires that the recipient's immune system be 
suppressed to avoid rejection of the implanted organ. This can lead to 
other complications - infection by opportunistic diseases - and even to 
an increased risk of cancer23. But the failure of a particular 
technology to solve a problem need not result in the medicalization of 
the individual to whom the technique is applied. Certainly, the patient 
who undergoes a heart transplant operation is then condemned for the 
remainder of his or her life to a regime of medication and close 
surveillance by the medical profession, but this may seem like an 
acceptable trade-off to patients who might otherwise have died of their 
illness. In fact, even where a patient requires constant medication, the 
patient may be made relatively autonomous regarding the administration 
of that medicine - as is usual practice now with diabetics. 
A more convincing account of medicalization would be the tendency for 
some doctors to prescribe tranquilizers to those patients whom they 
diagnose as clinically depressed. The effect of this practice is to 
create a dependency on the part of the patient, overtly on the drug 
prescribed, but also covertly on the doctor who prescribes it and 
monitors the patient's condition while the drug is in use. The process 
at work here is self-perpetuating because the doctor is not treating the 
cause of the illness (which may be linked to domestic matters, 
joblessness, social pressure and so on) but rather its effect. The 
difficulty is, that in prescribing the anti-depressant drugs, the doctor 
shields the patient against the situation which causes the depression. 
23. Taylor, ope cit., pp.150-152 
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Inured against the cause of his or her depression, the patient is thus 
no longer capable of judging objectively that the situation, or the 
patient's own ability to cope with it, has altered for the better. The 
situation becomes akin to Pascal's wager. Patients who are taking such 
drugs cannot be sure that if they ceased taking them they would be able 
to cope with their depression, cannot even be sure that the situation 
Which caused their depression in the first place (assuming that they 
know what did cause it) has changed for the better. So they keep taking 
the drug, just in case. In addition to thiS, of course, the drugs 
prescribed by the physician might well be addictive. The patient may not 
easily be able to cease the medication even if they wanted to (witness 
the difficulty many people experience when they attempt to give up a 
relatively mild drug like nicotine, obtained through smoking 
cigarettes). Here we have an example of what Illich has called 'clinical 
iatrogenesis' - an illness (drug addiction) Which is literally doctor-
induced. 
One reason for the occurence of situations such as this is that the 
cause may well be external to the patient, in the patient's domestic or 
social relationships, for example. Given that this is so, the solution 
to the depression would seem to be to alter the domestic or social 
relationships in which the depressed patient is enmeshed. But the 
doctor's business is with the individual patient and not the patient's 
domestic or social environment24 • Yet rather than admit that the cause 
of the illness cannot be treated, a doctor will in the main do something 
rather than nothing. In certain circumstances, there is a tendency on 
24. This is a consequence, in part, of the medical p:ofess~on's 
adherence to the medical model of disease causallty, discussed in 
Chapter Five, section iv, below. 
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the part of doctors to err on the side of caution When diagnosing 
particular illnesses, a practice Which is not always in the interests of 
the patient25 • But it has also been suggested that a doctor will do 
something rather than nothing because doing something makes the doctor 
feel good, and appear to be useful rather than helpless. The point of 
this is to retain a certain aura of competence in a situation where 
nothing effective can be done by the doctor26 • It might also be the case 
that doctors are placed under some commercial pressure to prescribe 
drugs. 
Richman cites the example of the medicalization of childbirth. During 
the nineteen-sixties, special care baby units (SCBU) were set up in many 
maternity hospitals to cope with the problems arising from both 
premature babies, and babies born past their full term. British 
obstetric policy during the early nineteen-seventies aimed at reducing 
perinatal mortality to the levels aChieved at that time by Holland and 
Sweden (8/1000 deaths). One method employed by obsetricians in pursuit 
25. 
26. 
This was demonstrated as long ago as 1934 in a classic experiment on 
the diagnostic practices of a set of doctors. The experiment 
involved subjecting a group of 1,000 11-year-old schoolchildren to 
investigation, upon which 61% were found to have had their tonsils 
removed. The remaining 39% were examined by a second group of 
physicians, who selected 45% of these children for tonsillectomy. 
Those not requiring tonsillectomy were then sent to a third group of 
physicians for investigation. Of these, 46% were selected for 
tonsillectomy. Those rejected as not requiring treatment were 
examined a final time, and again nearly half of their number were 
diagnosed as requiring tonsillectomy. At the end of the experiment, 
only 65 children remained who had not been recommended for 
treatment. American Child Health Association, Physical Defects: The 
Pathway to Correction, (New York, 1934), pp.80-96. Cited in Illich, 
ope cit., pp.10D-101 . 
The medical profession throughout its history has engaged 1n a 
number of apparently scientific practices designed oste~ibly to 
cure disease (leeching or 'bleeding' as it was known, 1S one 
example). Few of these' 'cures' were successful, wh~ch is why t~ey 
are not used today - but this did not stop the medlcal profess10n 
from gaining in status as a result of their employment. 
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of this aim was to induce contractions - using the stimulant oxytocin _ 
in those mothers who had carried their babies past the 'safe' forty-week 
term. This gave rise to what has become known as 'the daylight baby 
syndrome': far from being used solely in the interests of mothers and 
their babies, induction was used to reduce the number of children born 
during the night, at weekends, and during holiday periods, thus reducing 
staff costs. This practice had a number of other effects. Since, for 
convenience sake, some babies were now being born before term, the 
incidence of babies suffering from jaundice rose. Furthermore, oxytocin 
causes powerful uterine contractions which mothers are not always able 
to control. To relieve the distress caused by this phenomenon, epidural 
anaesthesia was introduced. This practice deadens the labouring mother 
from the wais t down, making it impossible for her to exercise any 
control over her contractions. Control of the birth process therefore of 
necessity passed from the mother to the attendant health professional. 
In addition to this, any drug administered to the mother during pregancy 
passes across the placenta into the baby. A further result of the 
control of childbirth by the obstetricians was that more babies were 
born in need of resuscitation. By 1977 the special care baby units set 
up in the early nineteen-sixties were dealing with three times as many 
casualties as they were in 1964, only this time they were the casualties 
of high-technology medicine27 • 
The importance of technology to the process of medicalization is also 
illustrated with respect to the diagnostic process - a key weapon in the 
medical profession's prevention armory. Taylor makes the pOint that by 
deSignating people 'at risk' from a disease, the medical profession 
27. Riclnnan, ope cit., p.36 
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can medicalize even those who are not suffering from any illness28. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that 'health' itself is increasingly being 
defined in terms of illness, or by an absence of illness29 • The 
increasing reliance of the medical profession on a battery of tests and 
screening programmes rests, according to Richman, on a belief that more 
tests equals better diagnoses equals better treatment. He goes on to 
suggest, however, that this is questionable in practice - doctors, it 
seems, may suffer from an information-overload, missing results, mis-
interpreting data, or even ignoring information derived from the battery 
of tests30• Furthermore, it seems that many tests employed by the 
profession are unnecessary, since the information ultimately derived 
from them could have been obtained by the practice known as 'history-
taking' which simply involves the doctor in interrogating the patient 
concerning habits and so on31 • It has also been pOinted out that doctors 
will sometimes order a test which is irrelevant to a particular 
patient's condition, thus incurring unnecessary expense in terms of time 
and mone~2. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
Taylor, OPe cit., p.191 
Taylor, for example, suggests that health is cu:rently.under~tood 
'as a state of continued negative reports for h1dden disease , ~ 
cit., p.3. See also Kennedy, ope cit., p.l5 
Richman, Ope cit., p.37 
Richman cites the experience of the united States when a survey, 
conducted in 1984 showed that of 52 million chest X-rays taken 
during that year,'30 million yielded information that c~d.have 
been gathered from history-taking. ibid. Taylor makes a slmllar 
point with respect to history-taking, ope cit., pp.69-70 
Richman, ibid. 
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IV • iii : Medicalization as a Social Process 
Professional self-interest is only one source of medicalization. In this 
section we consider two accounts of medicalization, each arising from a 
particular account of the social process, that is, of the nature and 
dynamic of modern industrial society. The views are those of Vicente 
Navarro, whose arguments are self-consciously marxist, and Ivan Illich, 
whose arguments can reasonably be placed on the right of the political 
spectrum33• We shall consider Illich first, then Navarro. 
(a) Illich: The Expropriation of Health 
Illich's argument begins with an account of the nature of western 
industrial society. As societies develop technologically, there is, he 
claims, a consequent specialization of knowledge which results in the 
development of powerful social groupings - the managers and 
bureaucracies associated with particular technical processes. This 
process, labelled 'industrialization' or 'professionalization' is said 
to supercede, or make irrelevant, traditional concepts of class, 
ownership and property, and therefore purports to replace traditional 
marxist and socialist critiques of society. Control of the production 
process has passed, it is claimed, from the owners of capital to the 
managers and administrators of that process34 • If Chadwick, in the 
nineteenth century, suggested that the health of the population was the 
province of engineers rather than the medical profession, Illich, in the 
latter part of the twentieth century suggests that medical 
professionals, in their reliance on technology and the achievements of 
science, have in fact become engineers, and that the medical endeavour 
33. 
34. 
David Annstrong, An Outline of Sociology as Applied to Medicine, 
(London: Wright, 1989), p.128 
Illich et aI, Disabling Professions 
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'is really an engineering endeavour,35. 
It is said by Illich to be characteristic of the process of 
professionalization that a need is created for hierarchy, and for a 
dependence of the lower ranks on the upper eChelons within the 
hierarChy. In terms of medicine, the lowest rank consists of patients. 
The industrialization and professionalization of medicine has what 
Illich describes as a 'social pathogenic' consequence, which results in 
a dependence on medical agents that tends ultimately 'to decrease the 
organic and psychological coping ability of ordinary people ,36. 
In other words, to the extent that the medical profession extends its 
practices into the lives of individuals, to that same extent does the 
ability of those individuals to cope with illness decrease. The problem 
becomes not simply one of the monopoly of health services by the medical 
profession (although this is part of the problem). The real damage is 
done at a deeper, structural level: 
More health damages are caused by the belief of people that 
they cannot cope with illness without modern medic~~es than by 
doctors who foist their ministrations on patients. 
Illich makes autonomy fundamental to health38 • The medical profession, 
in taking upon itself responsibility for the health of a person, also 
has the inevitable effect of undermining that person's capacity for 
autonomous behaviour. It should be stressed at this point that the 
35. Illich, "Clinical damage, medical monopoly, the expropriation of 
health: Three dimensions of iatrogenic tort", in Journal of Medical 
Ethics, (1975), Vol.l(l), p.78 
36. IlliCh, Journal of Medical Ethics, (1975), Vol.l(l), p.77 
37. Illich, ibid. 
38. Illich states that the 'ability to cope [with pain, sickness and 
death] autonomously is fundamental to [Man's] health. As he.becomes 
dependent on the management of his intimacy, he renounces hlS . 
autonomy and his health nrust decline', ope cit., p.275 (emphasls in 
original) • 
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position taken by Illich with regard to the relationship between 
autonomy and health is not equivalent to that articulated in the 
previous chapter. Our argument there attempted to demonstrate that 
health can be a condition of autonomy. Illich's claim is that autonomy 
is a condition of health. But there seems to be no reason to suppose 
that a person who lacked autonomy - someone, say, who was compelled to 
perform certain acts under hypnotic suggestion - must necessarily also 
lack health. Indeed, the acts suggested by the hypnotist might 
themselves require that the subject be in good health (for example, he 
or she might be required by the hypnotist to run five miles). It may 
well be true that, under certain circumstances, redUCing a person's 
autonomy might result in a worsening of their health. Shutting a person 
in an overcrowded prison and feeding them a diet lacking in nutrition 
will bring about a deterioration in health for that prisoner. But 
restoring autonomy to that prisoner might not restore her health - she 
might have decided to embark on a hunger-strike. For Illich, to be 
autonomous is to be healthy, but even the most autonomous of people may 
develop any number of diseases, from relatively trivial ailments such as 
a sore-throat, to life-threatening diseases such as cancer. It is not 
Illich's account of autonomy that is suspect, so much as his implied 
account of health. 
As a solution to the problem of medicalization, Illich proposes two 
broad strategies. The first of these consists of what might be called 
the dis-establishment of the medical profession. The state-supported 
monopoly of health care by the profession should be broken, in order 
that the individual may choose where, when, and what kind of medical 
care best suits him or her. This echoes the proposals made by Adam Smith 
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concerning the monopolistic status of the medical profession during the 
eighteenth century39. Like Smith, Illich is effectively arguing for the 
introduction of a free market in health care. The second strategy would 
necessitate that individual, rather than collective, responsibility for 
health should be maximised. (Not surprisingly, Illich sees the British 
N.H.S. as a regressive institution, increaSing dependence upon external 
health care). There is, it seems, a moral dimension to Illich's 
argument. Insofar as individuals do develop their ability to cope with 
their own health and ill-health, they will become 'better' individuals, 
more autonomous. But as we saw in Chapter Two, it is a mistake to equate 
autonomy with goodness, since the autonomous person might choose a life 
of wickedness. 
The question we need to address, however, is how Illich's account of 
medicalization might actually be said to work. Here, the crucial concept 
is 'expertise'. Since the medical professionals with whom the sick 
individual comes into contact are experts in dealing with sickness, the 
individual (who is not an expert) surrenders him- or herself to the 
doctor, surgeon, or whatever. That is to say, that the individual 
relinquishes control over the choices he or she makes, or will make, 
whilst in the care of the medical profession. It is the status of this 
act of relinquishing control that is of crucial importance for Illich's 
argument. It is fairly common, in the field of medical ethics, to come 
across the argument that the relationship between patient and doctor is 
essentially contractual. This implies that there is an equality between 
39. Jeffrey Lionel Berlant, Profession and ~ly: A Stuiy of.Medi~ine 
in the United States and Great Britain, Berkeley, L.A.: Un1vers1ty 
of California Press, 1975), pp.152-153 
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doctor and patient such that, in return for confidentiality on the part 
of the doctor, the patient will be completely honest about his or her 
~toms. The doctor's implicit offer of confidentiality is 'an 
enticement to sincerity' on the part of the patient40 • But even if one 
accepts that the doctor/patient relationship is contractual, it is still 
possible to cast doubt on the claim that the consultative situation is 
one of equality. If a contract does exist, then it is unspoken, or 
tacit, and this means that its terms are unspecified. It is likely then 
to be open to interpretation - or misinterpretation - by either party. 
In this the patient may be disadvantaged in that he or she is not in 
control of the consultation. It is, more often than not, the doctor who 
interrogates the patient, who mows or is likely to know what is wrong 
with the patient, and who mows or is likely to know what to do about 
the patient's illness. Even the language that doctors use sets them 
apart from their patients41 • The position of authority which they occupy 
would reinforce the patient's role as 'junior partner' in the 
'contractual', consultative, situation. But it is also true that the 
40. Michael H. Kottow, "Medical Confidentiality: an intransigent and 
absolute obligation" in Journal of Medical Ethics (1986), Vol.12, 
pp.117-122. The principle of confidentiality is enshrined in both 
the Hippocratic Oath (dating from the 5th century B.C.) and in its 
modern-day equivalent, the World Medical Association's International 
Code of Medical Ethics, (Geneva, 1983) in which confidentiality is 
designated an 'absolute' principle, binding even after the patient's 
death. Cited in Melanie Phillips and JOM Dawson, Doctors' Dilemnas: 
Medical Ethics and Contemporary Science, (Brighton: The Harvester 
Press 1985) p.207. In practice, however, confidentiality may not 
be ab~olute ~ a doctor may be required to pass confidential 
information about a patient to other medical professionals. The 
British Medical Association's guide to medical ethics - Philosophy 
and Practice of Medical Ethics, (London: British Medical 
Association 1988) - lists seven specific instances in which a 
doctor might pass confidential information to an outside source, 
including when the patient consents to this, or when it is in the 
interests of either the patient or society to do so, or when the law 
requires it(p.21). See also H.E. Fmson, "Confidentiality: a modified 
value" in Journal of Medical Ethics, (1988), Vol.14, pp.87-90 
41. Illich, ope cit., pp.174-175 
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patient might already be in a vulnerable situation with regard to the 
doctor because, after all, the patient may be ill. If the patient values 
his or her health then - confidentiality or not - he or she will have 
little choice about what is revealed to the doctor and what is not. 
The question is whether or not this situation leads to medicalization 
and a diminution of the patient's autonomy? We have already seen that 
illness of itself may reduce a person's autonomy. In such cases, a visit 
to the doctor might well result in a restoration of autonomy. If this is 
accepted, then Illich's position must be untenable since it cannot be 
the case that consulting a doctor both restores and eliminates a 
person's capacity for autonomy. It has also been pointed out that in 
many cases patients, when consulting doctor, will be quite prepared to 
surrender their autonomy for the sake of their heal th42. A person may be 
quite willing to place his- or herself in the hands of a doctor, given 
that that person does not know at all what the cause of his or her 
illness might be, or what to do about it. There is no reason to suppose 
that the decision to visit one's doctor cannot itself be an autonomous 
decision. 
For Illich, though, such a decision would in effect be playing into the 
hands of the medical profession. But what might the alternatives be? If, 
in suggesting that we take control of our own bodies in the name of 
autonomy, Illich is suggesting that we avoid doctors and resort to 
curing ourselves, then he is asking too much. Suppose that, without the 
assistance of my doctor, I am nevertheless able to diagnose myself as 
42. Onora O'Neill, "Paternalism and Partial Autonomy" in Journal of 
Medical Ethics, (1984), Volume 10, pp.173-178 
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suffering from cancer. Suppose too that I recognise that the turoour 
which I have discovered is operable. Would Illich then insist that in , 
order to retain my autonomy, I should steer well clear of surgeons? In 
rare cases it may be true that I could successfully operate on myself. 
In other cases I may be able to remain conscious throughout the 
operation so that I can direct the operation. But most cases involving 
operable tumours will require that the sufferer be anaesthetised 
completely during the course of the operation. Obviously one cannot 
anaesthetise oneself and retain control of the proceedings. 
If we avoid contact with the medical profession for fear of losing our 
autonomy, then we would need to enhance our lmowledge of our own body so 
that when we are ill, we will mow best what to do. But at this point 
Illich must also make clear what exactly it is that he is objecting to. 
Is it the medical profession itself, or the body of lmowledge which that 
profession possesses? If it is the latter, then in order to retain our 
autonomy the resort to manuals and instruction books published by and 
for the medical profession would seem to be ruled out of bounds. Broadly 
speaking, we would then have two options left. Firstly, we might turn to 
an alternative body of lmowledge, such as folk-medicine or acupuncture. 
But if, in the case of the medical profession proper, our autonomy is 
curtailed when we resort to its corresponding body of lmowledge, it must 
be the case that resort to any other body of lmowledge will similarly 
curtail our autonomy • Only through the second resort - trial-and-error -
would we retain our autonomy on Illich' s terms. Not only would this be 
time-consuming and possibly dangerous, it would also be regressive, in 
the sense that each one of us would have to make the same mistakes as 
everyone else in order to learn about our bodies and how to look after 
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them. If this Illich's position, then he is open to the same criticisms 
on this last point that were levelled at Wolff in the previous chapter. 
Paradoxically, returning to basics in order to avoid medicalization 
might itself seriously restrict our capacity for autonomy because we 
would have little time to pursue other options considered to be 
worthwhile. 
One of Illich's most trenchant critics is Vicente Navarro. Before 
setting out his criticisms of Illich, we shall give a brief account of 
his own position. Navarro is a self-professed marxist, and as such 
(bearing in mind the discussion of the liberal and marxist traditions in 
Chapter Three, section i) is not central to our concern with the 
relationship between medicalization and autonomy. We include him here, 
however, to balance our discussion of Illich. 
(b) Navarro: Medicine Under Capitalism 
In the opening section of this chapter we stated that the scientific 
character of the medical profession gave it the appearance of political 
neutrality. The claim was that since science is an objective, value-free 
enterprise, it is therefore free from the taint of political ideology. 
Navarro disputes this claim from both a methodological and from a 
practical point of view. Methodologically, Navarro claims that to see 
the medical profession (indeed any social grouping) as somehow 
autonomous, distinct from the rest of society, amounts to a form of 
methodological individualism. Any study which does not recognise this 
will give only a distorted view of the nature of the profession it seeks 
to understand. Society, for Navarro, is a whole with emergent properties 
that cannot be explained by studying isolated parts. These parts are 
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inter-related, and must be understood in their relations to each other. 
An understanding of the medical profession, how it operates and why it 
operates in the manner that it does, cannot be obtained without first 
understanding the dynamics of the society in which the medical 
profession and the health system is embedded43 • In Navarro's view, 
writing as he does from a self-consciously marxist perspective, the 
medical profession is linked to, and reflects in microcosm, the 
prevailing class structure of the society of which it is part44. The 
medical profession not only reproduces the characteristic class-
structure of the society of which it is part, but it also reproduces the 
prevailing ideology. In a capitalist society, this prevailing ideology 
is liberal individualism, and this is reflected in the field of medicine 
by the adherence of the profession to the individually-focussed medical 
model of disease causality45. Navarro argues that it is in the interests 
of capital that the medical model is prevalent, since it diverts 
attention away from the economic and social causes of ill-health, and 
makes the individual responsible for his or her own health46 • It is also 
for this reason that the state supports the medical profession's 
exclusion of potentially destabilising (because they are holistic) 
alternative medicines. Medicalization for Navarro amounts to a form of 
alienation: 
The expropriation of political power from the citizenry that 
takes place in the political process, and the absence of 
control over the product and nature of work that workers face 
in the process of production, are accompanied by the 
expropriation of control from the patient over the nature and 
43. Vicente Navarro, Medicine Under Capitalism, (London: Croom Helm, 
1976), p.vii; Crisis, Health, and Medicine, (London: Tavistock, 
1986), p.2. 
44. Navarro, Medicine Under Capitalism, p.206 
45. Navarro, ope cit., p. 206 
46. Navarro, ope cit., p.207 
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definition of health in the medical sector. 47 
Medicine serves a legitimising function for the capitalist system, to 
the extent that citizens accept that their health problems can be solved 
by medical intervention and behavioural change, rather than political 
o 48 I thO h 0 act10n • n 1S context, t e maJor preventive strategy is health 
education, since it reinforces the contention that individuals are or 
can be responsible for their own health and illness. It is in this 
context that everyday life, through a focus on life-styles and 
individual behaviour, has been medicalized49 • 
Navarro's critique of Illich focusses on the claim made by the latter 
that the medical profession creates a need in individuals to consume 
health care, and associated products such as drugs. Illich's claim 
suffers from being too abstract, or theoretical. The process of 
industrialization, as Illich sets it out, appears to be a universal 
phenomenon. Medicalization is common to all industrialized societies -
capitalist or communist - and will occur in any developing society as it 
industrializes (the 'convergence theory'). Thus Illich, according to 
Navarro, ignores the specific social and historical factors shaping the 
variety of medical systems in existence the world over. It has to be 
said that in focussing on class struggle as the dynamic of change, 
Navarro could be accused of much the same sort of universalisation he 
accuses Illich of. Navarro assumes that, although not all societies on 
earth are capitalist, all those that are share a set of unified 
characteristics. Thus the 'western' system of medicine is characterised 
by growth and effectiveness, and these characteristics result from a 
47. Navarro, ope cit., p.208 
48. Navarro, Crisis, Health, and Medicine, p.29, 40-41 
49. Navarro, ope cit., p.36 
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tension between the needs created by the process of capital 
accumulation, and the demands expressed by the working population. In 
other words, by the class struggle. 
The result is that Navarro sees the medical profession as an instrument 
of socialization. The capitalist economic system itself has a set of 
basic requirements which are necessary for its survival. These include 
the creation of wants; the existence of a market (a passive set of 
consumers); and the replication of a 'consumer ideology' where a person 
is not judged by what they do, but by what they have or consune. Whereas 
for Illich, the solution to the problem of medicalization is to de-
professionalize the medical profession, Navarro implies that such a 
solution will leave the real cause of the problem untouched and intact. 
For Navarro, only a complex reorganisation of society will de-medicalize 
the population, involving the transfer of power from the middle-class 
agents of capitalism to the working class. 
Obviously, criticism of Navarro's position must ultimately take the form 
of a critique of his marxist assumptions. We have already suggested that 
capitalism is assumed by Navarro to be an homogeneous entity. This is 
questionable50• Navarro also fails to discuss the more recent 
developments within the western system of medicine; the development of 
the service sector and the rise of the 'new middle class' - indeed 
whether or not it makes sense to talk of class in the traditional 
50. Bryan S. Turner for example, suggests that one distinction that may 
be made is betw~en 'early' and 'late' capitalism. Medical Power and 
Social Knowledge, (London: Sage, 1987), pp.176-180 
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marxist sense at al151 - and he does not discuss the significance for 
individuals, capitalism, or the medical profession itself of the 
privatization of key medical functions52 • Another important laetma in 
Navarro's writing is an account of the rise of 'alternative' medicines , 
and where this fits into the class-based account. It has been noted that 
the popularity of alternative medicine is almost exclusively a middle-
class phenomenon53 • If so, this calls into question the critical 
potential of these practices, unless Navarro intends the middle-class to 
usurp the revolutionary role traditionally assigned by marxists to the 
working class. Indeed, there seems to be good grounds for thinking that 
the so-called alternative medicines may themselves be a product of an 
economic system that, on Navarro's own analysis, both creates and 
satisfies demands. It has also been suggested that, at least with regard 
to the United Kingdom, the policies of the incumbent Conservative 
Government designed where possible to reduce public spending - including 
spending on health care - have the effect of creating a situation 
favourable to the 'disorganised' sector of private health care, i.e. the 
alternative medicines54• Insofar as Navarro's account of the medical 
profession is based on an analysis of the class structure of a society, 
then his account of medicalization stands or falls with that account. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
This problem is discussed, for example, by Andre Gorz, '!be Critique 
of Economic Reason, Translated by Gillian Handyside and Chris 
Turner, (London: Verso, 1989), pp.91-103 
Turner, ope cit., pp.180-183 
Riclnnan, ope cit., p. .. 
RiChman, ope cit., p.220. As Richman also polnts out, lt also has 
the effect of making the Labour Party the defender of the status guo 
and all that this entails concerning medical hegemony and 
medicalization, to the extent that it defends the National Health 
Service. 
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IV.iv:. Medicine and Social Control 
It is sometimes suggested that the purpose of medicalization is to 
effect some measure of control over the population, although it is not 
always clear on whose behalf such control is being exercised. It is 
possible, for example, to read Navarro in this way, where control is 
effected through the production, by the capitalist economic system, of 
certain health demands which the medical profession and its allies then 
caters to. Drugs are a good example of this process, for they are not 
only geared to the restoration (or maintenance) of health, but are also 
an extremely profitable enterprise for their producers55 • Some see the 
medical profession as a weapon of social control in the hands of the 
state where, in return for its services, the state rewards the 
profession by supporting its practices with the force of law56 • Others 
see the medical profession as a potential replacement for the 
'traditional' institutions of social control - the church and the 
legislature - as the influence of these wanes57 • One of the most 
influential statements of the thesis that medicine is an instrument of 
social control is that developed by Talcott Parsons, and it is to his 
account that we now turn. 
In order to understand Parsons' account of how the medical profession 
facilitates social control, we need first of all to say something about 
55. 
56. 
57. 
For example, a worldwide potential health catastrophe suCh as 
HIV/AIDS presents not only a challenge to scientists to find a cure, 
but also provides the pharmaceutical companies with the 'greatest 
new pharmaceutical market in history'. Dtmcan Campbell, "The amazing 
AIDS scam" in New Statesman & Society, 24/06/1988, p.10 
Bryan S. Turner, The Bogy and Society, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1984), p.213 . . " 
Irving Kermeth Zola "Medicine as an Institutl0n of Soclal Control 
in Sociological Review, (1972), Vol.20, pp.487-504; "In the Nam: of 
Health and Illness: On Some Socio-Political Consequences of Medical 
Influence" in Social Science and Medicine, (1975), Vol.9, pp.83-87 
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his general theory of social action. In order to understand human 
action, Parsons contends that it is necessary first of all to understand 
the social system with which one is dealing, since it is this system 
that provides a normative structure t~ human inter-action. At the risk 
of drastically over-simplifying Parson's complex work, we may say that 
individual human action is to be understood as role-oriented, where the 
role (or roles) that an individual occupies largely explain that 
individual's action. Social order is maintained by individuals 
successfully occupying the roles allotted to them, and from which they 
derive their various duties and obligations to each other. Leaving aside 
the problem of who or what does the alloting (and the related problem of 
how, if one's actions are determined by one's social roles, one can ever 
change one's roles) we can see from this that SOCiety consists, for 
Parsons, in an equilibrium constructed on the ground of role-occupation. 
Those who do not fulfil their roles, or fulfil them incorrectly, are 
disruptive to this equilibrium, and hence to social order. Thus they are 
labelled 'deviants,58. Parsons describes society as a sort of steady-
state mechanism, an organic phenomenon which is held in equlibrium by 
the network of roles that characterise it, and the reciprocal duties and 
responsibilities attendant on those roles. His account of SOCiety is 
ultimately static. There is, for example, no explanation as to how a 
society might develop, no account of how change might occur within the 
social system. Change, almost by definition, is instability, and 
anything that threatens the stability or status guo of society is to be 
discouraged, or managed. Even values are social things, generated -
apparently spontaneously - by the social structure. Amongst other 
58. Parsons' argument was initially set out in 'Dle Structure of ~ial 
Action, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1937) and was later developed l.n The 
Social System, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951). 
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things, it is not clear how one is to view political protest. One may, 
for example, view political protest in a straightforwardly analytical 
way as deviancy, since in criticising society it potentially 
destabilises it. The people of R . wh hr Oman1a 0 overt ew Ceaucescu were 
clearly social deviants in this sense. What is not addressed, and what 
it is not possible to address from the pOint of view of the Parsonian 
social SCientist, is whether or not they were right, for that is a 
matter internal to the social system. Moreover, if values do originate 
from within the social structure, Parsons cannot adequately explain the 
existence of conflicting values within a particular society - why, for 
example, some sections of a population think homosexuality immoral while 
others do not. 
In the field of medical sociology, Parsons' main contribution was to 
postulate the idea of 'the sick role,59. If an illness prevents a person 
from fulfilling his or her allotted role (or roles) then the person who 
is ill is potentially deViant, and is therefore potentially a threat to 
the social order. The threat to social stability is overcome within the 
terms of Parsons' system by the concept of 'the sick role'. Since the 
functioning of society depends on the successful occupation of roles, 
social order will be maintained if the 'deviant' (i.e. sick person) 
successfully adopts the sick role. The role of the medical profession is 
59. The concept of 'the sick role' was developed in "Definitions of 
Health and Illness in Light of American Values and Social St~cture" 
in E. Gartly Jaco (Ed.), Patients, w.sic;ans and Illness, Thlrd 
Edition, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1979 , pp.12D-144. It has been 
critically assessed by S. Levine and M. A. Kozloff, "The Sick Role: 
Assessment and Overview" in '1he Annnal Review of Sociology, (1978), 
Vol.4: pp.317-343; Raym~d Illsley, ProfessiODal or ~c Health? 
Sociology in Health and Medicine, (London: The Rock Car lmg 
Fellowship/The NUffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1980), pp.73-77; 
and Bryan S. Turner, Medical Power and Social Knowledge, pp. 39-41. 
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to legitimise the patient's adoption of the sick role - if it did not 
have this legitimizing function any shirker could claim to be sick in 
order to avoid his or her responsibilities. The only way to escape fran 
one's role without disrupting the social order is to slip into another 
role (providing, of course, that it is not the role of shirker). 
But the sick role brings with it a new set of responsibilities, amongst 
Which are that patients will seek the assistance of the medical 
profession should they fall ill, and that they will do as their doctor 
tells them to do in order to get back into their proper role as quickly 
as possible. For their part, doctors must be neutral and detached, as 
are scientists. Since they have privileged access to the bodies of their 
patients, for example, all eroticism must be removed from the medical 
encounter. Doctors must have 'technical-specificity' which seems to mean 
that they must be experts in their field. Doctors must also be 
'collectively orientated', which means that they must not become profit-
orientated businessmen. Parsons suggests that they are in this respect 
something of a maverick profession (but not deviant) in capitalist 
society, which is geared toward the profit-motive. Insofar as Parsons 
has a theory of medicalization it consists in the adoption of the sick 
role by the patient. Medicalization, therefore, protects society from 
disruption by sanctioning certain behaviours and so marking others out 
as properly deviant. It is through its legitimization of sickness that 
the medical profession acts as an instrument of social control. 
Parsons' view of medicalization has the effect of rendering 'deviant' 
behaviour legitimate. This is achieved by declaring a disruptive state 
an 'illness'. One potentially positive effect of legitimising 'deviant' 
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behaviour is to obviate the stigma that sometimes attends particular 
'illnesses'. If alcoholism can be defined as an 'illness' amenable to 
cure or treatment by the medical profession, then alcoholics may be 
placed beyond the reach of moral disapprobation60 • Medicalization, in 
this respect, has been linked to a wider humanitarian trend61 • But it 
has also been argued that there is a negative side to this process for 
it may be that removing blame also removes responsibility from an 
individual, and therefore robs that individual of his or her dignity62. 
Thus one effect of medicalization is to divorce responsibility from 
social action, creating a two-tier society comprising on the one hand of 
morally responsible people and on the other a set of amoral sick 
people63 • It might also have the effect of undermining the very idea of 
morality, since we end up with no concept of 'evil', only of 'sickness' 
or 'deviancy' 64. 
But it is not only the notion of moral responsibility that is undermined 
by Parsons' account of action, for it also undermines the notion of 
personal autonomy that we developed in Chapter Two. This is not a 
problem of medicalization as such, for medicalization is but a facet of 
the way society generally functions within Parsons' system. The question 
60. Conrad and Sclmeider, ope cit., p.247 
61. Conrad and Sclmeider, ope cit., p.246 " . 
62. R. M. Veatch, "The Medical Model: Its Nature and Problems , ln A. L. 
Caplan; H. T. Engelhardt; and J. J. McCartney (Eds.), ~ts of 
Health and Disease: Interdisci· Per ctives, (Mas sac usetts: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1981 , p.531. Veatch s use of the term 
'medical model' is derived from Parsons, so that he means to refer, 
not to the model of disease causality (discussed in Chapter Five, 
section iv) that is usually linked with this term, but instead the 
Parsonian model of social structure as it is applied to medicine. 
This explains why Veatch talks of the medical model as.denYi~ 
individual responsibility for illness, whereas the medica~m el as 
it is generally understood suggests the opposite. 
63. Conrad and Sclmeider, ope cit., pp.248-249 
64. Conrad and Sclmeider, ope cit., p.255; Kennedy, ope cit., p.6. 
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is whether or not there can be autonomous action wi thin a system where 
actions are said to be determined by the roles we occupy? In a 
determined universe such as Parsons' seems to be, it must be the case 
that, if the roles we occupy determine the way we act, and the roles an 
individual occupies are themselves determined by the social structure, 
then deviancy, if and when it occurs, nmst also be detennined by that 
same structure. If this is not the case, then some explanation is 
necessary as to how it is that some (i.e.deviant) actions manage to 
avoid determination while others do not. It also looks very much as 
though the only free actions (by which is meant actions not determined 
by the social structure) are those perpetrated by social deviants. If 
there can be free actions, there is no reason to suppose that they would 
of necessity manifest themselves in deviant behaviour. After all, an 
autonomous person might choose a life of dull conformity over a life of 
romantic rebellion but they would be no less autonomous for that, just 
less interesting. 
Conclusion 
If the medicalization thesis is that the medical profession, through its 
various activities, systematically reduces the autonomy of those who 
come within its ambit, then none of the theories that we have so far 
considered appears successfully to achieve this. If, as we argued in the 
previous chapter, health is important to the exercise of autonomy, then 
it seems that the medical profession must at least some of the time have 
a positive effect upon its clients' autonomy. We do not deny that, on 
occasion, representatives of the medical profession might have a 
detrimental effect upon a person's capacity for autonomy, but this is 
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unlikely to fulfil the medicalization thesis' requirement that it be a 
~stematic effect of medical intervention. 
In the next chapter we examine a particular aspect of health policy from 
the perspective of our account of personal autonomy. Through an 
examination of the assumptions underlying the British-government 
sponsored Prevention and Health campaign we consider the implications 
for health policy of adopting the account of autonomy developed in the 
first three chapters of this thesis. In particular we shall be concerned 
to examine the problems for our account of autonomy generated by the 
medical model of disease-causality which appears to have underpinned the 
proposals made in the documents published under the Prevention and 
Health rubric. We also (in section v) focus on the related issue of 
responsibility for health that arises on the ground of this model of 
disease-causality. 
Chapter V: Autonany and Preventive 
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Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined the phenomenon known as 
'medicalization' the importance of Which to our overall argument lay in 
its purported ability to systematically undermine the autonomy of 
individuals as patients under the auspices of the medical profession. 
The central difficulty of the thesis, as we indicated in the previous 
Chapter, is that the medical profession appears to have the ability to 
restore autonomy to their patients. That this is so must be understood 
in the light of our previous argument concerning the relationship 
between personal autonomy and health. If health is indeed an important 
condition of personal autonomy (where this is understood to comprise not 
only of the capacity to choose from amongst a set of options, but also 
to implement one's choice) then the medical profession, at least to the 
extent that it successfully restores health to its patients, can also be 
said to enhance the autonomy of those patients. It must be reiterated 
that we do not deny that the medical profession, or certain of its 
members, can have a detrimental effect upon the autonomy of some of its 
clients - doctors have been known to fail to diagnose, or to mis-
diagnose illnesses on occasion, sometimes with disastrous consequences 
for the patient. But such instances do not bear out the general 
argument, characteristic of the medicalization thesis, that the medical 
profession systematically undermines autonomy. 
However, there may be an important sense in which autonomy might be 
undermined through a restriction of choice. We have already noted, with 
Joseph Raz, that the autonomous person must have a range of choices from 
which to assemble his or her life. A person who has no choice, or only 
one choice to make, will find their capacity for autonomy restricted. 
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This in part accounts for the importance of health to aut . onomy, Slnce 
ill-heal th may restrict the number of choices a person might have. We 
noted in the first part of the preceding chapter that the medical 
profession, by virtue of its scientific status, excludes a number of 
health practices from its ranks, effectively consigning such practices 
(the 'alternative medicines') to the private sector. The effect of this 
is to restrict the health-care options available to those people who, 
for whatever reason, cannot afford to pay for private medical care. In a 
sense then, those people Who cannot afford private medical care and 
whose illness does affect their ability to exercise their capacity for 
autonomy will find their autonomy undennined twice over - the first titre 
through their illness, and the second time through the restriction 
placed upon them by the combination of financial circumstances and the 
exclusive practices of the established medical profession. Of course, 
those people Who can afford to and choose to utilise the private medical 
sector will be constrained, under the present system of health-care 
ftmding in the United Kingdom, to pay for services they may no longer 
require (assuming that private medicine, in Whatever form it may take, 
can cover all the contingencies of state-funded, 'established' medicine, 
which is, at present, doubtful). A government concerned to maximise the 
autonomy of its citizens may choose either to bring all health-care 
practices under the umbrella of public funding, so that those who cannot 
afford independently to seek alternatives to 'established' medicine are 
given the opportunity to do so, or it might follow Illich's advice and 
'dis-establish' the medical profession altogether, withdrawing direct 
funding from health-care in favour of, for example, a system of 
incentives to individuals to provide health insurance for themselves. We 
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shall not argue the merits or demerits of these alternative routes to 
enhancing personal autonomy here. 
Instead, our concern in the present chapter will be to consider the 
relevance to personal autonomy of a particular aspect of health policy _ 
preventive health-care. There is one reason why a concern with this 
particular area of health policy should be interesting to us, and this 
is the claim that preventive health-care pre-empts the process of 
medicalizationl • This claim, of course, assumes that there is at least 
some substance to the medicalization thesis (in one of its forms), and 
we saw, in the previous chapter that doubts exist concerning this. Even 
so, within the terms of some theories of medicalization, the status of 
prevention is itself suspect. According to some versions of the 
medicalization thesis, it is always possible that the medical profession 
might bring some hitherto non-medical behaviour within its sphere of 
influence by turning it into an object of medical interest. For example, 
we have already noted that the term 'health' lends itself to a variety 
of interpretations. If the business of the medical profession is to 
procure the health of its clients (i.e. patients), and health covers a 
wide range of factors, activities and capacities, then those factors, 
activities and capacities might conceivably become the business of the 
medical profession. We have only to recall the World Health 
Organisation's definition of 'health' as being 'a complete state of 
physical, mental and social well-being, not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity'. Given such a wide-ranging definition of health 
there would appear to be few, if any aspects of life which may not be 
1. Peter Conrad and Joseph Sclmeider, Deviance ~ Med!ca1izatioo: 
Fran Badness to Siclmess, (St. Louis, MisSOur1: C.V. MosbY & Co., 
1980), p.255 
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medicalized. Paradoxically, it seems, preventive health strategies may 
result in an increase in the surveillance of the population through the 
creation of categories of 'risk', where, for example, sections of the 
population are singled out as candidates for screening programmes. The 
result is that even When individuals are not ill, they may, according to 
this argument, still be the object of medical attention. In Crawford's 
phrase, what occurs is the 'medicalization of everyday life,2. This may 
also be said to have the odd effect of creating, in Parsonian terms, a 
'potentially-sick role' such that, even when an individual is not yet 
ill, he or she might be said to have a socially-derived responsibility 
to participate in preventive programmes3• We return to the issue of 
responsibility for health below, in section v where we also relate the 
discussion of prevention to our previous discussion of medicalization. 
Our central concern in this chapter, however, is to consider what 
implications might follow from adopting our accOlmt of personal autonany 
as an organizing principle of social policy. Given our argument in the 
first three chapters it follows that of particular interest to us here 
will be the kinds of persons that health policy assumes there to be. 
Health policy, of course, is a large and diffuse area of concern. To 
attempt an examination of health policy as such would clearly be 
impossible in a work of this size. In order, therefore, to facilitate 
2. 
3. 
Robert Crawford, "Healthism and the Medicalization of Everyday Life" 
in International Journal of Health Services, (1980), Vol.10(3), 
p.380. See also Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine. Medical Nemesis: 
'Dle Expropriation of Health, (Hannondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), 
pp.96-104 . . 
Crawford, ope cit., p.379. It is interesting to note 1n this context 
that the British government has recently advocated a programme of 
'regular and frequent health checks' by General Practitioners for 
elderly people and children. Department of Health, PraDoting Better 
Health, (London: HMSO, 1987, Cm.249), para.1.1S, p.4 
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our discussion, we concentrate our attention upon one particular area of 
health policy - prevention. But even this particular area is itself too 
cumbersome to deal with adequately in a work of this size. In order that 
we might have a manageable discussion, we concentrate on one specific 
set of policies within the field of prevention. We shall concentrate our 
attention on the Prevention and Health campaign, 1atmched under the 
auspices of the British Government's Department of Health and Social 
Security in 1976. The interest of this campaign lies partly in its self-
conscious raising of the issue of prevention within the context of what 
was perceived to be a cure-oriented health service; partly in its focus 
on the individual as opposed to the medical professional as the agent of 
health; and partly in the fact that the series of documents issued at 
the time both invoked a tradition of preventive health-care stretching 
back to the great public health reforms of the nineteenth-century. It is 
also true that the documents published in the Prevention arxl Health 
series represent the British Government's last or latest word to date on 
lifestyle or behaviour-related illness. The publications, spanning a 
period of six years, have not been revised since they first appeared 
over a decade ago4• 
Some commentators have argued that, following the creation of a national 
health service in 1948, a curative approach has predominated, despite 
the aims set out in both the National Health Service Act (1946), and the 
4. Publications by the Department of Health and Social Services 
(D.H.S.S.) tmder the Prevention and Health rubric were Prevention 
and Health: Everybody's Business (1976); Reducing the Ri~k: Safer 
Childbirth and Pre~ (1977); the White Paper Prevention and 
Health (Comd. 7047, 1977 ; Fating for Health (1978); AVO~ Heart 
Attacks (1981); and Drtnk:ing Sensibly (1981). The ~al:;:a: Safety 
Commission also published Occupational Health Servi.ces. '!be Way 
Ahead (1977). 
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White Paper that preceded it (1944)5. One important reason why this 
claim is made is that the National Health Service , in its present form, 
is 'demand led', as doctors themselves recognise6• It is clear that most 
individuals have recourse to the medical profession when they are, or 
suspect themselves to be, ill. This suggests that, in the main, the 
medical profession is not called upon to prevent illness, but to cure or 
at least to manage an illness that has already established itself in the 
body, or person of the patient. This suggestion itself depends upon a 
cormnonplace distinction between preventive medicine or medical care and 
curative medicine. The force of this distinction itself derives partly 
from the extent, through time, of its usage - it can certainly be traced 
back to 1878, and probably beyond7 - and partly from the apparent 
simplicity of the dichotomy. On investigation, however, the distinction 
between curative and preventive medicine is revealed as more complex 
than it seems. It has been pointed out that 'prevention' is often 
invoked as a rhetorical device by politicians (of all political hues), 
by medical professionals, and by 'consumers' of medical services alike8. 
This tends to give prevention a politically neutral veneer, with 
preventive poliCies cutting across political barriers (rather like 
environmental issues). Others suggest that prevention has become 
something of a 'buzzword' - abused almost as often as it is used9• For 
this reason our concern will be as much with the limitations of the , 
5. Judith Allsop, Health Policy and the National Health Service, 
(London: Longman, 1984), p.30 . 
6. Dr. Peter Toon, "Symposium on Prevention", 'n1e Practit1oner, 
December 1987, Vol.231, p.1585 
7. William Stokes, State Medicine: A Discourse, Delivered Before the 
University of Dublin 6/4/1872 (Dublin: JOM Falconer, 1872) 
8. David Billis, "At Ri;k of Prev~ntion", Journal of Social Policy, 
(1981), Vol.10(3), p.367; Allsop, ope cit., p.l73 . Mi 
9. Lenn E. Goodman and Madeleine J. Goodman, "Preventlon - HOW
1
1 8~e 
of a Concept Undercuts Its Worth". Hastings Centre Report, 9 , 
pp.26-38 
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concept and its attendent policies as with its advantages. Preventive 
health-care policies reflect a number of underlying assumptions and 
theories concerning the aetiology of disease and the appropriate methods 
of dealing with those diseases, as well as certain political or 
ideological views about Where responsibility for preventive policies 
ought to be located. Having developed an account of personal autonomy in 
the first half of this thesis, we shall want to assess the assumptions 
concerning those persons and their abilities made in the Prevention and 
Health documents. This will not spell out the kinds of policies that 
might be entailed by employing our account of personal autonomy as an 
organising principle. It will, however, allow us at least to criticise a 
set of policies by pointing up the inadequacies of the assumptions upon 
which they rest. Are aims, then, are negative rather than positive. 
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V.i: The Concept of Prevention 
On the face of it, prevention is a simple concept. It has been remarked 
that, at least with respect to the physical world, 'to prevent' means 
'to stop,lO. But placed in the t f con ext 0 social policy, this apparently 
straightforward statement begs a number of questions, for we might want 
to know what it is that is to be prevented or stopped. We might also 
want to know how a situation is to be prevented or stopped, and by whom. 
Finally, we might want to know ~my a situation is to be prevented or 
stopped. Billis claims that, with regard to the physical world, the 
concept of prevention can be illustrated in the following way: 
(A .... B) -.p 
The variables in this proposition refer, respectively, to a causal 
factor (A); a physical factor (B); and a problem-state (p). The 
proposition is intended to bring out the relational character of the 
variables - the causal factor acts on the physical factor to produce the 
problem-state. Since these are variables, they may be filled out in many 
different ways. Examples of causal factors given by Billis include 
nails, a deluge, frost and a match. Acting on relevant physical factors 
- a tyre, land, a water-pipe, and paper - they may give rise to various 
problem-states. In these cases the problem-states would be, 
respectively, a puncture, a flood, a cracked pipe, and a forest-firell • 
These are fairly straightforward examples of causal relationships. All 
the same, we can immediately point to some difficulties with the idea of 
prevention. Let us begin with the notion of the problem-state. 
10. Billis, ope cit., p.369 
11. Billis, ibid. 
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What is not immediately clear from the four examples used by Billis, is 
that they are, of necessity, problem-states. This is partly because they 
are abstract examples. Given a context, each of these examples could 
conceivably be redescribed, if not perhaps to be positively beneficial, 
then at least so as not to present a problem. To take just one of the 
examples: that of the pl.IDctured tyre. A puncture that prevented a 
politician from driving his car away one morning, a politician who 
failed to realise that a terrorist group had attached an explosive 
device to the bottom of his car, might seem inconvenient to him (or her) 
at the time, but would surely be thought beneficial in the long rtm. Of 
course, this would be partly a function of perspective. For the 
terrorist group the problem-state would consist in the politician's 
discovery of the bomb, or at least the device's failure to detonate as 
planned. Similarly, a pl.IDcture might be a problem for a gang of 
criminals attempting to make their getaway from the scene of a crime. 
For the police pursuing those criminals, a punctured tyre on the 
criminals' car would be highly desirable. 
What we should notice here is that for a particular situation or 
sequence of events to be designated a problem-state, someone, or some 
group, must judge that situation or sequence of events to be 
problematic. This may be subjective, where one judges for oneself that a 
problem exists, or objective, where the judgement is made of a third 
party. For example, a sincere smoker might disagree with a doctor that 
smoking, at least in his or her own case, is a problem. It is also 
possible that a person (or group) might judge themselves to be in a 
situation which is problematic for certain reasons, while another person 
(or group) judges the same situation to be problematic for quite 
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different reasons. This latter point might well be illustrated with an 
example drawn from the field of medicine When a doctor eli 
• agnoses an 
illness, he or she will recognise that illness as a problem for that 
patient. It is, in other words, the having of an identifiable illness 
that is the problem from the perspective of the doctor. But for the 
patient, it may not be the having of the illness which is the problem, 
so much as the incapacity that results from being ill. For a doctor (or 
other health-care professional), illness can be said to be a technical 
problem, for there are certain objective criteria against Which a doctor 
may assess a person's health-status12• These criteria may not be beyond 
dispute - for example, a ttmlour is identifiable (because observable) in 
a way v:rhich a pain is not - but when the criteria, such as they are, are 
fulfilled, then the doctor would conclude that the person in whom they 
they are fulfilled was 'ill'. This, however, might not be the conclusion 
of the patient. It has been shown that, of a group of people with 
clinically-defined illnesses, a proportion were not aware that they were 
'ill' and, furthermore, did not consider themselves to be so13. With 
regard to certain diseases, the subjective/objective distinction is 
problematic. For example, if someone is diagnosed as HIV-positive, that 
person might be in a position to live a normal life for up to seven 
years. During this time, they are not manifestly 'ill'. They are not 
even diseased, strictly speaking, for the diseases that ultimately kill 
those HIV sufferers who develop AIDS are opportunistic, invading the 
body when the immune-system finally begins to collapse. This is not to 
deny that being diagnosed HIV-positive might be debilitating in non-
12. 
13. 
Andrew Twaddle, "The Concept of Health Status" in Social Science and 
Medicine, (1974) Vol.B, p.30 tudy 
Innes H. Pearse and Lucy H. Crocker, ']be Peckham Experiment: A ~ 
in the Living StnIcture of Society, (London: George Allen & UnWln, 
1943), pp.95-96 
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physical ways. Psychological debilitation might ensue, for example, in 
the form of depression. It has also been argued that ce t . 
r am states of 
illness, or certain diseases, have a social dimension, such that to be 
labelled as a sufferer or carrier may incur costs which might prove 
debilitating socially or economically14. 
It could be said that, from the perspective of the doctor, the patient 
has deviated from some biological norm - for axample, an organism might 
be said to have invaded the body of the patient. But from the 
perspective of the patient the norm deviated from may well be a 
behavioural one - the patient can no longer act as he or she did prior 
to the illness. If enough tests are run on a person, some biological 
'problem' can always be found15 • In this sense, everyone might be said 
to be ill, for the simple reason that no-one is perfect. But many of 
these so-called 'problems' would not be problems for those to whom they 
are attributed, because individual lives are lived within a given set of 
parameters. A person might, for example, be technically overweight 
(where his or her weight exceeds the average for his or her height). 
Medically spealdng, this person has a problem. But it might not be a 
problem for that person. He or she would almost certainly be incapable 
14. Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1983) and AIDS and its Metaphors, (Harmondsworth: Petloouin"Bo?ks, 
1988). See also Keith Alcorn, "Illness, Metaphor and AIDS , 1n 
Aggleton and Homans (Eds.) Social Aspects of AIDS, (London: The 
Falmer Press, 1988), pp. 65-82 
15. See, for example, the results of the 'periodic health overhaul' 
conducted amongst 1,206 families (3,911 individuals) at the 
experimental Pioneer Health Centre in Peckham, South East London, 
over a period of four-and-a-half years from 1938. Of the to~al males 
examined (1,946), 1,673 (86%) presented with some form of disorder, 
while only 273 (14%) were considered free from disorder: Of the 
total females examined (1,965), 1,880 (96%) presented Wlth some form 
of disorder, while only 85 (4%) w'ere considered to be free from 
'disorder'. Pearse and Crocker, ope cit., pp.93-123 
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of rumting for any distance, but he or she might have no interest in 
rurming, or sport of any kind, anyway. It would be all too easy in our 
fitness-conscious society to accuse that person of laziness, but this 
would smack of the tyranny of public opinion which John Stuart Mill so 
detested. 
A similar disjunction between public and private perspectives occurs 
with regard to the disabled. Quite often, what makes disabled people 
disabled is not their technical disability, but the social disabilities 
resulting from their failure to conform to other peoples' standards of 
normality. A person confined to a wheel-chair might experience 
difficulty in entering a building because the entrance can only be 
reached via a flight of steps. In such a case, a wheel-chair ramp would 
enable that previously disabled person to enter the building. The very 
concept of 'normality' can have pernicious consequences. But the concept 
of 'normality' might also have a sense which is internal to an 
individual. For example, for Christopher Nolan, the spastic novelist and 
poet, immobility and dependency are 'nomal' because he has Imown no 
other condition. But for the scientist Stephen Hawking, paraplegia is 
abnormal since it is a condition to which his body has been 
progressively subjected by illness, so that physically he is not the 
same person that he was a decade ago. Hawking, we may say, has deviated 
from the social 'norm' - the norm of a healthy person - but he has also 
deviated from his own personal norm. Nolan, on the other hand, has never 
matched up to any social norm, but he has not deviated from what is, for 
him at any rate, a personal norm. Note that we are talking 
straightforwardly of physical 'normality' here. There is little doubt 
that Nolan as a poet and novelist is well above whatever norms might be 
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applicable to other.people of similar age and background. Indeed, 
Nolan's work as a poet and novelist is acknowledged to be of a high 
standard quite apart from his age and background16 and Hawking, despite 
his illness, remains outstanding in his field. 
It must be said that the notion of distinguishing between public (or 
social) norms and private (or subjective) norms is itself problematic 
for it might be the case that the sense of self one has depends upon 
meeting a set of socially-derived criteria; a set of standards or norms 
over Which one may have little or no control. It is here that the notion 
of self-respect might be invoked, and this might be illustrated with 
regard to the consequences of unemployment. Whether or not employment is 
desired for its own sake (because it immerses one in a COllective, 
social activity) or is simply a means to an end (consumer goods, for 
example), its absence appears on the whole to have a detrimental effect 
upon the self-esteem and morale of those who are unemployed, sometimes 
leading to psychiatric illness, and even suicide17• It might be said 
that the Conservative Party's attempt to cut back public spending 
involved identifying and exploiting a norm of employment, creating a 
climate in which those who were unemployed, for whatever reason, were 
made to feel uncomfortable in their predicament. Given the account of 
personal autonomy developed in Chapters Two and Three, it should not be 
surprising that what persons are or consider themselves to be has a 
social element to it, since the social forms with which the autonomous 
person engages may generate norms, or standards. Conformity to such 
16. 
17. 
Nolan's novel, Under the Eye of the Clock, (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1987) was the Whitbread Book of the Year, 1987 ) 
Sean Sayers, "The Need to l~ork" in Radical PhilosophY, (1987 , 
Vol.46, Summer, p.18 
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noms is not detrimental to autonomy, and may well be constitutive of 
it. But it is also true that, if indeed there is such a thin g as a norm 
specific to a person (as opposed to a norm derived from the social) then 
it too must be fluid up to a pOint, since human beings themselves change 
through time. The person one is at the age of five both is and is not 
the person one is at the age of, say, fifty. In terms of physical 
resemblance the difference is profound; and the person of fifty (one 
hopes) will have a wisdom that one lacks at the age of five. Yet there 
is a real sense that, these differences apart, it is the same person 
that has lived through the changes that have occured. If preventive 
policies are to be founded upon a COncern for the autonomy of persons 
then a greater understanding of the relationship between one's 
understanding of oneself as a person, and one's environment (social; 
cultural; and possibly even economic) will be required. This 1rill 
especially be true if the account of autonomy to be employed is that 
developed in the first three chapters of this thesis, Where the person 
is not simply viewed as a unity (of mind and body) but also as 
essentially social through his or her relationship to social forms. This 
may, in turn, require a more responsive social policy mechanism which 
can accommodate individual nuances. 
V.ti: Strategies of Prevention 
The subjective/objective divide is not the only difficulty that 
preventive policies have to overcome. Another set of difficulties arise 
out of one's understanding (or lack of it) of the causal processes at 
work in the development of illness. If prevention is a relational 
concept, as the above formula suggests, then preventive action will 
obviously depend on an understanding of the nature of the relationship 
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between the three variables. Furthermore, preventive strategies must 
pre-empt the problem-state by intervening at some point in the causal 
relationship that exists between the three variables. This may be done 
in a number of ways. First, the causal factor can be removed. For 
example, a nail can be picked off the road in order to prevent a 
puncture. Second, the physical factor could be altered in some way - the 
tyre could be made stronger. The medical equivalent of this strategy 
would be vaccination as a protection against disease. A third method 
might involve the erecting of a barrier between the causal and physical 
factors. Mosquito nets have been cited as an example of the barrier 
method of prevention18, but a more immediately relevant example would be 
the use of the contraceptive sheath as a protection against various 
sexually transmitted diseases. A final strategy would involve avoiding 
the causal factor - a person might avoid those areas of the world where 
malaria is rife or, in the case of the sexually transmitted diseases, 
might decide to become celibate. There might of course be some overlap 
amongst these strategies, and they will not always fit neatly into one 
or other of these categories. Scurvy, for example, is a disease caused 
by a deficiency of vitamin C. It can be prevented by eating fruit 
containing the necessary vitamin, or by taking the relevant vitamin 
supplement. To do so is simultaneously to remove the causal factor - a 
deficiency of vitamin C - Whilst altering the condition of the person 
suffering from the disease. 
Before any attempt at intervention may be made, hmvever, the causal 
relationship must be understood. There is, of course, a wealth of 
philosophical speculation about the nature of causal relationships, but 
18. Allsop, Ope cit., p.174 
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such speculations are outside the scope of our immediate concerns. All 
that needs to be recognized here is that plaCing too much emphasis on 
certainty in our understanding of the causal processes thought to be at 
work in the creation of a problem-state could prove to be an obstacle to 
prevention. Our understanding of any causal relationship might be 
imperfect, while still providing us with a ground for preventive action. 
This principle can be illustrated with reference to the case of John 
Snow, a London doctor who, during an outbreak of cholera in the early 
nineteenth-century, noticed that people drawing water from one 
particular stand-pipe close to his practice contracted the disease, 
~vhile those drawing water from elsewhere did not. Snmv was able to 
recommend a course of preventive action to his patients, despite only 
having established a statistical relationship between cases of cholera 
and the contaminated standpipe. It is also true to say that some of the 
greatest reforms in the history of British health-care were founded upon 
what is now held to be an erroneous model of disease causality. The 
public health reforms set in motion by Edwin Chad1vick's Report on the 
Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of Great Britain (1842) 
were underpinned by its author's adherence to the 'miasmatist' theory of 
disease transmission. Miasmatists such as Chadwick believed that the 
various forms of disease were caused by 'atmospheric impurities produced 
by decomposing animal and vegetable substances, by damp and filth, and 
close and overcrm~ed dwellings,19 summed up in Chadwick's aphorism that 
'all smell is disease'. Miasmatists held that diseases lay dormant in 
specific places - piles of refuse, rotting vegetable matter, human 
excrement, stagnant ponds and so on - where they would be activated by 
19. Cited in Alasdair Clayre (Ed.), Nature and Industrialization, 
(Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1977), p.133 
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some causal factor. Views differed as to which of f' 
a range 0 poss1ble 
causal factors might contribute to the release of th di . 
e seases conta1ned 
in these 'nuisances', some arguing that inclement weather was to blame 
, 
while others argued that changes in atmospheric pressure released the 
diseases. Variously, or in combination, lightning, thunder, rain, wind, 
sunshine, heat, cold, and humidity were all indicted as possible causes 
of disease20• 
Although useful preventive measures may be (and have been) derived from 
incomplete evidence and erroneous theories of disease-causality, the 
hypothetical nature of knowledge about causal relationships can also 
prove to be an obstacle to prevention. This is no less the case in terms 
of policy-formulation at the level of national government, as the 
example of the 1974 report on Diet and Coronary Heart Disease shows by 
the Committee on Medical Aspects of Food Policy (COMA)21. This report 
recommended, as a preventive strategy against heart disease, that the 
British public should be encouraged to eat less fat, and especially less 
saturated fat. One member of the panel, Professor Jo1m Yud..1d.n, did not 
agree that the evidence warranted such a conclusion and produced a 
minority report registering his dissent. David, now Lord, Ennals, 
20. 
21. 
The miasma - or pythogenic - theory of disease-causality.had largely 
replaced an earlier influential theory based around the 1dea of 
contagion. See F.F. Cartwright, A Short History of Medicine, 
(London: Longman, 1977), p.97, and also below, pp.215-218 
Department of Health and Social Security, Diet and coronary heart 
disease: report of the Advisary Panel of the Conmittee on Medical 
Aspects of Food Policy on diet in relation to cardiovascular and 
cerebrovascular disease, (Chainnan: Professor Sir Frank Young). 
Report on Health and Social Subjects No.7, (London: HMSO, 1974). The 
panel reported again, reaChing similar conclusions, in 1984. 
Department of Health and Social Security, Diet and cardiovascular 
disease: report of the Advisory Panel of the Camdttee on Medica:I 
Aspects of Food Policy on diet in relation to cardiovascular 
disease, Report on Health and Social Subjects No.28, (London: HMSO, 
1986). 
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Minister for Health and Social Security between 1976 and 1979, later 
justified his department's apparent failure to implement the 
recommendations of the report on the grotmds that the members of the 
committee had failed to reach an agreed conclusion as to the merits of 
the evidence presented to them22 • But as we have seen, any claim to 
certainty, whether made by a scientist or by a lay-person, can only be 
as good as the available evidence will allow. Since evidence is always 
incomplete, there will always remain the possibility of dispute 
concerning a set of findings. One example of this is the tenacity wi th 
Which the tobacco companies question the validity of the findings 
linking cigarette-smoking with a wide variety of respiratory diseases, 
often dismissing such findings as a mere statistical correlation. 
Indeed, fuLnals' reluctance to act upon the findings of the COMA report 
goes against one of the recommendations made by the Social Services and 
Employment Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee of the House of 
Commons in their report on preventive medicine23 • This report, begun in 
1975 and published in April 1977, recommended that: 
Where a consensus exists about the dangers arising from the 
consumption of certain foods the Government s2~d have a duty 
to bring this to the attention of the public. 
In the White Paper Prevention and Health, which represented the 
Government's formal response to the Sub-Committee's report, the 
recommendation was subsequently accepted by the Government without 
reservations. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
Ennals' statement came in reply to a question put during a debate on 
the prevention of heart disease, held in the House of Lords, 
follmv.ing publication of the 1984 COMA report. Cited in Geoffrey 
Cannon The Politics of Food, (London: Century, 1987), pp.319-3~O 
Expenditure Committee. Session 1976/77. First ~rt ••• Prevent1ve 
Medicine, Volume I: Report, (London: HMSO, 1977 
Expenditure Committee, ope cit., recommendation mnnber 45. 
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Since evidence is rarely, if ever, indisputib1e in the field of 
medicine, there is always likely to be the attendant problem of deciding 
When to accept, or decline to accept, a scientific claim. This, in the 
Department of Health and Social Security's publication Prevention and 
Health: Everbody's Business (1976), is refererred to as 'the dilemma of 
uncertainty,25 described as knowing 'Whether or not to act on the basis 
of inadequate information' 26. But the 'dilenma of l.n1certainty' does not 
only refer to the quality of the information available to the decision-
maker, for it is also recognised that the adoption of any prevention 
strategy might have unintended consequences. 'Today's problems,' it is 
suggested, 'are sometimes the consequence of yesterday's policies,27, so 
that the adoption of any policy 'is often a matter of balancing a 
possible risk against a known advantage,28. 
Such considerations underlie two currently controversial moves relating 
to the quality of the food supply. The first concerns the introduction 
of the hormone bovine sanatotropin (BST) into cattle to increase their 
milk-yields, the second concerns the process known as food irradiation. 
Critics of both practices point to the lack of knowledge of potential 
side-effects should these processes be introduced into the national 
25. 
26 • 
27. 
28. 
Department of Health and Social Security, Prevention and Health: 
~'s Business, (London: HMSO, 1976), pp.66-68. See also 
D.H.S.S., Prevention and Health, (London: HMSO, 1977, Cmnd. 7047), 
para. 19 
D H S S Pre~ti· on and Health: Eve:::1::vt::' s Business, p. 66 • • •• , 'Y~~ ~
D.H.S.S., ibid., p.68 
D.H.S.S., ibid., p.66 
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diet29 • If David Ennals can be said to have treated th d. 
e a V1ce of his 
scientific advisors with too much caution, Jolm Selwyn ~r (then 
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) can reasonably be said to 
have shown too little when he claimed, of BST, that 'nobody has any 
doubt about any damage being done to human beings [by BST], it is 
totally safe,30. Of course, in view of the account of scientific 
methodology given in Chapter Four (section i, pp.151-157) it is tmlikely 
that irrefutable conclusions will be reached on any issue. This is 
clearly illustrated in the case of cigarette-smoking. Of all the 
behaviour-related preventive issues in the field of medical care , 
cigarette-smoking and its implication in the causation of a wide variety 
of respiratory diseases is amongst the best understood. Yet despite the 
evidence that exists connecting cigarette-smoking with disease, the 
Royal College of Physicians is still compelled to write in a tentative 
manner, as in the following passage: 
Cigarette smokers are about twice as likely to die in middle 
age as are non-smokers and may have a risk similar to that of 
non-smokers ten years older. It is estfmated that over 20,000 
deaths in men between the ages of 35 and 64 are caused every 
year by smoking in the United Kingdom. The chances are that two 
out of every five heavy smokers, but only ~r out of every five 
non-smokers, will die before the age of 65. 
Uhfor tunat ely , of course, Governments are not only ham-strung by the 
'dilemmas of uncertainty'. They may also be compromised by political 
realities. In terms of profits from sales of tobacco on the internal 
29. On BST see Dorothy Wade's report "A country flowing wi th milk and 
drugs'" The ,,----.l-=an 24th June 1988 p 27 On irradiation see 
, ~tLL, " •• " "-__ -..J~ _ 
anon., "Gunmer defends food irradiation proposals , '!be \.J\mLU.usu, 
19th September, 1989, p.2, and subsequent correspondence - letters 
from Christopher Robbins (21/9/89 p.22); Dr. A. J. Swallow of the 
Cancer Research Campaign (22/9/89 p.18); and Prof. A. E. Bender of 
the Institute of Food Science and Technology (23/9/89 p.22) 
30. Quoted in l.vade, ibid. 
31. Royal College of Physicians, Smoldng and Health Now: A Report, 
(London: Pitman, 1971), p.2 (~~hases added). 
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market and as exports the tobacco companies regularly feature in the top 
thirty British firms. Between them they employ around 27,<X>O workers, 
often in areas of general economic depression. The industry also 
contributes a substantial amolIDt to Government revenue. It is unlikely 
that any Government would seek to antagonise such an economically 
important industry - one reason why vohmtary agreements between 
Goverrnnent and the tobacco industry (through its negotiating body, the 
Tobacco Advisory Council) are the main choice of policy instrument. 
Another 'hidden' economic consideration is the effect on the economy in 
terms of pensions and medical care should the amount of people who 
presently die every year from smoking-related diseases live on into old 
age32• There might also be straightforward electoral reasons for 
adopting a policy of minimal interference. An increased tax on tobacco 
may be a vote-loser. This argument was employed by Richard Crossman in 
1967 when he argued that, since the majority of smokers were to be found 
amongst the working class, a Labour government that imposed a higher 
rate of tax on a commodity enjoyed mainly by its own supporters would be 
politically suicida133• 
32. Such considerations have been voiced by an interdepartmental h 
committee of officials drawn principally from the D.H.S.S., t e 
Treasury, Customs and Excise, Trade and Industry. The reJ?Ort 
produced by this committee in 1971 was subs:quently cons1~efq~~ 
limbo until a copy was leaked to 'lbe Guardian newspaper 1TI ~ • 
G. T. Popham, "Government and Smoking: Policy-i'-f..aking and Pressure 
Groups" in Policy and PolitiCS, (1981), Vol.9(3), pp.344-345 
33. Popham, ibid., pp.335-336 
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V.iii: Prevention and Health Policy 
The Prevention and Health campaign, latmched tmder a Labour Goverrnnent 
in 1976, was intended to 'stimulate discussion on the possible 
contributions of prevention towards the solution of our health 
problems ,34. It was aimed at a wide audience, including those involved 
with aspects of 'environmental health, food standards and the education 
and social services', in fact, all those services 'which have 
significant effects on the nation's health,35. This, of course, also 
included the (then newly-reorganised) National Health Service. The 
publication of the discussion document, Prevention and Health: 
Everybody's Business, was described in the White Paper Prevention and 
Health published the following year as marking 'an lIDequivocal change of 
policy within the Health Departments towards prevention,36. Yet it has 
been remarked that the most striking aspect of this change in policy was 
not so much the advocacy of prevention as a means of tackling health 
problems, but rather the emphasis placed on the role of the individual 
in this respect37• This theme, as we have already noticed, runs 
throughout the series of documents published under the Prevention and 
Health rubric. However, the stress on individual responsibility must be 
put into an overall context of medical care. For example, in the 
document Priorities for Health and Personal Social Services in England 
(published in 1976, the same year as the Prevention and Health campaign 
was lalIDched), preventive health care is seen as part of an overall 
strategy, centred around the primary health care team38 • Primary health 
34. D. H. S • S., Prevention and Health: Everybody's Business, p. 6 
35. D.H.S.S., ibid. 
36. D.H.S.S., Prevention and Health, para. 12 
37. Allsop, ope cit., p.179 in 
38. D .H. S. S., Priorities for Health and Personal Social r ces 
England: A Consultative Document, (London: HMSO, 197 
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care, as it is understood in this document, incorporates four main 
categories of general medical provision - general medical . 
se!Vl.ces, 
general dental and opthalmic services, pharmaceutical services, and a 
fourth category covering services provided by health centres and family 
planning clinics. This last category also includes general prevention, 
such as health education. The stated intention of this document was 
twofold. Firstly, it was designed to stimulate local health authorities 
to giving more thought, and more resources, to preventive activities. 
But secondly, and even more importantly, was the need 'to bring home to 
everyone how much they can do to improve their own health and that of 
their family,39. These are, of course, the stated aims of the Prevention 
and Health campaign proper. To illustrate its commitment to prevention, 
the government was able to point to an increase in the 1975/76 budget of 
400% over the 1970/71 budget for some preventive services, specifically 
those concerned with immunisation, vaccination, fluoridation and family 
planning. This increase must be set against the total health care 
expenditure, where these preventive services received only £4Om or 4.2% 
of the total amount spent (against £lOm or 1.6% of the 1970/71 budget). 
A more modest rise was antiCipated for the 1979/80 budget, with 
preventive services increasing by another 33% over the '75/76 figures, 
to total 4.8% of the overall budget40• 
The White Paper, Prevention and Health (1977, Crnnd. 7047), offered a 
tripartite definition of prevention: 
Prevention in relation to health is either an attempt to 
prevent disease or disability before it occurs (prim~ . 
prevention), the early detection and treatment of condltlonS 
with a view to returning the patient to normal health 
39. D.H.S.S., Ope cit., para.3.23 
40. D.H.S.S., ope cit., fig.3, p.21 
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(secondary prevention), or the continuing treatment f di 
di b "I" t " d d1 0 sease or sa 1 1ty 0 avo1 4yee ess progression or compl" t" (tertiary prevention). 1ca 10ns 
This threefold definition was not specifically developed for the 
campaign and although it may be comprehensive in scope it is not 
categorical but rather admits of a number of 'subtle but significant 
differences of interpretation,42. These differences of interpretation, 
it is suggested, lead to a 'blurring' of the distinctions between the 
three modes prevention. For our purposes, however, the most interesting 
blurring that occurs concerns the distinction we have already noted 
between 'preventive' and 'curative' medicine, whereby the latter can be 
redescribed as a branch, or sub-division, of the former. This is brought 
out more clearly if one considers Sir Richard Doll's claim that the 
objectives of preventive medicine are two-fold. His claim is that 
preventive medicine aims at (i) the prologation of life (or, to put it 
another way, the avoidance of death), and (ii) the reduction of 
disability43. If an illness is either disabling in any way, or life-
threatening, or both, then to cure that disease is to prevent disability 
or death. Hence curative medicine is also preventive medicine. This 
leads us to consider what the point of the tripartite distinction might 
be. 
41. D.H.S.S., Prevention and Health, (London: HMSO, 1977, Cnmd 7047), 
Appendix II: "Definition of Prevention". 
42. Andrew Tarmahill, "Reclassifying Prevention" in Public J:IealtJ:t, 
(1985), Vol.99, pp.364-365. Tanna~ill notes that the trlpartlte 
definition of prevention can be traced back to"196~. " 
43. Sir Richard Doll, "Preventive Medicine: The ObJectlves , -rrto!fue 
of Preventive Medicine: Ciba Foundation Symposiun No.110, on: 
John Wiley, 1985), p.3 
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One suggestion is that it enables us to establish the foci of specific 
" ti 44 Thus" "gh preventlve prac ces. lt nu t be said that tertiary prevention 
is the job of those health professionals concerned with rehabilitation _ 
osteopaths, for example, or psychiatrists - or with the care of those 
suffering from chronic complaints such as Alzheimer's disease, or 
terminal cancer. Secondary prevention might be the province of general 
practitioners (administering vaccines; performing cervical smears etc.) 
or any other set of people who perform these functions (health visitors" , 
community nurses; and others). Primary prevention can be said to involve 
a wide range of people and institutions, from health professionals 
(doctors; health educators; midwives) through local government employees 
(environmental health officers) and others (the police force; water 
boards) to the national government (through, for example, legislation). 
One of the most important points that both the White Paper and the 
document Prevention and Health: Everybody's Business sought to establish 
was that, in terms of primary prevention, individuals themselves had a 
far greater role to play45. 
But if the point of the tripartite schema is to locate the onus of 
responsibility for specific preventive practices, then the blurring of 
distinctions pointed to above also has the correlative effect of making 
this task less straightforward. Doctors, for example, may be said to 
involve themselves in all three categories of prevention. They might (in 
conjunction with the home-visiting services or the patients own family) 
involve themselves in the care of the chronically ill. They certainly 
involve themselves in many of the activities falling under the rubric of 
44. Tannahill, ope cit., p.365-366 
45. D.H.S.S., Prevention and Health, para. 287; 
Heal th: Everybody's Business, p. 95 
D.H.S.S., Prevention am 
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secondary prevention, and have recently been encour d 
age to play a far 
greater role in primary prevention than they already d046 • It has also 
been pointed out that some interventions are diff1' cult t 1 o p ace within 
the tripartite schema. Treatment of an haemophiliac might be called 
tertiary prevention from the point of view of the patient, but primary 
prevention from the point of view of the patient's relatives and 
friends47 • 
It might also be the case that the schema fits certain types of health 
problem better than others. This is implied in a recent report of the 
Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, which stated that the 
traditional three-part schema was not 'sufficiently comprehensive for 
all elements of prevention po1icy,48. In view of the foregoing 
discussion, it is significant that the Advisory Council, in developing a 
more comprehensive account of prevention, chose not to increase the 
number of categories, but instead to reduce them proposing a bipartite 
distinction: 
a. reducing the risk of an individual engaging in drug misuse, 
b. reducing the harm associated with drug misuse. 
Were this to be applied to the field of medicine, we would see that the 
first of these criteria accords ~Yith primary prevention - ~~ich, as we 
have seen is concerned with preventing disease or disability from 
ariSing in the first place - while the second criterion accords with 
both secondary and tertiary prevention - which may both be said to 
46. D.H.S.S., Pranoting Better Health, para.3.18 and para.I.IS 
47. J. Griffiths; J. Dennis; P. Draper; J. Popay, "Concepts of 
Prevention" in Clark and Henderson (Eds.), Camurlty Health, 
(London: Churchill Livingstone, 1983), p.2~ ci1 the 
48. Home Office, Prevention: Report of the Advisory Cot.m on 
Misuse of Drugs, (London: HMSO, 1984), Section I; para. II 
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concern themselves with the management of disease 0 eli b'l' 
r sa 1 lty, once 
that disease or disability has arisen. 
One way in which the discusion so far might be sunmarised would be to 
say that while all curative medicine is also preventive, not all 
preventive medicine is curative. Of the three categories, it is 
specifically primary prevention that has no curative content at all 
, 
while the other two categories - both secondary and tertiary prevention 
- essentially aim to cure, or return the individual to health. This is 
not to say that these two categories are concerned solely with curing 
patients. We have already seen that tertiary prevention, for example, 
includes the care of those suffering from chronic diseases. It also 
covers the management of currently incurable diseases, such as mental 
disorders (schizophrenia, for example), and diabetes mellitus49 • If the 
point of the tripartite definition of preventive health-care is intended 
to delineate responsibilities for the various classes of preventive 
activity it covers, it also paradoxically masks an important point 
concerning responsibility which the bipartite definition uncovers. For, 
if both secondary and tertiary prevention assume the presence of a 
disease or disability, then both of these categories, almost by 
definition, are the province of the medical profession itself (bearing 
in mind that the medical profession is 'demand led'). Primary 
prevention, on the other hand, is not - at least not necessarily. 
Primary prevention comprises a vast range of activities from the 
elaborate (the passing of legislation through Parliament, for example, 
in order to ensure clean water supplies) to the mundane (looking both 
ways before one crosses the road). These activities themselves may be 
49. D.H.S.S., Prevention and Health, p.82 
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carried out by a wide range of people, from individuals to Government 
officials. Secondary and tertiary prevention also encompass a vast range 
of activities, from the elaborate (cardiac by-pass operations; heart 
transplants, and so on) to the mundane (the prescribing of anti-
biotics), but these activities are carried out by a fairly narrowly-
defined set of people - the medical profession. Hence, secondary and 
tertiary prevention are essentially professional categories; primary 
prevention is not. In other words, it is primary prevention - and not 
secondary or tertiary prevention - that is, to coin the phrase, 
everybody's business. Despite the allusion here to the flagship document 
of the Prevention and Health campaign, the documents published under 
that rubric are generally concerned with one particular sphere of 
responsibility - that of the individual. 
Although we refer to the series of documents published under the 
Prevention and Health rubric as a 'campaign', very little coherent 
policy activity resulted. In 1984 an attempt was made to produce a 
systematic review of the fate of the fifty-eight proposals made in the 
report of the Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee on preventive 
medicine to which the White Paper Prevention and Health was the 
Government's formal response50• Not all of the Sub-Committee's proposals 
were endorsed by the government at the time. Of the fifty-eight 
proposals made by the Sub-Committee, only twenty-four were accepted 
without reservation. Eight were rejected altogether, while the rest were 
accepted 'with reservations' or were said to be 'under consideration'. 
50. J Henderson and D. Cohen 'No Strategy for Prevention' in Harrison ~d Gretton (Eds.), Health Care U.K. 1984, An ~c, Social and 
Policy Audit, (London: Chartered Institute of Pub11c F1nance and 
Accountancy, 1984) 
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In conducting their review, Henderson and Cohen concentrated only on 
those proposals that had been accepted outright and were not either 'too 
vague for meaningful investigation ••• or ••• for which information could 
not readily be obtained.' It was discovered that, where proposals had 
been fmplemented, as in the case of immunisation, sex education and the 
keeping of age/sex registers, the benefits in terms of improvements in 
health were generally of limited value. In areas where more than one 
proposal was made, such as health education, there appears to have been 
a failure to co-ordinate the implementation of policies. For example, 
spending on health education through the Health Education Council 
increased between 1977 and 1982, but this was not backed up by a 
concerted attempt to persuade the medical schools to give the topic of 
health education a higher profile in their training courses. The Royal 
College of General Practitioners (RCGP) now publishes information on 
health education for its members, but it appears not to monitor the 
effectiveness of this strategy in raising public awareness of health 
issues. In some instances there appeared to be little or no policy at 
all. Food policy, as Henderson & Cohen note: 
••• consists of ensuring informed choices freely made by 
members of the public. But when it comes to providing the 
necessary information, the De~artmen~s seem.reluctant tg1take a stand on any issue where eV1dence 1S not 1rrefutable. 
Even where advice was offered, as in the document Prevention and Health 
- Fating for Health (1978), it was often too vague to be of any 
practical use52 • 
51. 
52. 
Henderson and Cohen, ope cit., p.65 . 
The British Medical Association's Board of Science and Educat10n 
said of this document that it 'is not a practical statement of 
dietary change since it neither indic~tes whose.ea~ing h~bits should 
change, nor by how much'. British Med1cal Assoc1at10n, Diet, 
Nutrition and Health: A Report of the Board of Science ana 
Fducation, (London: BMA, 1986), p.5 
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V.iv: Prevention and ~s of Disease-CausaJity 
One of the most salient criticisms of the general h approac to prevention 
outlined in the series of documents published under the ~ltion and 
Health rubric focusses on the model of disease-causality that is said to 
underlie it. We have already noticed the importance of theories of 
disease-causality to preventive action. For example, we saw that 
Chadwick's nineteenth-century public health reforms were informed by the 
miasmatist, or pythogenic theory of disease causality. This was not the 
only theory of disease-causation available to Chadwick and his 
contemporaries. There were at least three others of note. The major 
rival theory to the miasmatists' was the 'contagionist' theory which 
held that diseases were transferred through direct contact with the 
diseased person or his or her clothing, personal effects, and so on. 
Each theory gave rise to different political and practical 'solutions' 
to epidemics of disease. Miasmatists argued for the removal of 
'nuisances', for clean air and ventilation, and so on. Contagionists, on 
the other hand, favoured quarantine as the chief barrier against the 
spread of disease. The contagionist theory dominated at the time of the 
first two cholera epidemics of 1831-1832 and 1848-1849. A third theory, 
known variously as the moral, biblical, or (a contemporary term) the 
fundamentalist model, proposes that disease is both evidence of, and 
ptmismnent for, moral depravity53. Archaic as this might seem, it has 
recently been revived, in the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, by some 
christian fundamentalists seeking to demonstrate to those still 
unconvinced that homosexuality is against the will of their particular 
god. This project has once more been discredited following the spread of 
53. See, for example, John Wesley's Primitive .ick: or, An Easy and 
Natural ~thod of Curing ~st Diseases, (1 9: Reprint, London: G. 
Woodfall, n.d.), p.lll 
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HIV / AIDS to otherwise 'iImocent' groups of people such as haemophiliacs, 
unsuspecting female sexual partners of male sufferers, and victims of 
rape. A fourth theory, developed against the context of late-nineteenth-
century romanticism, emphasised the role of personal behaviour. The 
romanticisation of nature in the face of apparently deforming 
industrialisation led some to attribute sickness and disease to 
urmatural lifestyles and to recommend natural teclmiques and remedies 
for illness against artificial, scientific remedies54. 
The twentieth-century debate about the cause of disease has turned on 
two models - the medical model, and the environmental model. Of these, 
the former is generally said to dominate within the medical profession 
(hence its name) but it is also said to underlie Governmental policies 
in the field of health careSS. Broadly speaking, the medical model holds 
that disease has, in principle, a single causal factor such as a virus, 
or germ. Indeed, the model is sometimes known as the 'germ theory,56. 
This causal factor locates in the body of an individual, and gives rise 
to various symptoms Which may assist in the identification of the virus 
or germ. Diseases, then, are held to have specific individual 
aetiologies, requiring specific individual cures. The body of the 
individual is the ultimate focus of any attempt to cure disease. Once a 
disease has been identified, the responsibility for that disease 
devolves to a socially-recognised expert - e.g. a doctor - for 
54. 
55. 
56. 
Sylvia Noble Tesh, Hidden Ar ts: Political ldeo~o ~ Disease 
Prevention Policy, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Universlty Press, 
1988), pp.18-19 
Peter Townsend "Individual or Social Responsibility for Premature 
Death? Current' Controversies in the British Health Debate" in 
International Journal of Heal th Services, (1990), Vol. 20 (3), p. 378 
Tesh, ope cit., p.38 
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treatment 57 • Although the medical model is widely employed by the 
medical profession, its explanatory value is open to criticism, for not 
all diseases fit into the requisite framework. Cancer provides one 
example of a disease for which no single organism - virus or germ - has 
been identified as a causal factor. We have already remarked that one 
reason underlying the Government's interest in prevention during the 
mid-nineteen seventies was the curative emphasis of the National Health 
Service. This emphasis can partly be explained by the medical 
profession's adherence to the medical model of disease-causality, for, 
as Sylvia Tesh has remarked, the medical model 'is more directly 
applicable to the treatment and cure of diseases than it is to their 
prevention' 58 • 
The main alternative to the medical model of disease causality is the 
social, or environmental model. If the medical model locates the source 
of disease in the body of the individual, the social model locates it 
outside of the individual, in the social or cultural environment. If the 
medical model sees health as a negative state - as an absence of disease 
- the social model sees health as a positive state of well-being59 • One 
distinct advantage of the social model is that it can incorporate most 
of the diseases that the medical model applies to (espeCially those that 
are transmissible from one individual to another) and many others that 
the medical model fails to account for. For example, the social model 
can account for diseases such as cancer, and ischaemic heart disease, 
57. 
58. 
59. 
Raymond Illsley "Everybody's Business? Concepts of Health and 
Illness", Health and Health Policy, Priorities for Research, Social 
Science Research Council, 1977, AppendiX 4, p.3 
Sylvia Noble Tesh, "Disease Causality and Politics", Journal of 
Health Politics, Poli? and law, (1981), Vol. 6(3) , p.374 
Townsend, ibid., p.37 
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where no germ or virus is to be fo\trld. The social model can also 
incorporate the notion that health and illness might be functions of 
. 1 d t· 60 . 1ncome, c ass, an oppor un1ty • It 1S this latter point that leads us 
into a consideration of the political implications of each of the two 
models, for, if the medical model more appropriately emphasises curative 
practices, it might seem that the social model more appropriately suits 
preventive policies. While this might be true in theory, in practice it 
is not the case. 
V.v: Prevention, Politics and Responsibility 
It is sometimes suggested that the dominance of the medical model over 
other theories of disease-causality can be explained in terms of the 
implications it holds for the construction of health policies. Tesh, for 
example, points out that the medical model has the advantage of 
simplicity over the social mode161 • In order to overcome disease the 
medical model requires only changes in individuals, since it both 
focusses on individuals in the search for disease and operates upon 
individuals in curing disease. The social model, on the other hand, may 
call for changes in the structure of society. In this respect, the 
social model represents a 'frankly political' approach to health care, 
in that it tends to hold the owners and managers of industry largely 
responsible for the ill-health of the population. It is for this reason 
that the social model has come to be associated with the political 
'left' since it often implies a critique of the capitalist mode of 
60. Tesh, Hidden Arguments, p.49 
61. Tesh, "Disease causality and Politics", p.373 
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od t · 62 I . . pr UC lon • t lS essentlally because of the focus on the individual 
that it is plausible to claim that the medical model of disease-
causality underpinned the policy-shift towards prevention, signalled by 
the Prevention and Health campaign in the mid-nineteen seventies. 
We have already noticed (above p.191) that the idea of prevention has 
cross-party appeal. But consideration of the implications of these two 
models of disease-causality demonstrates the contentious nature of 
prevention, for each model gives rise to radically different policies. 
Indeed, some frarL~y acknowledge that adoption of the social model would 
literally have 'revolutionary implications,63. At the very least, 
preventive policies become politically contentious64 • Emphasis placed on 
individual responsibility means that attention is diverted away from 
industrial and environmental sources of disease. Attention is also 
diverted away from economic sources of disease, for it is not only 
pollutants from factories that cause disease, but also poverty65. The 
62. See, for example, Joseph Eyer and Peter Sterling, "Stress-Related 
Mortality and Social Organisation", ']he Review of Radical Political 
Economics, (1977), Vol.9, Spring, pp.1-44. See also Vicente Navarro, 
Crisis, ~th, and Medicine: A Social Critique, (London: Tavistock, 
1986), pp.1 4-170 
63. T01YI1Send, ibid., p.378 
64. Rosemary Taylor, "The Politics of Prevention" in Social Policy, 
(1982), Summer, p.33 
65. The connection between poverty and ill-health was demonstrated by a 
Parliamentary ResearCh Working Group, chaired by Sir Douglas Black, 
set up in 1977 by David Ennals, then Secretary of State for Social 
Services. The Working Group's report, published by the D.H.S.S. 
under the title of ~ities in Health, (London: HMSO, 1980) but 
known popularly as ~ck Report established that material 
deprivation was the single most important (but by no means the only) 
contributing factor to the significantly higher rates of illness 
amongst the poorer sections of the population. Townsend, ibid., 
pp.384-385. The findings of The Black Report were recently suppo:-ted 
by the British Medical Association's Board of S:i:nce an~ Educatl0n 
report, Deprivation and Ill-Health, (London: Brltlsh Med:cal . 
Association, 1987). The latter document is interestin~ Slnce It 
shows the medical profession itself utilising the soclal model of 
disease-causality. 
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ability of individuals to change their behav1· 
our may, in part, be a 
function of their economic status but it nn.·ght I d d h . 
, a so epen on t e1r 
social status as well. Cultural influences have f 1 be h 
, or examp e, en s own 
to play a part in the ability of certain social groupings to give up 
smoking66 • 
A second consequence of the indiVidually-focussed medical model of 
disease causality is that, in ignoring the wider industrial, economic 
and social causes of disease, the individual comes to be held, 
inappropriately, responsible for his or her own health. This practice 
has been described as 'blaming the victim,67, a practice that _ 
potentially, at any rate - 'serves to reorder expectations and to 
justify a retreat from the language of rights and the poliCies of 
entitlements,68. The suggestion is that those individuals who 
deliberately indulge in health-threatening activities, could conceivably 
be denied access to health-care facilities. One problem with this is 
that it ignores What has already been called 'the dilemma of 
uncertainty' - a phenomenon deployed in the ~ltion and Health 
doctnnents to explain and justify caution on the part of the Goverrnnent 
in implementing certain policies. Here, we may turn the phenomenon in 
66. For example, the White Paper, Prevention and Health, recorded that 
reductions in the numbers of people smoking manufactured cigarettes 
were greatest amongst professional workers, and greatest of all 
amongst doctors. Smoking generally continued to be more prevalent 
amongst social classes III, IV, and V, and .heaviest amongst the 
latter with little reduction taking place in the ntnnbers of women smoker~, and even, in social classes III and V, ~n increase in the 
ntnnbers of those smoking. Para.S2 and page.lS, f1g.3 
67. William Ryan, Blaming the Victim, (New York: Vintage Books, 1976); 
Robert Crawford, "You Are Dangerous To Your Health: The Ideology And 
Politics Of Victim Blaming" in International Journal of Health 
Services (1977) Vol.7(4) pp.663-680; J. P. A1legrante and L. W. ~';;;"';"';';;;"';"';;'-:i!' " 1 . " U..--or ~.-1~ Green, "When Health Policy Turns to Victim B anung , l~ 
Journal of Medicine, (1981), pp.lS28-1S29 
68. Crawford, ope cit., p.668 
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favour of the individual in the following way. Since not all smokers 
develop lung-cancer, and not all those who develop lung-cancer are 
smokers, establishing a link between the fact that a given individual 
smokes and that he or she has developed lung-cancer must depend, in 
part, in establishing that he or she would not have developed the 
disease had they not smoked. This is clearly impossible to do. Given the 
existence of such 'dilemmas of uncertainty' it would seem to be 
unjustifiable to hold individuals responsible, in any strong sense, for 
the state of their health. Resorting to a weaker sense of responsibility 
does not help. If smokers who develop lung-cancer are to be penalised 
because they knew that smoking increased the risk of ill-health, then 
there seems little reason not to refuse medical care to the hang-glider 
pilot who is injured in an accident. After all, hang-glider pilots mow 
that there is a risk involved every time they launch themselves from a 
m01.n1tain-side. 
'There are two other areas where 'blaming the victim' might have 
important consequences. The first of these areas concerns the obtaining 
of life-insurance 69 • Insurance companies, for some time now, have 
required that applicants for life-insurance declare whether or not they 
smoke. If they do, then a premium may be payable in order to counter the 
increased risk of developing anyone of the range of diseases connected 
with that activity. The smoker is thus penalised for smoking, ostensibly 
on the grounds that the smoker has a choice as to whether or not he or 
she smokes, whereas the non-smoker, who might nevertheless be 
susceptible to these diseases, does not have a choice as to his or her 
69. Crawford, ope cit., pp.669-671; Deborah A. Stone, "~e Resist~b1e 
Rise of Preventive Hedicine", Journal of Health Pol1tics, PoI1CY and 
Law, (1986), Vol.11(4), p.676-677 
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own susceptibility. This ignores the addictive nature of cigarette-
smoking (many smokers take up the habit when they are not mature enough 
to understand the dangers of smoking). It also ignores the pressures, 
both social (for example, from one's peer-group) and commercial (for 
example, cigarette advertisments) that may influence one to take up the 
habit in the first place. More recently, insurance companies have sought 
to raise the premiums for those groups currently defined as 'at risk' 
from HIV/AIDS70• 
The second area concerns employment. It has been pointed out that in the 
united States of America, the practice of 'medical screening' is 
increasingly being used by employers to 'weed out' those members of the 
work-force who are deemed susceptible to life-style, or behaviour-
related diseases. This benefits the employers by reducing absenteeism 
and the costs associated with thiS, including health and disability 
insurance costs, and possibly even compensation payments to workers71 • 
However, the benefits to be derived from 'weeding out' employees are 
uncertain, since any financial savings must be set against the cost of 
the vetting procedures. Health tests of the kind necessary to detect 
life-style or behaviour-related diseases are often technologically 
sophisticated, and the staff required to conduct such tests will also 
incur additional expense. Costs might actually increase if companies had 
to spend more time vetting prospective employees. It has also been 
pointed out that, given a plentiful supply of potential employees and a 
70. 
71. 
Anon., "Lifestyle Insurance", The Guardian, 2nd May, 1987, p.23 
Stone, op.cit., p. 683-685. While this argument may not be 
immediately relevant to the Uhited Kingd~, it is.never~heless the 
case that many companies and businesses ln the Uni~ed Kingdom ~ke 
the offer of employment conditional on the completlon of a medlcal 
examination. 
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diminishing demand for skilled labour, an unhealthy workforce might 
ultimately help to reduce costs by reducing the amount of money paid to 
workers who have retired, or who have been disabled through injury72. 
Despite the ambiguities inherent in the idea of 'blaming the victim', it 
nevertheless surfaces now and again in British politics. A recent 
example would be the statements by a representative of Government 
suggesting that the rise in instances of domestic food-POisoning may be 
attributed to poor hygiene in the home, rather than to poor hygiene in 
the food-processing plant73 • 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined in some detail a specific area of 
health policy. In section i we examined the concept of prevention. Since 
prevention is a relational concept, by exploring the relationship 
between the three variables (causal factor; physical factor; problem-
state) of which it is comprised, we were able to identify some of the 
problems that preventive policies might generally be expected to 
encounter. One problem, of relevance to our discussion of personal 
autonomy, concerns the norms or standards employed in defining a 
situation as problematic, for there w~y be a gap between public (or 
objective) and private (or subjective) accounts of what comprises a 
problem-state. There might be general agreement over many health-related 
issues (for example, few people in a society such as ours, regardless of 
72. Neil A. Holtzman, "Prevention: Rhetoric and Reality", International 
Journal of Health Services, (1979), Vol.9(1), p.35 
73. Sir Donald Acheson, Chief Medical Officer to Her Majest~'~ . 
Government, issues guidelines to housewives on how to ffi1nlffilSe 
chances of food poisoning. Reported by Aileen Ballantyne; Owen 
Bowcott; Michael Smith, "Government launches food poisoning 
enquiry", '.ftte Guardian, 11th February, 1989, p.l 
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the level of autonomy they have aChieved, would regard the existence of 
a cancerous tumour as anything other than a problem-state) but if, as Ive 
have suggested, health is tied to autonomy, there may be room for 
disagreement. For example, some religious persons might view illness as 
just punishment for the sins they have committed. The problem-state then 
would be their behaviour, and not necessarily the illness. In 
designating a particular situation as a 'problem-state' a government (or 
the medical profession, or whoever is charged with developing preventive 
policy) might have the effect of over-riding individual autonomy at some 
point. Of course, such occasions might be justified on the basis of a 
distinction (such as Young makes) between 'occurent' (or short-tenn) 
autonomy and 'dispositional' (or long-term) autonomy74. But this 
distinction is itself problematic since it too only attains relevance in 
the light of a person's plans and projects and there is no reason why 
these should not be fluid and impreCise, and subject to revision and 
alteration. This is not solved by making reference to the social fonns 
one engages with either, since we assume that autonomous individuals may 
disengage from these when they so wish, and providing that it is within 
their power to do so. The imposition of noms and standards is 
potentially authoritarian and this, of course, is partly what autonomy-
based theories are designed to avoid75 • 
Another set of problems turn on understanding the causal relationship 
that holds between the three variables. Aspects of this problem were 
discussed in section ii and iv. In section ii we suggested that, despite 
philosophical problems with the idea of causality, it was not ahvays 
74. Robert Young, Personal Aut~: ~ Negative and Positive 
Liberty, (London: Croom He~98~.72-75. 
75. Introduction, section i, p.lO 
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necessary to have fully grasped the nature of the relationship between 
the variables before preventive action could be taken. However, in 
section iv, where we discuss models of disease-causality, an 
tUlderstanding of the nature of the relationship between the three 
factors assumes some importance. This is because different models of 
disease-causality entail different views as to where the locus of 
disease, and also of responsibility for disease and disease-prevention, 
must fall. This consideration has political implications in terms of the 
kinds of policies ultimately adopted, as we saw in section v. But it 
also has implications for autonomous individuals in the kind of 
assumptions that are made about those at whom preventive policies are 
aimed. For to allocate to persons responsibility for their health is 
also potentially to allocate to those same persons blame for their ill-
health. Thus the criticism made of preventive programmes that they 
'blame the victim,76 can be seen to follow from an erroneous 
understanding of those persons who are the subject of preventive 
policies. For example, the Prevention and Health campaign (discussed in 
section iii) appears to have assumed that those individuals at whom the 
documents were aimed had achieved an adequate level of autonomy. But the 
kind of autonomy assumed appears to have been of the types criticised in 
Chapter Three (sections iii and iv), where there is little or no 
reference to the wider (i.e. social, cultural, political, or economic) 
context within which the 'autonomous' individuals are located. 
76. This chapter, section v, pp.220-223. Judith Allsop ~ot~s. that in 
certain areas, preventive policies a~pear to treat lndlvlduals as 
responsible motivated and self-rellant at one level, and as 
helpless addicts at an~ther. Cigarette-smoking, for example. Allsop, 
2P. cit., pp.180-l8l 
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This last point suggests that a more thoroughgoing set of preventive 
policies would have to take into account the context within which 
individuals operate. This in turn suggests that some version of the 
social model of disease causality would need to be employed in the 
development of preventive policy, and of health policy generally. After 
all, the health of autonomous persons is not solely determined by their 
own actions. Autonomous persons should not just be viewed as a unity of 
mind and body, but also as situated in an environment. In this respect, 
the 'heroic' view of individuals adopted by the Prevention and Health 
campaign, and the corresponding assumption that the imparting of 
information is of itself sufficient to ~prove the health of the nation, 
is clearly inadequate. 
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In this conclusion we review the principal points that have been 
established in the preceding five chapters. We first of all consider the 
~plications for the project of employing autonomy as an 'organizing 
principle' for social policy of the particular account of personal 
autonomy developed in Chapters One to 'Three. We then consider the 
implications for theories of medicalization of adopting this account of 
autonomy. We then examine, from the perspective of personal autonomy, a 
specific policy-area - preventive health-care. We conclude finally with 
some general comments about the overall project of employing an account 
of autonomy as an organizing principle for social policy, and of the 
kinds of policies that might result from this. 
* * * * * 
The problem initially identified in Chapter One focussed on the alleged 
'essential contestability' of the objectives of social policy. Since 
there are many possible objectives, some means of arbitrating amongst 
them was seen to be desirable. The option explored in this chapter was 
that of utilising one of the many possible objectives of social policy 
as an 'organizing principle' around which social policy would be 
formulated. Two frequently-cited candidates for this task - the 
alleviation of need and the securing of liberty - were discussed and 
rejected. Both were seen to require some further argument as to which 
needs and liberties (of many possible options) would be deserving of 
social concern, and which would not. Two further candidates for the role 
of organizing principle were then discussed. First, Rawls' neo-Kantian 
argument, set out in his A Theory of Justice, was discussed. Rawls 
considers that the principles upon which a just society may be 
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constructed can be chosen from behind a 'vel· 1 of . ,. 19norance . Thi s was 
shown to be deeply problematic, mainly because the individuals who are 
to decide the principles of justice are required to abstract themselves 
from the society of which they are both a part and a product. Rawls' 
Kantian as Stmlptions , it seems, get the better of him at this point since 
it is by no means clear that persons could get themselves into the 
'original position' without ceasing to become persons in any meaningful 
sense. The second theory discussed was that developed by Plant, Lesser 
and Taylor-Gooby in their Political Philosophy and Social Welfare. These 
authors, utilising a reflexive argument, propose that autonomy be 
employed as an organizing principle for social policy. One immediate 
advantage of focussing on some notion of autonomy is that it 
acknowledges the subjective nature of the good - that which is of value 
to individuals. Thus, focussing on some notion of autonomy appears, on 
the face of it at least, to provide a means by which the authoritarian 
implications of those social and political theories that posit an 
objective good might be avoided. 
Plant et al suggest that since it is taken to be characteristic of human 
beings that they are, or are potentially, capable of moral agency, then 
the conditions necessary for autonomy (tmderstood as moral agency) could 
provide a framework within which social policy might be fitted. The 
authors themselves propose four basic conditions necessary for autonomy 
- survival (since if there were no people there could not be moral 
agency); freedom from arbitrary exercises of power; freedom from 
ignorance; and freedom from ill-health. The difficulty with Plant et 
~'s argument lies in its focus on the moral capacities of persons. The 
concept of moral autonomy can itself be seen to derive from Kant whose 
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theory is liable to those same criticisms already 1 11 d 
eve e at Rawls. The 
Kantian concept of moral autonomy is formal and abst t I . 
rac. t requ1res 
the decontextualising of individuals and this ToTe ar 
, ,w gue, is inadequate 
as a ground for social policy. We therefore proposed that the Kantian 
notion of moral autonomy be rejected in favour of some notion of 
personal autonomy and in Chapter Two we proceeded to examine one such 
acc01mt. 
Taking Plant et aI's claim that moral agency is (potentially at least) a 
characteristic of persons as our starting point, in Chapter Two we 
demonstrated that, unlike moral autonomy, personal autonomy was neutral 
amongst moral theories. Moreover, personal autonomy was itself shown to 
be a prerequisite of moral agency. Kant, for example, equated moral 
autonomy with acting morally, but some notion of autonomy must also 
tnlderpin inmoral behaviour, and our account of personal autonomy is 
shown to fulfil this criterion. Having established that personal 
autonomy is more fundamental than moral autonomy, we then turned to an 
examination of the nature of the relationship that might be thought to 
exist between autonomous persons and their environment. This took the 
form of a critical appraisal of Joseph Raz's account of the relationship 
between autonomous persons and 'social forms' as set out in his '!be 
It>rality of Freedan. Although flawed in a number of ways, Raz' s accotnlt 
of 'social forms' nevertheless serves to demonstrate that autonomous 
persons must be understood in relation to a social context, since it is 
this social context that is partly constitutive of their autonomy (for 
example, it may shape the choices they have). This indicates that the 
account of personal autonomy developed by us can avoid the accusations 
of individualism that are sometimes levelled at liberal theories because 
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it has a social element to it. One 0 bl poSS1 e advantage of emphasising the 
social nature of personal autonomy in this way 10 s th tOt 0 
a 1 more eas1lv 
lends itself to the task of providing a substantive or 0 0 0 0 gan1Zlng prlnc1ple 
for social policy (against, for instance, the formal abstraction of 
Kantian models). In Chapter Three, this possibility was explored in the 
context of a discussion relating autonomy to health, and to health 
policy. 
The argument in favour of contextualisation (and against accusations of 
individualism) was also pursued, in Chapter Three, through a discussion 
of the idea of independence, associated with some libertarian thinkers 
(Wolff, in our case, but Sartre in his pre-marxist phase would do as 
well). Our account of personal autonomy led us to conclude that too high 
a level of independence is untenable, especially in a complex world such 
as ours. There is no reason, for example, to expect autonomous persons 
to display an inordinately high level of independence because autonomous 
persons may choose to define themselves either by their commitments or 
by their submission to authority (or both of these) rather than their 
rejection of these things. Given the costs involved in, say, gathering 
and checking infonnation, it follows that autonomy might be fostered by 
inter-dependence, rather than independence. 
Plant et al claim that freedom from ill-health is one of the conditions 
necessary for moral agency. In Chapter Three we considered whether or 
not there might be some such link between health and our account of 
the personal autonomy. Health-care~ as we noticed at the time, is one of 
largest policy-areas. If our account of personal autonomy is to be 
utilised as an organizing principle for social policy, it would seem to 
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be important to establish two things: first, that health is indeed 
relevant to personal autonomy (this is assumed to be the case by Plant 
et aI's, though they do not attempt to examine the connection) , and 
second, what the nature of the relevance is. In order to establish that 
there is a link, we argued that certain 'intellectualist' accounts of 
autonomy would have to be rejected. This was explored through the notion 
of a 'rational self'. One reason for rejecting some hypotheses of the 
'rational self' is their association with the Kantian notion of moral 
autonomy, already rejected in Chapter One. However, we concentrated 
instead on a legacy, bequeathed to us by the seventeenth century French 
philosopher, Rene Descartes. This philosopher posited two irreconcilable 
facets of persons - mind and body - of which the former is the more 
fundamental of the two. Something of Descartes' project survives in the 
tendency of some accounts of autonomy to posit an 'inner' self, or a 
mental entity, as somehow more 'real' than the physical, or rather the 
embodied self. Our argument demonstrated that personal autonomy must be 
tmderstood as a capacity of the whole person. This was shown to be 
because autonomy is not only about choosing from amongst a set of 
options, but also about implementing one's choice. In order to implement 
one's autonomously chosen objectives, one must express oneself through 
the medium of one's body within a social setting. It is in this context 
that the condition of the body, or health, can be seen to be important 
to autonomous persons. It is on this basis also that health comes within 
the ambit of social policy. 
What remains unclear, however, is the precise nature of the relationship 
between autonomy and health. For example, it seems relatively clear that 
autonomous persons might choose to sacrifice their health for the sake 
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the of some other goal, even to the extent of giving up their lives for 
sake of others, or some cause that they have (autonomously) aligned 
themselves with. The importance of health will therefore be relative to 
the plans or projects that autonomous persons develop or adopt. But if 
this is the case, then a problem arises for the project of utilising 
this accotmt of autonomy as an organizing principle for social policy. 
For example, it is tmclear how one is to utilise autonomy as a guide to 
distributing finite resources amongst a given population. For if health 
is important to autonomous persons in that it affects their ability to 
make and implement autonomous chOices, it follows that different levels 
of health and different kinds of health will be important to different 
people since the plans and pro jects individuals have will be specific to 
them. For example, an athlete will require a high standard of physical 
health in order to achieve his or her objectives, while a person who 
occupies a sedentary and academic post will not necessarily require the 
same standard of physical health. 
Of course, it might be objected that, in terms of health policy, the 
point is not to foist athletic fitness upon everybody, but simply to 
cater for a basic standard of health. Yet even the notion of a basic 
standard of health is problematic from the point of view of autonomy 
because it is tnlclear what level of autonomy is to be aimed at by health 
policy. Few people, if any, lack all opportunity to make and implemen t 
autonomous choices (if they did, they would hardly qualify as persons at 
all) so that even the most apparently unhealthy of persons might be in a 
position to make some autonomous choices. There is also no clear 
. done's relationship between the standard of health one enJoys an 
. ht for example be in peak 
capaci ty to exercise one's autonomy. One m1g , ' 
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physical condition but be unable to read, appreciate music, write, and 
so on, so that one's options are considerably narro than 
wer those of a 
person less physically fit, but literate One might al be 
• so superbly 
fit, but as a consequence of being brainwashed into believing that one 
'wants' to be an athlete. These last two examples, of course, represent 
(respectively) ignorance and arbitrary exercises of nnTJor and th 
t""'....... ese, 
alongside ill-health, are taken by Plant et al to be conditions tmder 
which autonomy is curtailed. It may be that, in fOCUSSing in this thesis 
on only one of the conditions (health) said to be necessary for 
autonomy, we present an unreasonably distorted picture of the 
relationship between autonomy and social policy. It may be that a more 
integrated social policy (one, that is, that takes account of the other 
'basic conditions' identified by Plant et a1) would be required in order 
adequately to foster autonomy. 
The idea of a standard of health is problematic for another reason. For 
as one's health either improves or deteriorates, one might re-assess 
one's plans and projects in the light of one's present condition. 
Alterations in the standard of one's health might also raise (or lower) 
one's expectations, so that what might have been thought an adequate 
standard of health at some earlier point might become inadequate at s~ 
later point. This itself might pose a serious problem for the project of 
utilising personal autonomy as an organizing principle for social 
policy. The problem is that if the point of social policy is taken to be 
that of securing the conditions for autonomy, and the nature of autonomy 
is as described in Chapters Two and TIrree, then it is unclear - without 
some external argument - as to where governmental responsibility for 
health begins and ends. Given the reasonable assumption that resources 
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would be finite, the external argument would have to establish reasons 
for denying health care to some who appear as autonomous 
, persons, to 
require it, while giving it to others. The external argtmlent would also 
have to establish where the 'cut-off' point is to be drawn for the 
allocation of resources to any individual. A hip-replacement for an old 
person might improve his or her ability to implement autonomous chOices, 
but then so might access to all available means for imprOving heal th, 
including the latest technological innovations (drugs, machines, and so 
on) as well as clear, unlimited access to medical professionals such as 
one's General Practitioner. But unlimited access to health care is 
impractical. In a world of limited resources, one person's tmlimited 
access might well be at the expense of another person's. This suggests 
that utilising autonomy (at least as we have understood it) as an 
organising principle for social policy will be unsatisfactory for the 
same reasons that need and liberty were seen to be unsatisfactory. All 
of these - need, liberty and autonomy - may provide important objectives 
for social policy, but none of them seems to be especially foundational 
since they all must make reference to some further argument in order to 
set priorities. If the account of autonomy that is to be adopted is the 
one set out in Chapters One to Three above (and our argument contended 
that it must be), then serious doubts must be expressed concerning the 
practical use of this account as an organizing principle for social 
policy. We remarked in the Introduction to this thesis (pp.12-13) that 
the project of utilising the reflexive argument in order to establish 
the priority of autonomy over other objectives was open to criticism 
°d tOf1°ed a potentially from a number of perspectives. But we have now 1 en 1 
fatal difficulty for this project Which is internal to the argument 
itself. 
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In Chapters Four and Five, however, we continued the project of 
exploring the accotmt of personal autonomy developed in the previous 
three chapters. Chapter four focussed On the concept of 'medi l' . 
ca lzatl.on' 
the relevance of which to our argument consists in the claim that 
engaging with the medical profession in pur sui t of heal th can have a 
~stematically debilitating effect upon one's capacity for autonomy. 
Three versions of this argument were identified and explored in turn. 
The first considered medicalization to be a by-product of the medical 
profession's self-interest. This was seen largely to manifest itself in 
a concern on the part of the medical profession to defend its scientific 
status against those medical practices that do not fall within the 
parameters set by the medical profession itself. It also manifests 
itself in a concern to opt (more often than not) for SCientific, 
teChnological solutions to health problems. This was in part a function 
(as we saw in Chapter Five, section iv) of the medical profession's 
adherence to the individually focussed 'medical model' of disease-
causality. Because their attention is focussed narrowly on individual 
patients, doctors (or so the argument goes) fail to see that ill-health 
can be a result of environment factors, as nruch as of pathogens within 
the patient's body. However, a number of considerations tell against 
this account of the medicalization thesis. First of all, having 
established that health is a condition of autonomy, it follows that in 
successfully restoring a person to health the medical profession will 
have had a positive effect upon the autonomy of that person. If, as we 
have argued, ill-health thwarts one's attempt to implement one's 
autonomously-chosen projects then the restoration of health will remo\re 
the impediment to this. This is not to deny that individual members of 
h (f . ty of reasons) have a t e profession might, on occasion and or a varl.e , 
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detrimental effect upon the health (and hence t ) 
au onemy of individual 
patients. But the medica1ization thesis, in its claim that such an 
effect is systematic, seems too strong. 
'The second accotmt of medica1ization is also seen to fail for the same 
reasons. This views medica1ization, not as a product of professional 
self-interest, but as the result of a social process of which the 
medical profession is but a part. Two aCCOtmts of this were considered. 
The first of these focussed on Ivan Illich's claims concerning the 
'professiona1ization' of modern life; the second focussed on Vicente 
Navarro's marxist accotmt of medica1ization. If we take Illich merely to 
be stating that life in modern industrial is so complex that we are 
forced to rely on specialists ('professionals' in Illich's language) for 
a great many of the services we require, then his theory is relatively 
uninteresting, since this is obviously true. Illich, however, does not 
stop there, but goes on to argue that reliance upon specialists 
undermines our capacity for autonomy. In the field of medicine and 
health-care, I11ich' s argument (developed in his Limits to Medicine) is 
that in taking over responsibility for health, the medical professional 
systematically robs individuals of their capacity for autonomy. The 
problem is that I11ich' s tmderstanding of what it is to be autonomous 
rests on an assumption of independence, and this (as we demonstrated in 
Chapter Three, section iii) is tmtenab1e. It is by no means clear that 
autonomy would be enhanced if persons had to rely solely on their own 
resources, and, in a complex society, to attempt to do so could have the 
effect of seriously compromising autonomy. The resources of autonomous 
persons are inevi tab1 y limited, and there is no reason why they should 
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not therefore adopt strategies for overcoming such ll.IIU· .tat. 
1ons, even to 
the extent of seeking assistance from people in po . t . f . 
S1 10ns 0 author1ty. 
Navarro's marxist accmmt of medicalization turns not . . 
, surpr1s1ngl y, on 
what he takes to be the needs of capital In one sense f 
• ,0 course, 
Navarro's argument falls outside the scope of this thesis for we have 
sought to locate our argument within a liberal framework (see, for 
example, the distinction made in Chapter Three, section i, pp.l06-114, 
between 'liberal' and 'marxist' traditions). Criticism of Navarro 
therefore involves questioning his marxist asstnnptions. Although, 
strictly speaking, this task is outside the scope of this thesis we 
nevertheless indicated some potential points around which such 
criticisms might be developed. For example, one aspect of Navarro's 
argument is that the medical profession reproduces the class structure 
and ideology of the capitalist SOCiety wi thin which it is embedded. But 
one needs to ask at this point how salient it is (given the way 
'capitalist' society has developed and is developing) to talk of present 
class structures in classic marxist terms. Navarro, for example, pins 
his hopes for de-medicalizing society on the development of a 'working-
class science' and a 'working-class medicine', just as the traditional 
'working-class' appears to be vanishing. 
The third accotmt of medicalization, which sees the medical profession 
as an instrument of social control, was explored through the work of 
Talcott Parsons. Through the concept of the 'sick role', Parsons 
attempts to argue that the primary ftmction of the medical profession, 
in SOCiological terms, is the control of 'deviance', where 'deviance' is 
understood as behaviour likely to destabilise society. For Parsons, 
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social action is a nmction of the roles which govern the behaviour of 
individuals in a social setting. These roles have normat. 1ve power so 
that they generate the values and beliefs that char t. . 
ac er1se a glven 
society. Society is held in equilibrium just so long as individuals 
successfully occupy the roles that the social structure (apparently 
spontaneously) allocates to them. Those Who do not occupy roles, or 
occupy them unsuccessfully, are disruptive to the stability of society. 
Illness, since it prevents individuals from perfOrming the duties that 
their roles require of them, is itself potentially disruptive of the 
social order. The task of the medical profession (which is also its 
social control function) is to legitimise potentially deviant behaviour 
by assisting sick individuals into the role of 'patient'. This generates 
new responsibilities for the potentially deviant (i.e. sick) individual , 
replacing those temporarily suspended as a result of illness. 
From the perspective of autonomy, the central problem of Parsons' 
account of society lies in its apparently deterministic nature. All that 
an individual is would seem to be determined by the role (or roles) he 
or she occupies, and these, it seems, are themselves determined by the 
social structure. The problem for accounts of autonomy is not so nruch 
that the medical profession undennines autonomy, as that the very idea 
of autonomy cannot be made to fit easily within the Parsonian universe. 
Individuals might believe themselves to be autonomous and sane might 
value autonomy very highly indeed, but such beliefs and values would 
themselves be determined by the social structure. We do not extend our 
criticism of Parsons to encompass the free-will/determinism debate - to 
do so would be to step beyond the scope of this thesis - but we do 
conclude that there is little reason to believe that the medical 
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profession has a systematically debilitating effect upon individual 
autonomy, even from the Parsonian perspective1. 
In Chapter Five, we considered one particular aspect of health policy in 
the light of the account of autonomy developed in the first three 
chapters of the thesis. The point of this was to enable us, through a 
study of one area of actual social policy, to consider the kinds of 
implications that might arise for health policy, and for social policy 
generally, of adopting personal autonomy as an organizing principle for 
social policy. The area we chose to explore was preventive health care , 
since this places great emphasis upon the responsibilities that 
individuals might be said to have for their own health. What was of 
interest, therefore, was the kind of individuals that this aspect of 
health policy assumed. In order to facilitate our discussion, we 
examined the series of documents published under the Prevention and 
Health rubric between 1976 and 1981. Through a discussion of the concept 
of prevention, we identified a set of problems that preventive policies 
would encounter, amongst which the difficulty of identifying a 'problem-
state' (i.e. the state of affairs to be prevented). The difficulty here 
resides in the different perspectives from which a state of affairs 
might be viewed - not only, that is, from the public policy perspective, 
but also from the perspective of autonomous persons. For example, one 
thinks of the tendency, still common in an overtly heterosexual social 
setting, to perceive homosexuality as a 'problem' to be dealt with, 
perhaps by psycho-analysis. 'TIle problem for many homosexuals, however, 
is not their sexual preference, but the attitude of many heterosexuals 
to what is, for the former, a fact of their lives. A social policy that 
1. On this point see Introduction to this thesis, p.13, n.18 
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purported to take the autonomy of individuals as its central objective 
might be expected to guard against the imposition of 'objective' 
standards upon autonomous individuals, in heal th, as in other policy 
areas. 
From the point of view of our aCCO'lmt of autonomy, the central feature 
of this campaign that interested us was the use of the 'medical model' 
of disease-causality to underpin the advice offered in the published 
Prevention and Health documents. The 'medical model' holds that disease 
has a single causal factor (a virus, for example) which located in the 
body of an individual. The model assumes that since diseases have a 
single cause, they require specific individual cures. The individual 
then becomes the focus of attempts both to cure disease (once it has 
established itself in the body of that individual) and to prevent it. 
Thus the Prevention and Health campaign focussed closely on the 
responsibility of the individual in aVOiding ill-health. But the medical 
model of disease-causality was, as we saw, open to a number of 
objections. First, in apportioning responsibility for health it also has 
the effect of apportioning blame for ill-health. This might itself have 
pernicious consequences, where health-care resources might conceivably 
be withheld from sick individuals on the grounds that they have only 
themselves to blame. A second objection to the medical model is that it 
perceives individuals only in isolation from their surroundings. If, as 
we argued in Chapter Two (section iii, pp.84-86) our notion of personal 
autonomy underpins the attribution of responsibility to individuals 
(such that if they were not acting autonomously they could neither be 
held responsible for their actions, nor could they be blamed), and this 
is coupled with our argument (in Chapter Three) that autonomous persons 
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must be understood to be partly constituted by (and also partly 
constitutive of) a social environment, then it follows that health 
policy founded upon our account of personal autonomy must take this into 
account. And it follows from this that, since the medical model of 
disease-causality does not do this, it is inadequate as a basis, at 
least of preventive health-care policy, but possibly also of health-care 
policy generally (especially so, given the increasing body of evidence 
that links health to environmental factors). In other words, given our 
account of personal autonomy, it would seem that the social model of 
disease-causality (pp.217-218) ought to provide a more appropriate focus 
for health policy than the medical model. 
* * * * * 
What general conclusions might we draw from the thesis as a whole? There 
seem to us to be two broad conclusions that follow from the arguments 
contained in the work. The first of these concerns the project of 
utilising some account of autonomy as an organizing principle for social 
policy. The second concerns the kinds of policies that might result from 
adopting the account of personal autonomy developed in this thesis. 
The project of utilising autonomy as an organizing principle stems, as 
we saw, from the allegedly evaluative nature of social policy. Autonomy, 
and in particular personal autonomy, was supposed to provide a neutral 
point around which to develop social policy. The account of personal 
autonomy developed in Chapters One to Three fulfilled this criterion, 
but was, of necessity, fairly weak, intended to range over all 
autonomous persons while, as far as possible, avoiding either Kantian 
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abstraction or 'strong' theories of human nature. However, it was still 
necessary to locate our account of autonomy - weak as it may be - in 
relation to a social context. This in turn led us to argue for an 
'embodied' account of autonomy that made health an important attribute 
of autonomy, and (since the point of the account of autonomy was to act 
as an organizing prinCiple for social policy) justified bringing health 
within the ambit of social policy. Thus our intentionally weak account 
of personal autonomy can be said to give rise to a 'strong' conclusion. 
The problem, as we indicated above (p.235), is that in making health a 
condition of autonomy, the project of utilising autonomy as an 
organizing principle seems to be dealt a potentially fatal blow since it 
is difficult to specify, without some external argtmlent, what level of 
health is to be the objective of a social policy bounded by finite 
resources. The fatality might be aVOided, of course, by making more 
explicit than we have done (or have the space to do) the exact nature of 
the relationship between health and autonomy. In particular, some 
attention would have to be paid to the SOCially-constructed aspects of 
health, and of the way in which individual projects and plans come to be 
forged. For even though we have tried to demonstrate the contextual 
nature of autonomy, we have not explored in any detail the relationship 
between the autonomous 'self' and its context. A full understanding of 
health in relation to autonomy might possibly make the level of health 
to be aimed at internal to the account of autonomy. This will have to be 
explored elsewhere. 
In terms of social policy - and given the contextual and 'embodied' 
account of autonomy developed in Chapters Two and Three - it seems clear 
that any social policy that organizes around our account of personal 
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autonomy must pay attention to the way in which individuals relate to 
their environment. Of course, this itself depends upon a greater 
understanding of how autonomous individuals relate to their enviromnent 
(and there are many 'environments' with which they may engage, including 
social, cultural, political and economic). It also suggests, despite 
both the intentional weakness of our account of personal autonomy and 
the fact that our argument has been conducted almost exclusively within 
the confines of liberal political theory, that the implications for the 
construction of social policy might potentially be revolutionary. 
- End-
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